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- RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
30. An excellent account of Colonel Ellis' work can be found in: J. J. Reber, "Pete Ellis: Amphibious Warfare Profit", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1977.
31. A complete account of Ellis' Micronesian mission can be found in: Dirk A. Ballendorf, "Earl Hancock Ellis: The Man and His Mission", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1983.
32. An excellent account of the censorship activities can be found in: Patrick W. Giese, U.S. Naval Intelligence Gathering Activities in the Japanese Controlled Islands of Micronesia", (unpublished masters thesis), 1983, University of Guam.
33. A great deal has been written about the Earhart case. A definitive and conclusive work is: Dick Strippel, Amelia Earhart, New York, Exposition Press, 1968.
- 34-35. Thomas Wild, "How Japan Fortified the Mandates", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 1955.
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Fiji's New Cabinet Members

Last January, the Prime Minister of Fiji has announced a reshuffle of the Cabinet of the Government of Fiji. The new Cabinet took effect on 1 February, 1984 are as follows:-

Prime Minister and Minister for Fijian Affairs, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Ratu David Toganivalu.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tourism and Civil Aviation, Mr. Jonate Mavoia.

Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, Mr. Mohammed Ramzan.

Minister for Housing and Urban Affairs, Mr. Edward Beddoes.

Minister for Communications, Transport and Works, Mr. Semesa Sikivou.

Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Militoni Leweniqila.

Attorney-General, Mr. Manikam Pillai.

Minister of Finance, Mr. Mosese Qionibaravi.

Minister for Education, Dr. Ahmad Ali.

Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Dr. Apenisa Kuruisaqila.

Minister for Lands, Energy and Mineral Resources, Mr. Jone Naisara.

Minister for Primary Industries, Mr. Charles Walker.

Minister of State for Co-operatives (responsible to the Minister for Primary Industries) Mr. Livai Nasilivata.

Minister of State for Forests (responsible to the Minister for Primary Industries), Ratu Josaia Tavaiaqila.

Minister of State for Rural Development (responsible to the Minister for Fijian Affairs), Mr. Apisai Tora.

12. Gertrude C. Hornbostel, Personal Correspondence, 19 November 1968. This correspondence is now located in Ellis Collection, MARC Collection, University of Guam.
13. "Memo: Pickens to Chief of Staff", 3 February 1916, RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C.
14. "General Orders, A.G. Army to Engineers, Hawaii", n.d., P.D. 127-4, RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
15. "Memo . . . , 3 February 1916, RG-38.
16. As early as 1903 the United States recognized the potential threat of Japan when, in that year, the Joint Army-Navy Board first considered a defense of the Philippines; see: Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy", *Pacific Historical Review*, XXXV, 3 September 1968, pp. 234-57. As time went on the concern mounted and war plans were drawn and continually revised.
- 17-19. The decisions to fortify Guam were never taken on the part of the United States. By the time Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1935, American military planners had concluded that Guam could not be adequately defended no matter how great it would be fortified. See: Gerald E. Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor*, University of Missouri Press, 1968.
20. American efforts at deciphering codes began early and continued throughout WWII to the great advantage of the Americans. The breaking of Japanese codes early on enabled an advantageous American negotiating position with the Japanese at the Washington Naval Conference of 1922; see: David Kahn, *The Codebreakers*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1967.
21. "Memo . . . , 3 February 1916, RG-38.
22. "Attache Reports", 27 May 1920, RG-38, citing *Nichinichi*, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
23. See Hatanaka for an explanation of the various periods of Japanese administration of the Mandates.
24. Testimonies of Saipanese remembering Hornbostel, 1968, Ellis Collection, MARC Collections, University of Guam.
25. "Modern Military History", RG-45, Correspondence from agents, 1920-29, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
26. "Letter From DIRNAVINTTEL to COMNAVGUAM", 1 September 1920, RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.; also see: Dirk A. Ballendorf, "The Use of Scientists and Scientific Information in American Spying on the Japanese Mandates", (unpublished monograph), 1983, MARC Collections, University of Guam.
27. "Recollections of an Interview with Dr. William Hobbs by Peter Hill in 1968", Ellis Collection, MARC Collections, University of Guam.
28. "Intelligence Work in the Islands of the Pacific", 3 October 1920, 21067-3, RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. An agreement signed by Perry and the Okinawans at Naha in 1854 provided for an unmolested burial ground for U.S. citizens at Tomari, Okinawa.
29. "ONI Cable", 14 October 1920, 21067-3,

and numerous roads and railways on more than 61 islands in Micronesia. Five submarine bases were reported to be either under

construction or in existence.³⁵

When the American offensive in the Pacific was launched in 1942-43, it was predicated

upon much good information, which, in the long run, saved many lives, both American and Japanese.

NOTE ON SOURCES

At the National Archives in Washington, D.C., Record Group 38 has documents from the Chief of Naval Operations, including reports from the Office of Naval Intelligence. Record Group 45 also contains correspondence from agents and intelligence reports. At the Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam, the MARC

Collections, contain a special Ellis Collection in which are found testimonies relating to intelligence operations and also testimonies of Micronesians who personally remember Colonel Ellis and Hans G. Hornbostel. Also, in the MARC Collections, is correspondence between Dirk A. Ballendorf and Mrs. Gertrude C. Hornbostel.

NOTE

1. This paper was presented in a seminar at the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 9 November 1983.
2. Dirk A Ballendorf, "Japanese Bastions in the Pacific", *Micronesian Reporter*, 1st Quarter, 1972, XX, No. 1.; "The Confidential Micronesian Reporter", *Micronesian Reporter*, 3rd Quarter 1973, XXI, No. 3.; "The Micronesian Ellis Mystery", *The Guam Recorder*, Vol. 4, No. 4., 1975; "Getting Behind the Coral Curtain: The Beginnings of American and Japanese Intelligence Gathering Activities in the Pacific", *Micronesian Reporter*, 3rd Quarter, 1978, XXVI, No. 1.; "Earl Hancock Ellis. The Man and His Mission", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1983.
3. Hatanaka Sachiko, "Micronesia Under the Japanese Mandate", *A Bibliography of Micronesia Compiled From Japanese Publications, 1914-1945*, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, 1977. The introduction to this volume provides an excellent and brief overview of the Japanese administration in Micronesia.
4. "Memorandum From Director of Naval Intelligence to Governor of Guam on Intelligence Work in the Islands of the Pacific", 15 September 1917, Record Group 38 (RG-38), 21067-3, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
5. Clifton Kroll to Governor Roy C. Smith, 25 November 1916, Correspondence, Atkins Kroll Papers, MARC Collections, University of Guam.
6. ONI/SFO, "Memo of Japanese Commercial Control in the South Pacific", 24 July 1918, RG-38, c-10-a 4669, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
7. "Memorandum . . . , RG-38, 21067-3.
- 8-9. "Naval Attache Report No. 303. Marshall and Caroline Islands", 29 April 1920, RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
- 10-11. "Naval Attache Reports", 23 June 1920, RG-38, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

on short trips to some of the islands in both the Ralik and Ratak Chains.

From Jaluit he went to Kosrae where he was the guest of Arthur Herrman and his associates, who had been providing information to ONI for several years, and who disliked the Japanese intensely.

Finally, in April 1923, Ellis landed at Koror, Palau, where he planned to reconnoiter thoroughly before proceeding southward to the Celebes. However, he took sick again; this time quite severely. While in Koror, Ellis lived with the high chief, Ibedul William Gibbons, and so he was well-cared for by the Palauans while ill.

The Japanese became concerned over his failing health, and wired American authorities in Tokyo. But it was too late for anyone to help. On 12 May 1923, Ellis died of alcoholism. His notes and personal effects were confiscated by the Japanese and never recovered. Any information Ellis may have gained on his mission was lost.³¹

The American intelligence gathering activities continued after Ellis' death throughout the 1920s. By 1930 the craft of the U.S. operations in spying had become routinized. Monthly monographs were prepared, radio-intercept patterns were employed against the shipping and field island stations, and the mails continued to be regularly

censored.³²

By 1935, after Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations, war planners on both sides of the Pacific could see that conflict was inevitable, and each nation girded for the unfortunate and costly war which was to come.

In 1937, Amelia Earhart, the famous American aviatrix, was lost in the Pacific on a circum-navigational flight between Lae, New Guinea and Howland Island.

Speculation that she was on a secret spying mission for ONI has never been proven. Ostensibly, she was supposed to have detoured from her flight plan while piloting her very fast Lockheed Electra, to overfly Truk in order to assess the naval build-up and facilities there. Following this deviation, she was supposed to have returned to her original flight plan, and proceed to Howland Island for a landing. But, before sighting Howland, she was supposed to have either crashed or have been forced down by Japanese planes, and taken to the Marshall Islands, and then on to Saipan, where she was imprisoned along with her navigator, Fred Noonan. After a long and painful incarceration, she and Noonan died or were killed.

There is no good evidence to suggest that any of this actually happened. Special investigations

which were carried out at the time and after WWII, turned up nothing to indicate that she was on a spy mission or that she had been captured, imprisoned, and later killed by the Japanese. Although the adventurous minds will probably always seize upon the loose ends of the Earhart case, the evidence strongly points to her being lost at sea during her promotional tour.³³

The question can be reasonably asked: what was gained from all this intelligence-gathering activity? From the point of view of discovering actual fortifications, the answer is: not anything. The Japanese did not even plan military fortifications until after 1935, and defensive fortifications did not begin until after the outbreak of hostilities.³⁴

But, from the point of view of gaining valuable knowledge upon which to mount an offensive campaign after the start of the war, the efforts were most worthwhile. By the time Pearl Harbor came, the American military authorities had the best information available on the facilities which the Japanese had constructed in Micronesia.

ONI had compiled a series of monographs on the Japanese Mandates which documented more than 33 anchorages and harbors, 7 airstrips, 9 seaplane bases, 17 radio stations, more than 23 potential fortifications,

small college in Hawaii, had published a journal article about some studies he had made some years earlier at Okinawa. In the article he mentioned that he had rediscovered the graves of five American seamen who had been with Commodore Perry on his first expedition to the islands in 1853.

Seizing upon this, ONI asked the State Department to send a note to the American ambassador in Tokyo instructing him to decorate the grave of the first Japanese envoy to the United States, Murakami Yoshihiro. The State Department complied with the request, and the ambassador decorated the grave. The Japanese press covered the event with enthusiasm and appreciation. Thus, the first part of ONI's plan was successful.

Some months later, ONI made another request of the State Department. This time they asked them to request the Japanese Foreign Ministry to grant the U.S. Navy permission to pay a port call at Naha, Okinawa, for the purpose of consecrating the graves of the five American sailors who had died on the Perry expedition.²⁸ The Japanese could hardly refuse since the Americans had been so nice about decorating Murakami's grave some months before. ONI was confident that the request would be granted since the Japanese had great respect and remembrance of the

dead. The request was in fact granted.

On 14 October 1920, ONI sent a cable to Asiatic Squadron Headquarters in Hawaii, informing them that the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs had "granted permission to visit the Loo Choo Islands for the purpose of reclaiming the graves of Commodore Perry's men at Naha." The cable further instructed headquarters to "designate the vessel and make the necessary preliminary arrangements."²⁹ The Japanese, however, apparently recognized the ulterior motives of the Americans, and did not grant permission for the U.S. ship to stop at ports in Micronesia enroute to Naha from Honolulu.

The case of Marine Colonel, Earl Hancock Ellis, is the most famous one of early U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts. Ellis was a prophetic war planner and naval strategist.³⁰ As mentioned earlier, he had served on Guam in 1914-1915, and had prepared a plan for the defense of the island.

Later, in 1921 and 1922, he was stationed in Washington at Marine Headquarters and prepared a 30,000 word report entitled, Advance Base Operations in Micronesia. This paper, which was accepted by Marine Corps Commandant, Major General John Archer Lejeune as an operations plan of contin-

gency,, outlined, in a step-by-step manner, an American advance across the central Pacific.

With this work completed, Colonel Ellis sought to go to Micronesia personally in order to refine the plan, and to actually see the advance base sites which he had described in the report. He started on his mission in the fall of 1922, and went first to Australia. From there he shipped aboard some small steamers to visit islands in the south Pacific. Returning to Australia, he proceeded to the Philippines, and then to Japan, where he planned to embark for Micronesia.

But Ellis had great physical difficulties. An alcoholic, he was taken sick at nearly every stop along the way. By the time he reached Japan, and after a stint in the U.S. Naval hospital at Yokohama, he was ordered home by the military authorities there. But, instead of following orders to return home, he bolted for the Mandates and was reported absent without leave.

Ellis made his way to the Marshall Islands aboard a steamship of the NBK Lines. At Jaluit he became so ill that he had to be hospitalized again, and spent several months recuperating. He was finally nursed back to health by an American Protestant missionary, Jesse Rebecca Hoppin. But, while in the Marshalls, he managed to travel

When WWI ended, the Japanese gained control of Micronesia according to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The United States, however, refused to recognize the claim unless the islands were mandated through the League of Nations. Such an arrangement would ensure a civilian administration. In 1920, the Japanese acted toward this end by establishing a civilian authority under the military on an interim basis. They announced their intentions in May 1920, in their English language newspaper, *Nichinichi*:

*The islands in the South Seas, at present under the military administration of our Navy Department, will at length have an office for their administration opened. The provisional military administration will be abolished, and a purely civil regime instituted.*²²

This was implemented on schedule, and ultimately, in 1922, the interim civil administration was ended and a permanent one, the Nanyo-Chō, was established.²³ The establishment of this civilian authority, however, did not diminish the American efforts at gathering intelligence information.

Hans G. Hornbostel, a former Marine who had assisted Ellis in the preparation of the report, A Military Reconnaissance of the Island of Guam in 1915, returned to Guam in the early 1920s to become a collector of

information and artifacts for the Bernice P. Bishop Museum in Honolulu. He became a regular informant for ONI and one of the most important intelligence gatherers in the northern Mariana Islands. Under his excellent cover as a collector for the Bishop Museum, he made three trips to Saipan, Tinian, and Rota between 1924 and 1926 where he carried on archaeological excavations and obtained many artifacts.

He had the cautious cooperation of the Japanese authorities at Saipan. Saipanese, reminiscing in the late 1960s, recalled that the Japanese watched Hornbostel closely during his visits.²⁴ Apparently, they even caught on to the real purpose of his activities enough to expect the Americans at Guam to reciprocate the chance for observations.

A 1925 cable from the U.S. Naval Headquarters at Guam to the Secretary of the Navy in Washington, refers to a letter sent to Guam from the Japanese hospital at Saipan requesting that a physician, Kurimoto, Matagoro, be granted permission to visit Guam "to study American methods in combating tropical sickness." The cable went on to state naval headquarters had "no local objections" to Dr. Kurimoto's visit, and further that "Mr. Hornbostel. . . had just returned from Saipan and Rota."²⁵

American scientists were also used by ONI as informants in the 1920s.²⁶ In 1923 an American geology professor from Michigan State University, William Hobbs, was granted permission to study coral formations in the islands of Micronesia. He traveled widely throughout the Carolines, and in addition to his scientific work, gathered intelligence information. He remembered that the Japanese were not always very cooperative. Of a visit he made to Palau, he remarked, "they (the Japanese) had us go into the channel (by small boat) against the sun, and I think they wanted us to crack up!"²⁷

One of the more interesting American intelligence-gathering ventures of the period involved the calling of U.S. ships on Japanese ports during WWI. The Americans were eager to send some vessels into Japanese-controlled waters. Not only was Micronesia a point of interest, but so were the Ryuku Islands.

Then known as the Loo Choo Islands, no American ship had called upon them since 1906. The Americans wanted to arrange for a call there and to take advantage of this call to stop enroute at some of the islands in Micronesia as well.

A curious scheme was devised to arrange the visit. ONI had noticed that an American anthropology professor at a

pursuant to a number of talks, so in reality it was a series of conferences. The Japanese were persuaded to keep their capital ship tonnage to a 5-5-3 ratio to that of the U.S. and Great Britain. In return the Americans and British agreed not to construct any new fortifications in the western Pacific or Asia. The Americans felt that if Guam were closed as a port, prior to the conference, that their negotiating power with the Japanese would be reduced because of the suspicion such a move might foster.

At one point early in WWI, consideration was given to fortifying Guam. In 1914, a Joint Army-Navy Board group was sent to Guam to study and make plans for "the defense of the island."¹⁴ One of the members of the group was Captain Earl Hancock Ellis, USMC, who later was a spy in Micronesia, and who died mysteriously while on his mission in the Carolines in 1923. In 1915 Ellis submitted a detailed report entitled, A Military Reconnaissance of the Island of Guam, which outlined procedures and tactics for the fortification and defense of the island.

The following year, the Navy estimated that it would cost \$16,150,000 to fit out Guam as a base.¹⁵ There was disagreement, however, in the military ranks, as to the feasibility of

fortifying Guam. Commander Lewis Coxe, USN, felt that "Guam should not be developed until Hawaii is reasonably secure from capture." His remark not only indicated his disagreement with proposals to make Guam a base, but also revealed the thinking in some quarters as to the seriousness of Japan's potential threat to the United States territories in the Pacific.¹⁶

Discussion on the fortification of Guam went on for seven years. During this time the cost estimates for constructing a base went up steadily. One was as high as \$43,000,000. In 1921 Senate Bill S-3091 was introduced, which provided funds to make Guam a base. Captain Edward Coontz, USN, appeared before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs to testify in favor of the bill, but nothing ever came of it in the way of actual appropriations.¹⁷

In January 1923, the U.S. granted permission for a Japanese ship to visit Guam. This was a gesture of openness on the part of the U.S. following the Washington Naval Treaty agreements of the year before. It was clear that the ship would be gathering intelligence, but since no moves had been made to fortify Guam, the permission was granted.¹⁸

No doubt the Japanese wanted to see for themselves that the Americans were making no moves to construct military

fortifications. On 13 March 1923, the Japanese light destroyer, Shiokaze, arrived at Apra Harbor, Guam, commanded by Captain Sato. She remained only for one day, sailing around the island and making appropriate calls ashore. The Americans prepared a full counter-intelligence report on the visit, and the Japanese were undoubtedly satisfied that Guam was not about to become a large base with fortifications.¹⁹

In spite of the fact that the mail service was halted between Micronesia and Guam—letters from Saipan to Guam had to go via Tokyo and Hawaii, and vice versa—the Americans pursued their intelligence-gathering by wireless. By 1920 the Americans had cracked some of the Japanese naval codes, and on 27 April 1921, the Chief of Naval Operations provided the Guam Governor with the necessary information and instructions to intercept all Japanese messages.²⁰

Japanese intelligence activity also increased, and American suspicions of Japanese nationals living on Guam were at an all-time high. Even a trusted Japanese, named Ooka, who worked for Atkins Kroll, was investigated because ONI was not sure whether he should be in "an employment in which he has intimate intercourse with Guam matters."²¹

pany, stated that "since the Japanese occupation we have been allowed neither to export or import goods." Herrman contended that the Japanese were trying to "force us out of the islands by refusing to allow us any space on Japanese boats for the importation of supplies or the exportation of goods or products."⁸ Further, Mr. Herrman reported an estimated "100 Japanese naval and government officials in Truk alone." There were also "three large coal piles at Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit." He also stated that "in Truk, a rockwalled chamber, about 100 feet square, has been constructed in the side of a hill, with an iron door and a wooden fence in front."⁹ Table II outlines Herrman's reports.

Mr. Herrman was clearly a valuable informant for ONI in Micronesia, but there were others, sometimes not as reliable but nevertheless present, who made corroborating reports. One such individual was an American marine who deserted his post, and fled, with a Chamorro woman, towards Australia in a small, 40-foot boat. He was soon caught at sea by American authorities near the Carolines, and stated that he had heard reports from the islanders that the Japanese had "guns and carriages in Palau, and that some of the guns were as large as ten inches."¹⁰

Naturally, reports such as

these continued to cause suspicion in American military intelligence ranks, and so observations were not only continued, but increased.

All ships, private and commercial, which passed through the islands and landed on the American west coast or in Hawaii, had their mail opened and scrutinized. Tourists, who were traveling from Australia to America, provided some of the greatest sources of information. Of course, they did not realize at the time that all their letters and postcards to friends and relatives were read by ONI before being forwarded to their destinations. Many Micronesians, particularly Marshallese who were residing in Hawaii, were questioned by American military authorities. All Micronesians who worked for American and British firms, and even those who worked for Japanese firms and who might be able to give information, were either questioned, or had their names placed on lists as potential informants. Informants were also sought in Micronesia.

In August 1920, the Chief of Naval Operations, B. F. Hutchinson, instructed the Guam Governor to "investigate confidentially" whether a certain employee of Atkins Kroll on Guam, and who traveled frequently to Palau on a company trading vessel, was a "desirable person" or not.¹¹

Since Guam was the only American territory within geographic Micronesia, it was of interest to Japanese as well as to American intelligence officers. When WWI began in 1914, there were over 100 Japanese nationals living on Guam, and Japanese trading vessels made regular stops there. American residents at the time recalled that the Japanese population on the island was regarded with suspicion.

One resident of the period who was the daughter of a German businessman and merchant on Guam, remembered that "there were a large number of Japanese agents there. The Governor's cook was one, and there was also a palace gardner, and some merchants."¹² At one point, just after WWI, the concern over Japanese infiltration on Guam was so great on the part of the Navy, that consideration was given to closing the island to all civilians and expelling all foreigners.¹³

The U.S. Department of State, however, did not favor this idea, partly because the Naval Armaments Limitation Treaty talks were coming up with Japan and Great Britain in 1922. This conference, which is known today as the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, actually began in late 1921 and carried through to the following year.

Many agreements were made

on the activities of the Japanese in the neighboring islands was not problematic for the U.S. Navy on Guam.

The German nationals being repatriated, in many instances, passed through Guam on their way out of the mandates, and they freely gave information. The *Cormoran*, a German ship which had been interned by the American authorities at Guam at the outbreak of the U.S./German hostilities in 1918, had aboard some seamen who had kept diaries in which were described some of the Japanese activities they had witnessed

while sailing in Micronesian waters. The businessmen who worked for the Atkins Kroll Company, also provided reports which they had gotten on their recent trips, and also from their employees who were native islanders and who still occasionally traveled among the Marianas group.

Between 1915 and 1919 a great number of reports were made by the U.S. Navy at Guam to ONI in Washington. Twelve of these are summarized in Table I. Although the summarization of the reports does not point up

any overt military installations by the Japanese, it does indicate sufficient development activity which could have military ramifications. The ONI, therefore, decided to continue its surveillance, and in the following years gained a good deal of information of a similar nature.

During this period there was an American company operating at Kosrae (Kusaie) called the J.V. Milander Company. They were almost forced out of business by the Japanese, who refused to grant them permission to ship copra. Mr. Arthur V. Herrman, manager of the com-

TABLE II: Reports of Japanese Activities in the Mandated Islands by Arthur V. Herrman Before 1920 ^a

Island Group	Activities
Marshalls	100 Marines present; one gunboat; radios present; 75,000 tons of coal.
Truk	100 Japanese officials present; construction of a rockwall chamber in the side of a hill of 100 square feet.
Palau	Admiralty headquarters established there from Truk; presence of gunboat, radios, and coal piles.
Ponape	Presence of Marines, radios, coal piles; Langor island is closed to natives.
Kosrae	Presence of 100 Koreans as laborers; one gunboat; some Japanese marines.
Yap	Presence of gunboat and radios.
Saipan	Presence of livestock; radios, and gunboats; large Japanese build-up.

^aU.S. National Archives, RG-38, Intelligence memos, 1915-1920, Washington, D.C.

Marshall Islands in 1917.⁶

These conditions resulted in the Americans deciding to place the Japanese controlled islands under a preliminary surveillance,

and in 1917 the Guam Governor was instructed by the Director of Naval Intelligence to "submit to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) any information of

interest in regard to activities of Japanese subjects. . . occurrences political and commercial, that may take place in the adjacent islands."⁷ Getting testimonies

TABLE I: Abbreviated ONI Reports on Japanese Activities in Micronesia, 1915 to 1919^a

Date/Place	Source	Japanese Activities Reported
2 January 1915, Truk	German diary	German nationals being expelled; Truk fitted-out as a naval base.
8 August 1916, Saipan, Yap, Palau	Atkins Kroll Co., Guam	Denial of trade and commerce; presence of radios.
14 December 1916, Marshall Islands	U.S. Army officer in Gilbert Islands	H.M.S. Mawatta refused entrance at Jaluit Harbor; all British and Australian ships expelled.
18 July 1917, Saipan	Atkins Kroll Co., Guam	Harrassment of traders; all commerce being discouraged.
6 May 1918, Jaluit, Truk	Atkins Kroll Co., Guam	Development of docks and warehouses.
8 July 1918, Marshalls	Atkins Kroll Co., Guam	Military activity at Jaluit by Japanese is suspected.
24 July 1918, Marshalls	Burns Philp Co., Aust.	Naval build up by the Japanese at Jaluit atoll.
3 September 1918, Jaluit	Atkins Kroll Co., Guam	Trading is discouraged; maybe Jaluit is fortified.
11 November 1918, Truk	German missionary, China	Dry docks and coal piles exist at Truk.
12 November 1918, Truk	German missionary, China	Substantiates the above report from another palce in China.
9 July 1919, Marshalls	Boston Missionary Society	Mail being censored by the Japanese authorities.
27 September 1919, Marshalls, Carolines, Mariana Islands	German Catholic priests	Powerful radios are present; small Japanese military forces; German government buildings are being used by the Japanese.

^aU.S. National Archives, RG-38, various reports, 1915 to 1919, Washington, D.C.

SPYING BEHIND THE CORAL CORTAIN : A PARTIAL VIEW OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE IN THE JAPANESE LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES OF MICRONESIA¹

by

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This most fascinating subject has captivated my attention for a number of years, and I have written about it before.² I must, at the outset, however, disclaim any suggestions that I am an expert on the subject.

Intelligence gathering, by its very nature, is confidential; no one person knows all the parts of any particular operation. Certainly, one as large and as comprehensive as I am commenting upon here, would be out of the purview of understanding of even a whole group of scholars. I have more than an average acquaintance as a result of my studies, researches, and teaching, but still I cannot account for the whole story. As interesting as some may find the following discourse, I emphasize that it is only a partial view.

After the Japanese seizure of the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands from the Germans in October 1914, the Imperial Navy closed them to

access by the outside world. Immediately, the Japanese squadron commander established military headquarters at Truk, and divided the islands into six administrative units: Saipan, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit. Naval governors were placed in charge of each district³. Systematically, the German nationals who resided in the islands were repatriated.

American authorities at Guam were concerned for several reasons. First, there was a high volume of small ship traffic between Guam and the northern Marianas on the part of the local people, and this was slowed down. Ethnically, the local people were all Chamorros, united by a common language, and many had extended families with members living at various locations throughout the chain. Second, there had been a relatively free and open trade going on under the German administration before WWI, and this was

also slowed down. Finally, the Americans regarded the Japanese take-over of the Micronesian islands as a strategic move which enabled the Imperial Navy to effectively cut-off American supply lines to the Philippines if they chose to do so.

Hence, any military or commercial build-ups in Micronesia were of great interest to the U.S. Navy.

As time passed, the situation failed to change; the islands remained closed. Roger Welles, Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence at the time, described the Japanese policy as "a veil cast over everything."⁴ The American firm of Atkins Kroll on Guam, who carried on a lucrative copra trade in the islands, complained through official channels about the Japanese refusal to grant permission for their ships to carry on commerce in Micronesia.⁵ Similarly, the Australian firm of Burns-Philp complained. They had been refused permission to enter the