

Cross-Cultural Implications Of a Behavioral Response

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CEREMONIES FOR THE WAR DEAD

One tradition long institutionalized in Japan is that of holding ceremonies not only for the war dead but also for all who died a premature death. The spirits of the prematurely dead were regarded as angry at being cut off before their lives could reach fulfillment, and the primary objective of such ceremonies was to mollify, appease or pacify these angry, vengeful spirits.

This tradition is the one followed by the Japanese government after the Meiji Restoration (1868) when it established a particular institution for the veneration of the spirits of those who had fallen during the civil war that preceded the Restoration. Subsequently, the Japanese government engaged in a series of wars: the Sino-Japanese War (1894), the Russo-Japanese War (1904), World War I (1914) and World War II (1941). The spirits of the war dead from these wars were ritually venerated at four types of institutions, as shown in Table 1.

With reference to the third type of institution shown in Table 1, a court case of considerable interest, having to do with the participation of a public official in a ceremony before such a monument, recently took place in M city near Osaka.

In December 1976, M city used city funds to transfer a "monument to the loyal spirits" owned by the local Bereaved Families Association to a city-owned site next to a city-run elementary school. The ceremony known as *ireisai*, or "spirit pacification ritual," was held before this monu-

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ment under the auspices of the Bereaved Families Association in 1976, and again in 1977. Among the participants was the city education commissioner. The city provided free transportation to participants in city-owned buses, elementary school tables and chairs were used in the ceremony, and clerical and other assistance was provided by public servants.

Mrs. K.R. and ten other residents of the city filed suit against the mayor and the education commissioner. The plaintiffs charged that the behavior of the defendants violated the principle of separation between religion and state as provided for in the Constitution (Article 20, Paragraph 3, and Article 89). They demanded that the mayor be required to reimburse the city ¥10,416 (calcu-

Table 1
Institutions for the Veneration of the War Dead

Type	Location	Description
Yasukuni Jinja	Tokyo	Established by the National Government. Spirits are enshrined and venerated in accordance with Shinto shrine ritual.
Gokoku Jinja	Prefectures	Established by the prefectural governments. Spirits are enshrined and venerated in accordance with Shinto shrine ritual.
Chūkōnhi	Towns and Villages	"Monument to the loyal spirits" commemorating the local war dead. Before and during WWII, erected by the Veterans Association; during the Occupation, when the Veterans Association was dissolved, handed over to the Bereaved Families Association. Ceremonies are held annually and may be either Shinto or Buddhist.
Haka	Buddhist temple and other cemeteries	Family graves. Spirits of family war dead, with other family dead, are ritually installed by family and kin, ceremonies being conducted in accordance with the family religion.

lated on the basis of the value of the misused salaries of the public servants involved), and that the education commissioner be required to reimburse the city ¥3,566 (the value of the salary paid him during the time he was attending the ceremony).

Judge Kozaki of the Osaka District Court handed down his judgment on 1 March 1983. He concluded that "the spirit pacification ritual is by nature a religious activity. Arguments claiming that its religious nature has diminished and that it is now essentially a generally accepted custom cannot stand." With regard to the question of whether national or local governments may instruct public servants to participate in religious activities as part of their public service, he declared that "in view of the religious freedom of the public servant concerned, no such instruction can be valid." He further held that "if a public servant does participate in religious activity, such behavior must be construed as private, regardless of circumstance or personal intention." On this basis the judge ordered the education commissioner to return to the city that part of his salary he had received while participating in the ritual, maintaining that "the education commissioner was not serving as education commissioner during the time of his participation in said ceremony."

On the other hand, Judge Kozaki turned down the plaintiffs' claims against the mayor on three grounds: (1) the clerical and other assistance rendered by public servants can be construed as an appropriate part of their general service to the public; (2) the lending of tables, chairs and the like is an ordinary, minor service offered to the public at the discretion of the school principal, and (3) buses and other city-owned facilities fall under the competence of the department concerned with their administration.

The participation of the education commissioner in this spirit pacification ritual held in front of the monument was thus judged to violate the constitutional principle of separation between religion and the state. The fact is, however,

that the behavior of the commissioner was fully in accord with the local community tradition, and the ceremony corresponds to the practices of the community. One could cite a number of community rituals that express the religiosity of the community, rituals widely practiced in Japanese society. In this case, nonetheless, the judgment upheld the charge that the commissioner's behavior violated the law.

A case like the one described above is indicative of a change now underway in Japanese religiosity. A number of factors enter into this change: public and private dimensions in the people's approach to religion; successive waves of political control of religion, first by Japanese, then foreign, and then again by Japanese political authorities; and major structural changes in family, community and society that have come about with industrialization and urbanization.

In the following we propose to sketch the Japanese community tradition as it relates to community religiosity, to trace the impact of the Allied Occupation on traditional community religiosity, to discuss the emergence of conflicts between individual-oriented and community-oriented approaches to religion since the late 1960s, and finally to offer our own interpretation of the issues.

COMMUNITY RELIGIOSITY AND THE STATE

Why did the education commissioner attend the spirit pacification ritual in M city? Why did the mayor send city employees to help carry it out, and why did he permit free use of city-owned buses, chairs, tables and such? Why was the ceremony conducted by Shinto priests in accordance with the ritual traditions of Shrine Shinto?

The answer to all of these questions has to be that such behavior was consonant with the dictates of tradition. To have done otherwise would have been to court resentment and most probably would have cost these officials their posts.

From the very outset, it was not a matter of a specific

institution deliberately deciding to hold the rite and to involve city officials. It was a matter, rather, of a ritual exercise involving the entire community, not excluding public servants. In appearance, to be sure, the ceremony was held under the auspices of a voluntary association, that of the Bereaved Families, but in reality the mayor and the education commissioner were by no means invited merely as individuals. They were indispensable to the ceremony as representatives of the community. The ceremony was first and foremost a community event; it only involved religious specialists in a secondary way.

Dr. Ōishi Yoshio, Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law at Kyoto University, has propounded the thesis that the Constitution refers only to the religion of individuals and not the religion of the community. He regards Shinto as a kind of national morality and deems that it should be excluded from the category of religion assumed in the Constitution. As he puts it:

Shinto is the seat of the folk spirit and of national unity. Yasukuni Jinja, for example, is the resting place for the spirit that promotes the national élan and motivates defense of our motherland. Shinto differs from religions that seek the spiritual salvation of individuals....During the meetings of the Council for Study of the Constitution, there was a time when the definition of religion became an issue. Professor Kishimoto [Kishimoto Hideo of the Department of Religious Studies at the University of Tokyo] questioned the wisdom of allowing jurists to deal with this matter and suggested that it be turned over to scholars of religion. We who specialize in constitutional law replied that the concept of religion in religious studies might well be left to scholars of religion, but that as long as religion and religious freedom were discussed in relation to the Constitution, these concepts needed to be examined and defined in terms understandable to constitutional specialists....Examination of the question of why and how human rights came to be

guaranteed in modern constitutions leads to the recognition that religion and religious freedom, in the context of the Constitution, can only be identified as the religion of the individual. The word "religion" as it appears in the Constitution refers solely and invariably, in my opinion, to individual religion.

Professor Ōishi goes on to say:

I believe that the American Occupation, in causing the Japanese government of that day to develop the current Constitution, undoubtedly held the view that State Shinto belonged to the category of religion. I contend, however, that the Occupation view is only one among many. During the Occupation that view was legally binding. But now the Occupation is over. The authority to interpret the Constitution inheres in Japan's national sovereignty. No longer are we bound by the Occupation interpretation. We have now returned to the interpretation that prevailed prior to the Occupation. (Testimony before the Nagoya Higher Court on 7 October 1970)

Ōishi's statement summarizes succinctly the views of most conservatives. It makes a theoretical separation between traditional community religiosity and the religious beliefs of individual citizens, identifies the former with custom or national morality, and provides a rationale for its support by the state.

The proposition "Shinto is not a religion," which Ōishi and others seek to restore, is the product of a subtle compromise between the guarantee of religious freedom first made in the Meiji Constitution and the tradition of community religiosity manifested in the *ie* (the kinship unit), *mura* (the village unit), and *kuni* (the national unit). Behind it lay two factors.

On the one hand was the Meiji Constitution. This Constitution may be understood as a means whereby the government sought to attain revision of the unequal treat-

ties with the Western powers, a means that necessitated both abolishing the earlier prohibition of Christianity and proclaiming adoption of the principle of religious freedom. The sending of the Iwakura Mission to the U.S. and Europe in 1871 and promulgation of the article on religious freedom in the Meiji Constitution of 1889 were links in the same causal chain, links whose forging was separated by nearly two decades.

On the other hand was the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, anticipating the convening of the Diet by one year. The Rescript was intended to offset the Constitution. It was recognized that major change would result from institutionalizing the Constitution through Western systems, and the desire was to support the integrity of tradition and traditional community religiosity.

The statement "Shinto is not a religion" may be rephrased as "Community religiosity is one thing, individual religious belief another." In this context the statement regarding Shinto expresses a decision to perpetuate traditional forms of community religiosity in recognition of the close and long-standing adherence between community religiosity and the state.

The Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education manifest a dual structure and not a single one. Together they bespeak a compromise between opposing cultural values. The separating of Shinto from the category of religion may be understood as a logical, if clever, extension of this compromise.

DISSOLUTION OF COMMUNITY RELIGION

The American Occupation regarded State Shinto or the Cult of the Emperor as the source of fanatical Japanese militarism and totalitarianism. It deemed Shinto a totalitarian ideology comparable to Nazism and Fascism, like them equally harmful to world peace and democracy.

This view of Shinto originates in a 1912 booklet entitled *Invention of a new religion* by Basil Hall Chamberlain, then a professor at Tokyo Imperial University. This

theme was elaborated with some instances of religious suppression and presented in 1922 under the title "The Political Philosophy of Modern Shinto" (*Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, second series, 49/2) by an American Baptist missionary, Daniel Clarence Holtom. Holtom later delivered a series of lectures at the University of Chicago and had them published in 1943 as *Modern Japan and Shinto nationalism*. These works influenced Japan watchers and policy makers in the United States when Occupation policy framed by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was implemented by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The heart of the Occupation actions resulting in the dissolution of State Shinto is contained in the Shinto Directive of 15 December 1945. The present Constitution, promulgated on 3 May 1947, was drafted under the direction of the Occupation and thus followed the line laid down in the Shinto Directive vis-à-vis State Shinto and strict separation between religion and state.

The Shinto Directive specified, among other things, that:

- (1) Japanese governments—national, prefectural and local—and all public servants and government employees acting in their official capacity were prohibited from sponsoring, supporting, perpetuating, controlling or disseminating Shinto.
- (2) All financial support from public funds and all official affiliation with Shinto and Shinto shrines were prohibited.
- (3) The Shrine Board (Jingi-in) of the Ministry of Home Affairs was abolished.
- (4) Private financial support of Shinto by individual citizens was allowed.
- (5) Private educational institutions for the investigation and dissemination of Shinto and for training in Shinto priesthood were permitted.

The directive included a statement of its purpose:

To separate religion from the state, to prevent misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faiths and creeds upon exactly the same basis, entitled to precisely the same opportunities and protection.

It further indicated that Shinto, after it had been divorced from the state and divested of its militaristic and ultra-nationalistic elements, could be recognized as a religion if its adherents so desired, in which case it would enjoy the same protection given any other religion "in so far as it may in fact be the philosophy or religion of Japanese individuals."

In symbolic exemplification of the goal of the Shinto Directive, arrangements were made for the Emperor, in a radio broadcast on 1 January 1946, to declare that he was not divine but human. In order to establish a basis in law for Shrine Shinto to survive in the form of religious corporations, an amendment was effected in the Religious Juridical Persons Ordinance in February 1946. As of that time shrines could be incorporated as private corporations. As one step in carrying out the directive, the Occupation, on 1 November 1946, ordered that all symbols, statues, monuments and other items relating to militarism be removed from public school grounds and other public premises. It also prohibited certain national holidays connected with Shinto mythology and banned certain designs representing mythological figures. Thus the Occupation intervened in the realm of community religiosity and barred communities from using traditional religious elements in their observances.

In the response of the Japanese people to the Occupation a sharp contrast may be observed between those associated with the former Shrine Board and those, both clergy and lay, in the non-governmental sector. The Shrine Board maintained that Shinto was not a religion, but rather was the fountainhead of national morality, and sought to carry this view to the Occupation. The National Association of Shinto Priests (Dainihon Jingikai), the Institute for the Study of Imperial writings (Kōten Kōkyū Sho) and the

Worshippers' Association of the Grand Shrine of Ise (Jingū Hōsaikai) felt, on the other hand, that the religious freedom principle proclaimed in the Potsdam Declaration would doubtless be enforced under the Occupation. As early as September 1945 they began to hold talks on how to cope with the impending situation.

The leaders of non-governmental Shinto anticipated that the Shinto shrines would be split off from the government and be categorized as non-governmental institutions. Assuming this development, they believed the Shinto shrines capable of surviving as independent institutions, inasmuch as shrines had traditionally been supported spiritually and financially by their local communities. They were on the lookout, therefore, for opportunities to be legally incorporated as either civil or religious entities. In February 1946, the former governmental Shrine Board having been abolished, a non-governmental Association of Shinto Shrines was incorporated as a religious juridical person, and some one hundred thousand Shinto shrines affiliated with this association thus became religious juridical persons. Yasukuni Jinja and the several Gokoku Jinja also became incorporated as religious institutions at this time.

Even so, no Shinto leader was willing to transform this community-oriented religious Shinto into a religion oriented to individual decision and belief. Certain professors at Kokugakuin University, for example, recognized the importance of folkways and emphasized the role of the locale in the beliefs and practices of traditional communities. Their teaching represented a shift of emphasis from an authoritarian State Shinto controlled by bureaucrats to a revitalization of community tradition at the hands of long-established community residents. This led to a movement to revive folkways as they had existed in local communities prior to the bureaucratic manipulation from above that resulted in "the invention of a new religion." The work and influence of Yanagita Kunio and Origuchi Shinobu may be understood as part of this stream.

Ironically, the attempt to draw the various Shinto

traditions together and create a universalistic theology attracted far less attention. This is merely one more indication that Shinto has its center not in individuals or universal teachings but in the folkways, festivals and ritual observances of natural communities.

The Occupation succeeded in divorcing Shinto from the state and in getting Shinto to identify itself as a religion. But the Occupation's highly Protestant conception of religion as a faith chosen and believed in by individuals failed to materialize in the now religiously incorporated Shinto. By nature, Shinto is essentially a community religion.

POST-OCCUPATION EFFORTS

With the recovery of independence in September 1951 efforts to reconstruct and restore social institutions began in earnest. Efforts to restore community religiosity at both local and national levels can be seen as part of this endeavor.

Some examples of such activity are reported in the *Jinja Honchō jūnenshi* ("Ten-year history of the Association of Shinto Shrines"). On 10 September 1951, according to this history, the Vice Minister of Education and the Vice Minister for the Relief of Repatriates issued a joint instruction "Concerning Funerals and Ceremonies for the War Dead." On 28 September 1951 the Deputy Director of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Education instructed prefectural Administrators of Religion to permit and proceed with conveying gratuitously to Yasukuni Jinja and the various Gokoku Jinja the titles to the government-owned land previously leased to them. On 1 October 1952 the Emperor and Empress visited Yasukuni Jinja for the first time since the end of World War II.

The instruction "Concerning Funerals and Ceremonies for the War Dead" mentioned above allowed governors of prefectures, mayors of cities, heads of towns and villages, and other public servants to participate in ceremonies for the war dead sponsored by individuals or non-governmental

bodies and, on such occasions, to express condolences, to deliver memorial addresses and to offer flowers, incense, etc. purchased with public funds.

Welcoming this instruction, the Association of Shinto Shrines encouraged member shrines throughout the nation to enshrine the spirits of the war dead in their respective communities and to hold ceremonies for their pacification. Public officials were urged to attend the ceremonies in symbolic expression of community coherence. More broadly, much of what the Association of Shinto Shrines seeks to accomplish is oriented to the restoration of community religiosity.

Two other efforts of this kind are also worthy of note. One is the endeavor to obtain state support for Yasukuni Jinja, the other the effort to restore as a national holiday the day referred to in Shinto mythology as the day on which the nation was founded.

The movement to restore state support to Yasukuni Jinja began in 1952 when the Bereaved Families Association published a resolution to that effect. Since that time a Yasukuni Jinja nationalization bill has been presented to the Diet as many as ten times, but its realization has been prevented because of the persistent opposition of Christians and followers of other religions, who are joined, curiously, by the Communists.

Despite the opposition of historians, leftwing intellectuals and many Christians, the mythological day of the nation's founding was restored as a national holiday in 1967. The reason for the opposition to this was that the opposing groups sought to prevent restoration of the prewar situation in which the government imposed State Shinto on all citizens regardless of their personal religion. According to the opposition, the prewar and wartime police used deviation from State Shinto as a rationale for oppression, as in the case of religious groups such as Ōmoto, Hito no Michi, fundamentalist Christian groups and the like. The logic of this contention virtually recapitulates that of the Occupation in that it entails the annihilation of Shinto

tradition in the form of community religion by means of external political power.

The rationale for suppressing Ōmoto and other religious groups prior to the end of World War II, however, had nothing to do with their religious contentions. The officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs who organized the suppression of these groups were scrupulous in specifying anti-social tendencies that necessitated the action. Their real aim was to control the activities of all organized institutions. This aim embraced not merely religious organizations but political associations and labor unions as well. The opposition argument has, therefore, only a slim basis in fact.

When those who oppose the Yasukuni Jinja nationalization bill and similar measures repeat the slogans of the Occupation, are they not displaying a certain narrowness of perception? Is there not a deeper, if unintended, meaning to be discerned in the series of suits brought by taxpayers against traditional practices? The action of a public servant in participating in a community ritual together with legal action brought to invalidate such behavior suggests a line of analysis that may throw some light on such issues.

DECLINE OF COMMUNITY RELIGIOSITY?

This article began by introducing a suit brought against two people in M city, the mayor and the education commissioner, for participating as public officials in a ritual for the pacification of spirits held before a *chūkōhī*, or "monument to the loyal spirits," and for making public facilities and employees available to assist in the holding of the ceremony. This was a traditional and common practice.

It was next seen that Japanese communities are tinged with religiosity at every level: familial, prefectural and national. Subsequently, we traced the imposition of a rigorous separation between Shinto and the state by the American Occupation—a case of the regulation of community religion by an external power with a different

conception of religion than that of those obliged to live under the regulation. We then saw something of the post-Occupation efforts to restore community religiosity and also of the efforts to prevent this restoration. Reflection on this train of events suggests at least a hint of what we may call contextual change.

The long tradition of Japanese religion has laid great stress on the religiosity of communities, whether at the *ie* (kinship), *mura* (local), or *kuni* (national) level. This stress is reflected in the fact that Japanese people attach little importance to dogmas and commandments, but outdo themselves in observance of ceremonies and rituals. What has come to prevail in the Japanese religious consciousness is not the dogma of the salvation of the individual soul or the idea of commandments symbolizing a covenant between a human and a transcendent being. The core of Japanese religiosity lies, rather, in the symbolic reinforcement of kin group integration through ceremonies commemorating the ancestors, of local integration through village festivals, and of national identity through ceremonies commemorating critical events in the life of the nation.

That Japanese religious tradition is not devoid of an individualistic dimension goes without saying. Prayers for individual salvation, for cure from illness, for good harvests or for business prosperity are common in the many forms of Japanese folk religion.

But individual religion functioned in a different and separate dimension from that of community religiosity. Moreover, communities and community religion in no way sought to control the individual in his or her personal religious practices so long as the person concerned followed the rules and customs of the community.

The point to be considered here may perhaps best be set forth concretely, since it came to the fore in another court case, one concerning a ground-breaking ceremony held in accordance with Shinto ritual prior to starting construction on a government building. This case, known as the Tsu City ground-breaking ceremony case, was brought

before the Supreme Court, which in July 1977 handed down a 10-5 split decision.

The plaintiff was a Communist member of the City Council. He was backed not only by leftwing intellectuals but also by a number of Protestant Christians and adherents of new religious organizations. The Association of Shinto Shrines stood behind the defendant, as did a number of Diet members belonging to the conservative Liberal Democratic Party.

The plaintiff asked the court's judgment on three points: (1) whether Shrine Shinto is a religious institution, (2) whether the ground-breaking ceremony is a Shinto practice, and (3) whether the city is bound by reason of the Constitution to refrain from official participation in such a ceremony. Calling for an affirmative judgment on all three points, the plaintiff argued:

As Shrine Shinto preserves many traces of the ideological forms of primitive society, it retains to the present day such a way of thinking in its system. The *ujiko seido* or tutelary deity/parish community system is one such survival. Another is the concept of the *ubusunagami* or local guardian deity. A community structure of this kind is bound to violate the religious freedom of individuals. Therefore it should not be allowed to prevail today. If Shrine Shinto insists on community consciousness, it will invariably contradict and conflict with the articles guaranteeing religious freedom in the present Constitution. The idea of making Yasukuni Jinja a state institution on the ground that it is a shrine for all Japanese citizens is an explicit manifestation of the community consciousness of Shrine Shinto and is in direct conflict with the religious freedom of individual citizens. The local government, in sponsoring a ground-breaking ceremony conducted by Shrine Shinto priests, gave expression to this misguided community consciousness. (Final statement submitted to the Supreme Court, p. 18)

In our view the plaintiff was correct in his recognition of community religiosity. Identifying individual religious freedom as a polar opposite, he called for a court judgment that would support his position.

Of particular interest here is the fact that this suit was brought by a resident of the community. A taxpayer's suit, it was initiated, therefore, not in consequence of outside pressure but, it may be suggested, in consequence of a degree of communal corrosion from within. This approach, it seems to us, offers a means by which religious studies specialists may treat the matter within the framework of their discipline.

On the defendant's side, the arguments were likewise three: (1) the ground-breaking ceremony has long been generally accepted as a customary convention, (2) a distinction is to be drawn between ceremonies which, though religious in form, are not to be defined as religious activities and those which are to be so defined (weddings, funerals, ground-breaking ceremonies, and a few other conventional ritual activities belong to the category not to be defined as religious); consequently, the government is prohibited only from making participation mandatory, and (3) the plaintiff's charges include several misinterpretations of the law.

Particularly noticeable in this context is the view of the defendant that general acceptance of such customary rituals is essential to community integration:

For the officiant at a ground-breaking ceremony, whether he be a Shinto priest, a Buddhist priest, or any other kind of priest, the ceremony is a religious exercise. Viewed from this angle, it is understandable as a religious ritual. But when the same ceremony is generally accepted by most citizens as a conventional practice, then for the general public it is more a matter of custom than of religion. It ought, therefore, to be identified as the custom it is.

When non-religious funeral ceremonies and memorial services are conducted, on occasion, by the govern-

ment, they seem almost anti-religious, and to people accustomed to Shinto and Buddhist traditions, these non-religious ceremonies are more vexing than those carried out in accordance with Shinto or Buddhist forms. Since rituals are expressions of a certain spirit, it will be impossible to find a ritual form that will please everyone. But recognition of the practices for which there is comparatively broad acceptance is necessary for the sake of community coherence. (Arguments of the Defense, submitted to the Supreme Court, p. 3, p. 8)

In the split decision mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court held that the ground-breaking ceremony, though Shinto in origin, had become a conventional practice. It further declared that the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit all contact between state and religion, and that state contact with ceremonies related to religion does not violate the Constitution so long as such ceremonies are widely accepted as conventional within the culture.

Ritual acts such as the ground-breaking ceremony and the rite for spirit pacification have from the outset been community events with a strong religious connotation. Members of the community participate in these events in ways consonant with their roles in the community. Dissident non-participation robs the events of their community-embracing meaning. It is precisely for this reason that Shrine Shinto endeavors to include the Emperor and other public officials in ceremonial observances at the various community levels. If the mayor and education commissioner, for example, were to participate in such ceremonies strictly as individuals, if their identities as community office holders were left implicit and their attendance became merely a matter of personal faith, their presence would not make the ceremonies expressions of community religiosity. Were such forms of participation to become widespread, Shinto as a community religion would have to be regarded as secularized.

Interaction between community-oriented religion with an identifiable tradition regarding loyalty to the natural community and individually-oriented religion with a different tradition of loyalty to a faith-community becomes increasingly intense when political control is at issue. In Japanese history, Christianity provides a good example of this. When Christianity first reached Japan in 1549, the country was divided into a number of warring fiefs. In this situation it spread among some warlords and the people in their domains. Upon unification of the country under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, however, Christianity was defined as repugnant to Japan's divine tradition, and for the first time Japanese Christians were ordered into exile. Again, when the seclusion policy terminated in 1858 and a modernization policy was adopted, both the prohibition against Christianity and the lifting of this prohibition proved a major headache for the Meiji government. The forced separation between Shinto and the state ordered by the American Occupation may be regarded as the third wave in the attack of individually oriented Christian tradition on the community-oriented religiosity of the Shinto tradition.

The history of religious persecution in Japan likewise manifests this kind of confrontation. Though few, the cases of religious persecution in Japanese history—such as the persecution of the Nichirenshū Fujū-fuseha, Ōmoto, Hito no Michi, and Sōka Gakkai—show that these organizations were at one in having an individualistic orientation and an object of loyalty that led them to resist participation in the natural community.

The court cases initiated by resident taxpayers now advance the individualist claim against the Shinto tradition of community religiosity from within the community. At first glance it seems odd to see Communists and Protestant Christians join hands in such cases, but when the confrontational structure identified above is borne in mind, this cooperation among essentially different, if not inimical, groups becomes explicable. This fourth wave is a new development. For the first time we have an individualistic

attack on community religiosity that comes not from without but from within. This in turn suggests to the religious studies specialist that secularization theory pertinent to the prevailing religious tradition in Japanese history must be shaped to take account of a form of religiosity that in orientation is essentially immanent rather than transcendent, essentially communal rather than individualistic. The discussions on secularization during the 1970s centered primarily, in our view, on religions with explicit symbol systems: God, church, dogma, and commandments. This paper intends to suggest that in religions of immanent orientation, a different mode of secularization is manifest.

Is it not ironic that on Mabuni Hill in Okinawa, all the prefectures of Japan are competing with one another in erecting solid (not necessarily beautiful) monuments to the war dead, and that both the national government and many local governments, as well as groups of veterans, invest immense amounts of time, energy, and financial resources in order to organize visits to former battlefields so as to search for the bones of fallen compatriots? In view of the essentially immanent nature of community religiosity, is this not merely a vulgar, perhaps even shameful, display? Or could it be an indication of a daring survival-effort on the part of community religion at a time when immanent religiosity is in danger of sinking from sight?