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Charles J. Fillmore: *Lectures on Deixis* CSLI Lecture Notes; no. 65

Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1997. v + 145 pp.

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The book under review is based on Santa Cruz Lectures Fillmore (henceforce, F) delivered in the summer of 1971. The first edition was published in 1975 by the Indiana University Linguistics Club. As F himself notes, much has changed during a quarter of a century. This second edition is a fresh reproduction with some referential updates and detailed annotations. The book is presumably directed to the readers who were just being born in the 70's. What is intriguing for an old timer is that these lectures, which were written when Generative Semantics was approaching the peak of its popularity, are reproduced at the bloom of cognitive-functional linguistics, which is in direct line of descent from it.

The book consists of a brief introduction and six lectures. The introduction explains the background and the circumstances of reproduction. The first three lectures take the form of a prolegomena to the specifics of deictic phenomena, while at the same time they are a gently paced exposition of F's core concepts and theoretical standpoint.

The opening lecture is devoted to a thorough examination of a simple English sentence, "May we come in?" The simple interrogative with a modal auxiliary introduces the audience to the basics of two-party discourse of role switching between speaker and addressee as well as the discourse-pragmatics of modal use. F thus acquaints the audience with the general principles of conversation, the logic of questions and answers, and significance of semantic and pragmatic information for the full interpretation of sentences. At the same time, F calls the readers attention to lexical items and grammatical forms which can be interpreted only

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when the sentences in which they occur are understood as being anchored in some social context, that context defined in such a way as to identify the participants in the communication act, their location in space, and the time during which the communication act is performed.

In the course of discussion of individual elements (the modal *may*; the pronoun *we*; the verb *come*; and the preposition *in*), F points out the importance of seeing the ways in which the form and meaning of the sentence constrain its possible use. Among the sentences cited in the course of discussion are such well-known examples as *The farmer kills the duckling* (Sapir: 1921), *The bill is large* (Katz and Fodor: 1963) and *The box is in the pen* (Bar-Hillel: 1960). F notes that the unnaturalness of the first sentence often lends itself to being misquoted as *The farmer killed the duckling*, and that shifting thus the tense of the verb from present to past renders the sentence some level of natural contextualization. The key to the ambiguity of the second and the third sentences is shown to be our knowledge about the universe in sentence interpretation. F argues that for a full linguistic treatment of sentence meanings, a language user would have to have access to encyclopedic information, and that a complete theory of language use would have to incorporate all possible knowledge about the universe.

Also addressed in the first lecture are such issues as different lexicalizations within a language and across languages, i.e. the wide number of ways in which concepts and relations get lexicalized and grammaticalized in the world's languages; and the potential danger of misunderstandings that might come up in crosslinguistic encounters. According to F, because so much of our conception of the world around us has been internalized, we are unaware of how deeply it affects our language and language use.

In his second lecture, F focuses on non-deictic aspects of conception of space which serve to locate objects and events in space, involving those which have some relevance to semantic and pragmatic facts about the vocabulary of natural languages. The discussion centers around the world of dimensionality and orientation in space; and human conception and coding devices of dimensionality properties of the referent.

There is a host of engaging and provocative inquiry into our concepts of dimensionality (simple location/surface/interior) and orientation in space (up/down, front/back, left/right). F notes that there is a basic sense of these terms by which human beings are taught to find left and right on their own bodies, for example, but that there is no way of defining left and right and that these concepts can be learned only by demonstration. F's exposition goes beyond the confines of our daily common sense, demonstrating, for example, that a missile moving in outer space does not have left/right orientation, which is possible if the object in question has both a vertical or up/down orientation and a front/back orientation.

Another example of F's well-informed and thoughtful exposition concerns the spatial notions associated with movement (location, source, goal and path), which is evidently related to his research into case relations. It is also highly likely that many of those findings have inspired research in anthropological linguistics.

The third lecture covers non-deictic conception of time. F begins this lecture by pointing out that unlike space, time is one-dimensional and unidirectional and that temporal notions are frequently based on a movement metaphor. Hence, the human mind tends to think of "the world" as moving through time (as seen in the expression, *in the months ahead*) or "the world" as being constant and time passing by it (as seen in the expression *in the following months*).

Here, too, we find evidence of F's all-round insight into aspects of human conceptions of temporal notions and the rationale for their lexicalization. Among the distinctions made of coding devices is that between *non-calendric* terms (used only for measuring time intervals) and *calendric* terms (used for time periods, having fixed starting points in absolute time), and that between explicitly bounded fixed-length sequences of naturally given time units: (*year, month, week,* etc.) and informal and vague ones with respect to their boundaries, which relate in some way to local "outdoor" changes (*seasons, evening, night,* etc.). The rationale behind such ordinary expressions as, "Why are you calling me in the middle of the *night*? Don't you realize it's three o'clock in the *morning*?" is that we unconsciously make distinctions between lexical items from the day-subdivision cycle which is put in phase with the calendar day and those which are not: the *night* here codes a non-calendric time period and *morning* a calendric one.

In the fourth lecture, F finally concerns himself with deictic space and time expressions. With respect to the definition of deixis, little is actually said but that it is the name given to the formal properties of utterances which are determined by, and which are interpreted by knowing, certain aspects of the communication act in which the utterances in question can play a role (p. 61), which include *person deixis; place deixis; time deixis* (*encoding time* and *decoding time*); *discourse deixis; social deixis.*

In all of its kinds, a deictic element represents a particular observer's point-of-view. "For an expression which in a non-deictic use requires mention of a reference object, in its deictic use the reference object, taken to be the speaker's body at the time of the speech act, simply goes unmentioned." F illustrates how we impute an orientation in space to the reference object by such terms as 'front', 'behind', 'above', 'below', 'left" and 'right'. "The location of the speaker and his outlook on the world can determine the orientation of the objects around him." For instance, what the sentence, "The kitten is *in front of* the tree," means is that the kitten is close to the side of the tree which "faces" the speaker, even though trees do not have front/back orientation of their own.

A variety of cases are examined in which messages can be correctly interpreted only if they are properly anchored in a communication situations. Uncertainties about the nature of this anchoring occur when the identity of the sender and that of the intended receiver, or the time at which the message was encoded is not known. The worst possible case F cites is that of finding afloat in the ocean a bottle containing a note which reads, "Meet me here at noon tomorrow with a stick about this big."

F maintains that a deictic word or expression can be used in one or more of three ways: *gestural, symbolic* and *anaphoric.* The *gestural* use is expected to be accompanied by a gesture or demonstration of some sort (e.g. "*this* finger"), and the interpretation of the *symbolic* use involves certain aspects of the speech communication situation (e.g. "*this* campus"). The anaphoric use of an expression is interpreted as being coreferential with a certain expression in the same discourse (e.g. "I drove the car to the parking lot and left it *there.*"). Unfortunately, F fails to note the fact that the various terms may differ according to whether they can be used gesturally, symbolically, or anaphorically: that it is difficult to think of gestural or anaphoric uses of "now" and "today", for instance. Nevertheless, F's definition and categorization may well serve as a useful first step toward a systematic investigation in this area. In fact, no agreement seems to exist among researchers on the classification of deictic functions today: different brands of definition and categorizations of deictics are found in, e.g., Hanks (1989), Himmelmann (1996), Eschbach (1997), Dirven and Verspoor (1998) and Ariel (1998).

The scope of F's examples is wideranging and intriguing, including such expressions as Russian word *sejchas,* which means both "just now" and "right away," the two separate ways of saying "this morning" in Chinantec (one used during the morning and the other during the rest of the day), and the unique deictic day naming system in Vietnamese, which goes three days ahead and four days back. While the various analyses are of necessity sketchy and perhaps superficial, the discussion is very effective and discerning. In exploring the three-term place deictic systems in Japanese, Spanish and Tagalog, F notes the difficulty of being absolutely clear about the reference to the conversation partners.

The fifth lecture discusses appropriate conditions for deictically anchored English sentences containing the motion verbs "come" and "go." They are lexically not complex 'action verbs', but require reference to all three major types of deixis — person, place and time. F develops arguments in a fair amount of depth, using extensive examples, including those with "bring" and "take," and arrives at a four-part hypothesis.

F's focus in the final lecture concentrates on various aspects of discourse and social deixis, which is in some way an extended concept of deixis. Discourse deixis, according to F, has to do with the choice of lexical or grammatical elements

which indicate or otherwise refer to some portion or aspect of the ongoing discourse, which includes all forms of anaphora and exophora in discourse: i.e. of relations in fact distinguished from deixis proper. The relationship or distinction of deixis and anaphoricity is, however, by no means clear: the label 'anaphoric use of deictic expression' is a typical example of F's nonchalant attitude to this problem.

The notion of social deixis is used to refer to the use of forms which reflect the social status of a speaker in relation either to the addressee or to someone else referred to. Frequent mention of Japanese 'honorifics' is made in this connection, a fact which may well have some relevance to F's initial interest in this field of research. It is regrettable, however, that there is no coverage of the area referred to by R. Lakoff (1974) as 'emotional deixis'.

The book is accompanied by 19 pages of extensive 'selected bibliography,' including the bulk of the works that came out after the publication of the first edition, attesting the substance and range of the deictic considerations addressed in this reproduction.

The broad scope of examples cited throughout the six lectures testifies to F's wide knowledge and cross-linguistic perspective.

The facts found in the languages with different coding systems from English are examined not as curious exotic practices but for the purpose of capturing cross-linguistic similarities and differences. References to various facts about Japanese coding practices are found here and there, e.g. the demonstrative systems, personal pronominals and honorifics, which indicate F's firsthand knowledge of the language.

The whole book is the product of extensive and serious scholarship. It is full of eye-opening descriptions, exciting discoveries and issue raising that relates itself to the later development of innovative methods and theories. F's own review is inserted here and there from the vantage point of a-quarter-of-a-century long expertise. It still preserves the original lecture hall atmosphere. Thus, the emphasis is more on providing basic information on the general phenomena of deixis than on exploring theoretical issues, methodological framework, and the like, with the possible exception of the fifth lecture on "coming" and "going."

This is recommended as a source book for those interested in orienting themselves to issues and phenomena on the grammar-discourse interface. It provides an in-depth introduction to deictic aspects of languages, exploring in turn notions of space, time, movement, the ongoing discourse, and the reflexes in language of the identity of the participants in a conversation and their relationship to each other. The broad scope of examples cited throughout the six lectures testify to the author's wide knowledge and cross-linguistic perspective. Each language-particular detail fits into a coherent larger picture, even though F's style of exposition often

appears to be open-ended.

There are some drawbacks to the book. It offers no conclusion nor subject index. It would also have been preferable for it to have some more discussion of tense, which itself is a deictic category (present, past, or future in relation to the time of speaking). References to 'metaphorical extension' and 'emotional deixis' are altogether missing.

Such quibbles aside, the lectures teach the audience to be sincere, to be down to earth, to give thorough examination of the facts and phenomena, and to be creative in cultivating a new field of research. They serve the crucial role of motivating them to wide research into lexical meanings and grammatical forms, and their relations to the discourse situation. It strongly indicates that an account of language structure must address such issues as how individuals perceive the world, how they make use of their limited cognitive resources and social communicative strategies. F is consistent in taking this approach to a full linguistic treatment of meanings throughout the past quarter of a century, which is evident in his recent work on pragmatic description of discourse (Fillmore: 1998).

Though better known as the founder of case grammar and frame semantics, F must be applauded for his success in whetting our appetite for deixis research. The book is a potential gold mine for linguists as well as learners of English as a foreign or second language.

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Fengh-Hsi Liu: Scope and Specificity

John Benjamins, 1997, viii + 187 pp.

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This book grew out of the Ph.D. dissertation by Liu entitled *Scope Dependency in English and Chinese,* submitted to the University of California at Los Angeles in 1990. This book includes three new chapters i) an overview (Chapter 1), ii) a discussion of recent developments in the treatment of semantic scope in the Minimalist framework (Chapter 7), and iii) concluding remarks (Chapter 8). This is a detailed investigation of quantifier scope interaction, with special reference to English and Chinese languages.

It has been widely assumed since May's (1977) work that quantifier scope can be taken as a syntactic or structural phenomenon, governed by syntactic principles and constraints. May (1977) argues that the ambiguity of (1) can be captured by the application of Quantifier Raising (QR) at the level of Logical Form (LF), which is a partial representation of the meaning of a sentence. Under this analysis, (1) has LF representations as in (2a) and (2b):

(1)   Every man loves some woman.
(2)   a. Every man$_i$ [some woman$_j$ [x$_i$ loves x$_j$]]
      b. Some woman$_j$ [every man$_i$ [x$_i$ loves x$_j$]]

(2a) is an LF representation corresponding to the reading where *every man* has scope over *some woman,* and (2b) is a representation with the reading where *some woman* has scope over *every man.* Thus, under the QR approach to quantifier scope, quantifier scope interaction is characterized as a property of LF representations derived by the application of QR.

In this book Liu criticizes previous analyses, declaring that they examined only a restricted set of quantifiers such as *every* N or *some* N, and claims that in order to capture a linguistically significant generalization of quantifier scope we should study the scope relations among various nominal expressions such as the individual-denoting NPs, the plural NPs, and universally or existentially quantified NPs. This claim results from the observation that quantified expressions do not