Geurts, Bart (1998) "The Mechanism of Denial," *Language* 74, 274–307.

Givón, Talmy (1978) "Negation in Language: Pragmatics, Function, Ontology," *Syntax and Semantics* vol. 3. ed. by Peter Cole, 69–112, New York: Academic Press.

Horn, Laurence (1985) "Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity," *Language* 61, 121–174.

Horn, Laurence (1989) *A Natural History of Negation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [reprinted by CSLI Publications in 2001[2]].

Imatani, Atsuko (2005) *Understanding Jokes*, BA thesis, Nara Women's University.

Noh, Eun-Ju (2000) *Metarepresentation: A Relevance-Theory Approach*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson (1986, 1995[2]) *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Wilson, Deirdre (1999) "Metarepresentation and Linguistic Communication," *UCL Working Papers* 11, 126–161.

Yoshimura, Akiko (2000) "The Target of Metalinguistic Use of Negation —A Unified Characterization from the Cognitive Processing Point of View —," *Bulletin of the Language Institute of Gakushuuin University*, No. 24, 109–118, Gakushuuin University.

Yoshimura, Akiko (2002) "A Cognitive-Pragmatic Approach to Metalinguistic Negation," *Proceedings of the Sophia Symposium on Negation*, ed. by Yasuhiko Kato, 113–132, Sophia University.

Frank Brisard (ed.), *Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference*

Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2002. x + 475 pp.

Reviewed by Keisuke Koga, Fukuoka University

1.　The book under review is a collection of researches devoted to theoretical extension and cross-linguistic exploration of the notion of grounding, one of the key elements of Cognitive Grammar posited to deal with the "subjective" aspects of grammatical structure. It specifically concerns anchoring entities designated by nouns and clauses to the ground (the speaker's conception of the speech situation, including the speech participants and the immediate circumstances). The operation of grounding indicates how the things and states of affairs (or "processes," in the CG terminology) referred to by nouns and clauses are epistemically related to the speech situation. In terms of grammatical form, grounding appears as determiners and tense/modal expressions, and functionally it turns nouns into nominals

(or noun phrases) and bare clausal conceptions into finite clauses, at least in languages like English.

The book consists of thirteen articles including a detailed introduction by the editor and two papers by R. W. Langacker, the founder of the CG theory. The rest of them, dealing with phenomena from a wide range of languages such as Finnish, French, Yucatec Maya, Spanish, Polish, German, and Dutch, as well as English, are divided into two groups, the first of which mainly concerns nominal grounding and the second of which takes up issues regarding clausal grounding. Each of the papers will be taken up for review below.

2.   Deixis is a concept similar to grounding, in that they both make reference to some facet of the speech situation, but deixis includes such non-grounding, lexical items as *now* and *yesterday*, as well as grammatical elements like tense marking. How these two concepts should be distinguished is the theme of Langacker's first paper "Deixis and subjectivity," a revised version of his earlier paper in 1993. Grounding elements are deictic in nature, he says, but not every deictic expression has a grounding function. The difference, according to him, lies in whether the element is "criterial to the formation of a nominal or a finite clause" (p. 8). For instance, a word like *yesterday* is deictic since it refers to a certain day in relation to the day in which the ground resides, but it is not a (clausal) grounding expression because it does not make the clause in which it appears (e.g. *It arrived yesterday.*) finite, as opposed to the past tense inflection. Langacker thinks that true grounding elements are grammatical rather than lexical in nature because what they profile is not the grounding relations themselves but the entities to be grounded by them. Grounding expressions therefore should be highly schematic in their profile and conceptually dependent on what they ground, in terms of their specific semantic content.

One thing he failed to note here is that deictic but non-grounding expressions like *yesterday* and *now* profile entities that are already grounded in themselves and, in that sense, they are *intrinsically grounded* expressions. *Yesterday* can serve as a full nominal without any determiner attached to it, as in *Yesterday was pleasant*, because it is already grounded and functionally comparable to ordinary noun phrases like *the day* or *that day*. (The same applies to personal pronouns and proper names, as Langacker himself mentions in note 7 (p. 25), and in Langacker (1993: 81 and 148).) When it is used as an adverbial, as in *He arrived yesterday*, it profiles the temporal relation between the day containing the process and the ground, as opposed to the past tense inflection, which in Langacker's view schematically profiles the process itself, evoking the temporal location only in the base.

In his second paper "Remarks on English grounding systems," Langacker examines the parallelisms and differences between nominal and clausal grounding;

particularly at issue is the relationship between their conceptual content and the degree of overt marking. He explains the relationship as motivated by a basic iconicity in which overt grounding marking signals an attempt by the conceptualizer to bring matters under his/her mental control, which emerges in the nominal sphere as the effort to direct attention to a particular instance of a type, out of all the possible candidates, and in the clausal sphere as the effort to "determine where the evolutionary momentum of reality is likely to lead it" (p. 33).

3.   That nominal grounding takes the form of determiners may lead to an impression that its essence boils down to just showing the addressee how to pick out the intended referent and there is nothing more "subjective" involved in it. But R. Epstein ("Grounding, subjectivity and definite descriptions") criticizes that most of the previous work on the definite article, relying on notions like familiarity or unique identifiability, focuses only on such logico-referential aspects of grounding and ignores the fact that there are cases in which the identity of the referent is neither contextually nor physically available to the addressee at the time of speaking. He classifies those cases into three groups which feature, respectively, high prominence in the ensuing discourse, role reference with a value-free interpretation, and shifts to non-canonical viewpoints, and he provides a unified explanation that covers all of them as well as the orthodox cases of unique identifiability. The definite article, according to him, just signals the existence of a low degree (cognitive) access path to the referent of the nominal, and its exact interpretation, including its extra nuances, must be sought through its interaction with contextual factors.

"Interaction, grounding and third-person referential forms" by R. Laury reveals how the ground is subject to dynamic change when observed in the course of conversational discourse, by examining actual usage of third-person nominals (viz. personal pronouns, demonstratives, proper names and kinship terms) in Finnish conversational data. The ground is claimed to be "socio-centric" in the sense that its state in multi-party conversation changes as the discourse progresses, depending on who the speaker is talking to and what he/she is talking about.

"Deictic principles of pronominals, demonstratives, and tenses" by T.A.J.M. Janssen examines the form-meaning correspondences of personal pronouns and demonstratives in several languages including the Japanese *ko-so-a* demonstrative system and accounts for systematic morphological patterns they show, by positing the speaker's "mental field of vision," which he says is divided into distinct regions according to the way they are viewed from the vantage points of the discourse participants (speaker and addressee). He additionally proposes that the tense opposition between present and past can be treated in like manner, i.e. they belong to two different regions in the mental field of vision, instead of just

indicating the difference in temporal distance (proximal vs. distal) per se.

4. Tense and mood are central grammatical categories pertaining to clausal grounding. In an attempt to provide an overall account of the French mood system ("The meaning and distribution of French mood inflections"), M. Achard proposes that the difference between the mood forms lies in the way the designated process is evaluated with respect to reality. According to him, the indicative mood signals that the process is conceptualized as residing in reality. The subjunctive mood shows the process as conceptualized in a local mental space "at the level of basic reality," where "events are directly apprehended, that is to say observed, dreaded, dreamed, imagined ..." (p. 208) and "the mere occurrence of the conceptualized event is being considered" (p. 211). The conditional mood establishes the conceptualized process as an alternative to reality that can only be realized if specific conditions are met. Achard also notes that only the indicative should be considered to incorporate tense because tense is the indication of a temporal location in the reality space and the subjunctive and conditional inflections establish the designated process outside of reality.

A problem with his mood system is the notion (and term) "basic reality" he proposes to account for the difference between the indicative and the subjunctive. He says the mood forms are related to two distinct levels of reality conception, the indicative to "elaborated reality" and the subjunctive to "basic reality." But even with his detailed description of the relation between these two levels of "reality" (pp. 207–209), the term seems misleading and confusing because "basic reality" is not reality at all and not treated as such in his explanation of the subjunctive (e.g. "the subjunctive indicates that the conceptualized event is not considered with respect to reality, but to a specific, more local mental space" (p. 197)). I think the term should be changed to something that indicates or suggests the *epistemically suspended* status of the conceptualized process designated by the subjunctive. As anyone who knows French (and other Romance languages) can see, what the subjunctive does, intuitively, is to refrain from specifying how the conceptualized process is related to reality and leave the job to a higher-order expression such as the matrix clause. Actually, this intuition is exactly what he tried to capture by using the notion of "basic reality," as shown by his own words, "At this level, events are recorded, but their epistemic status is not questioned or assessed" (p. 208).

"The English present" by Frank Brisard proposes an "epistemic" account of the English present tense, in which he claims it shows the designated process as part of the speaker's structural view of the world and thus constitutive of his/her structural knowledge of the world, which he regards as part of the ground. His epistemic (or modal) view of tense, however, is highly speculative (lacking

sufficient factual support) and hardly convincing. He has difficulty explaining why the present tense can designate a phenomenal (not structural) state like *Your keys are on the table* (p. 268). And his idea that the (simple) present tense represents a process in its structural nature and the present progressive, by contrast, represents it as a contingent phenomenon ignores the fact that the *aspectual* distinction between the simple tense form and the progressive form is systematically established throughout all tense forms in English. This systematic aspectual distinction and its interactions with tense are neatly captured in the standard "temporal" explanation explored by Langacker (1991, 1999, and 2001), in which the present tense is considered to indicate that a full instantiation of the designated process coincides with the speech event either in the "actual plane" or in the "virtual plane." It is thus difficult to see how Brisard's epistemic view of tense excels Langacker's account, at least in terms of factual verification and theoretical systematicity.

The imperfect tense in Romance languages is a curious crossroads of tense, aspect, and modality. While in its primary usage it contrasts with the present tense for its past-time reference and with the perfective past tense for its aspectual value, it can refer to a variety of imaginary situations like pretending and counterfactuals. "The French *imparfait*, determiners and grounding" by W. De Mulder and C. Vetters and "The preterit and the imperfect as grounding predications" by A. Doiz-Bienzobas are attempts to provide a cognitive account of this intriguing tense form in French and Spanish respectively, both based on the same idea that the imperfect tense indicates that the designated process is viewed from a viewpoint separate from the actual speech situation.

Specifically, De Mulder and Vetters claim that the *imparfait* signals that the process designated by the clause is to be conceptualized as an "actuality" viewed from a viewpoint other than that of the speaker and this viewpoint ultimately has to be identified via accessible contextual clues. According to them, the notion of "actuality" ("an experience of the events as they unfold themselves" (p. 122)) enables the form to have an imperfective construal of the designated situation, and the separation of the viewpoint from the actual ground gives rise to a variety of modal uses. Additionally, they compare the *imparfait* with the French articles and conclude that it is in some respects comparable to the definite articles (*le, la,* and *les*) in terms of the accessibility of the referent, and to the partitive articles (*du, de la,* and *des*) in terms of its aspectual value because both express continuity of the designated entities.

Doiz-Bienzobas characterizes the preterit and the imperfect, two past tense forms in Spanish that primarily contrast with each other in aspectual terms (perfective vs. imperfective), as grounding expressions that situate the designated process in different sorts of mental space or plane. Specifically, the preterit is

considered to locate a process in the past within the actual plane (or reality space) and has the process construed from the speaker's viewpoint in the ground, creating a sense of detachment between speaker and process. The imperfect, on the other hand, is taken to provide a past viewpoint removed from the ground, thereby creating a sense of pastness in its past imperfective uses; the presence of a viewpoint or conceptualizer removed from the ground enables the imperfect verb form 1) to describe generalized states of affairs or "the way things are in the world" within the structural plane (cf. Langacker 1999: Ch. 8), as reflected in the property readings that arise in many of its uses, and 2) to locate the process in a space different from the speaker's reality space, as exemplified in a variety of *irrealis* cases (e.g. counterfactuals, dreams, pretend games, and wishes). Doiz-Bienzobas also notes that the aspectual, temporal, and discourse-oriented notions often employed in the analysis of the two verbal forms are not fundamental for their characterization and can be explained as byproducts of this analysis.

A related interest in the peculiarity of the imperfective form is shown by A. Kochańska ("A cognitive grammar analysis of Polish nonpast perfectives and imperfectives: How virtual events differ from actual ones"), who analyzes the semantics of the Polish nonpast perfective and imperfective forms in their future-time uses. According to her, while the nonpast perfective simply profiles a future actual event, the profile of the nonpast imperfective, which refers to a current state or ongoing event in its prototypical use, is shifted to "the plane of a virtual document" in the future-time use; the virtual document can be anything that structurally shapes the natural course of events to the future (e.g. plans and schedules) and, thanks to its virtuality, a process in it can be activated at any time as an event temporally co-extensive with the time of speaking. (Though she does not note it, this is similar to the future-time use of the simple present tense in English, which refers to something like fixed future schedules, as in *John leaves tomorrow* and *Christmas falls on Sunday this year.*)

5. As noted earlier, Langacker considers grounding expressions to profile the thing or process they relate to the ground, instead of the grounding relation itself. But this profile configuration cannot be observed directly and can only be obtained through deliberate consideration of its symptomatic features (pp. 11–20). The German modals are considered by Langacker (1990) as non-grounding expressions because they have not acquired the same degree of formal grammaticalization as their English counterparts have; the most noticeable symptom is the fact that, unlike the English modals such as *can*, *may*, and *must*, they have nonfinite forms and require a tense inflection or another auxiliary verb to make the clause finite.

T. Mortelmans, however, proposes a more gradient view on grounding with

respect to how to categorize the German modals, in ""*Wieso sollte ich dich küssen, du hässlicher Mensh?* A study of the German modals *sollen* and *müssen* as 'grounding predications' in interrogatives." She argues that multiple parameters, functional as well as formal, should be considered when we determine the grounding status of a modal and suggests that the *epistemic* German modals can be included in the category of grounding expressions, drawing upon Diewald's (1993; 1999) view that the epistemic uses of the modals and the mood inflections (indicative and conjunctive I & II) should be regarded as having the same function, i.e. attributing a speaker-based factuality value to a state of affairs. She also points out that the epistemic modals generally do not allow nonfinite forms, past-tense inflections, or mood variations. Furthermore, she investigates *root* uses of two of the modals, *sollen* and *müssen*, in interrogative sentences and concludes that they function as grounding expressions in those circumstances.

"Grounding and the system of epistemic expressions in Dutch: A cognitive-functional view" by Jan Nuyts is another attempt to provide an unorthodox view on clausal grounding, based on a non-CG perspective and illustrated with expressions of epistemic modality in Dutch. Nuyts, drawing upon his cognitive pragmatic approach to language developed in Nuyts (1992; 2001), introduces a distinction between two separate levels of conceptualization that he assumes to be at work in linguistic communication: conceptual semantics and linguistic semantics. The former is a level of pre-linguistic conceptions that can be coded in multiple, alternative ways at the latter level, just like the case in which the same basic event conception can be expressed in the active or passive voice.

Based on this distinction, Nuyts proposes to reinterpret grounding as a notion that pertains to the level of conceptual semantics, a view that leads to the idea that the same (pre-linguistic) grounding conception can be coded in grammatically divergent ways. Thus, according to him, expressions of epistemic modality ("epistemic qualification" in his terms) like *waarschijnlijk* ("probable / probably": modal adjective / adverb), *ik denk* ("I think": mental state predicate), and *kunnen* ("can": modal auxiliary) are conceptually equivalent in that they all work to signal epistemic qualification (i.e. how much and in what way the speaker is committed to the truth of a state of affairs denoted by the (complement) clause) but they arise in different linguistic realizations due to their functional divergence in such pragmatic dimensions as the performativity vs. descriptivity of the epistemic qualification, the subjectivtivity vs. intersujectivity of the epistemic qualification, the informational status of the epistemic qualification, and interaction strategy.

Although his radically different conception of grounding obviously does not fit in well with the current CG framework, there is no doubt that it poses the interesting question of how to deal with the sense of epistemic modality shown by such "non-grounding" expressions as modal adverbs and first-person mental state

predicates.

6. The papers reviewed above show insightful discussions of grounding phenomena with analyses of wide-ranging cross-linguistic data and interesting divergences from Langacker's standard ideas in a number of respects. This shows how useful this book will be for those who investigate subjective or deictic aspects of grammar like definiteness, tense, and modality, even with non-CG perspectives. The book also demonstrates how Cognitive Grammar can incorporate the theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994) effectively and fruitfully in its expanded research applications.

The typos I have noticed are as follows:
   p. 221, line 29: reminder → remainder
   p. 264, line 25: relevant → irrelevant
   p. 384, line 3: it [is] this virtual occurrence

References

Diewald, Gabriele (1993) "Zur Grammatikalisierung der Modalverben im Deutschen," *Zeitschrift für Schprachwissenschaft* 12: 218–234.

—— (1999) *Die Modalverben im Deutschen: Grammatikalisierung und Polyfunktionalität.* Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Fauconnier, Gilles (1994) *Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Langacker, Ronald W (1990) *Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar.* Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gryuter.

—— (1991) *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar,* Volume 2: *Descriptive Application.* Stanford, California.: Stanford University Press.

—— (1999) *Grammar and Conceptualization.* Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gryuter.

—— (2001) "The English Present Tense," *English Language and Linguistics* 5: 251–272.

Nuyts, Jan (1992) *Aspects of Cognitive-Pragmatic Theory of Language.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

—— (1992) *Epistemic Modality, Language and Conceptualization.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.