

**Reference 1** Number of Deployed Nuclear Warheads by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery

		United States		Russia		United Kingdom		France		China		
Missiles	ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missiles)	450 Minuteman III:	450	356 SS-18: SS-19: SS-25: SS-27: RS-24:	54 40 160 78 24	_____		_____		56 DF-5 (CSS-4): DF-31 (CSS-10):		20 36
	IRBM MRBM	_____		_____		_____		_____		132 DF-3 (CSS-2): DF-4 (CSS-3): DF-21 (CSS-5):		6 10 116
	SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missiles)	336 Trident D-5:	336	144 SS-N-18: SS-N-23:	48 96	48 Trident D-5:	48	64 M-45: M-51:	32 32	12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3):		12
Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles		14		11		4		4		1		
Aircraft		73 B-2: B-52:	19 54	78 Tu-95 (Bear): Tu-160 (Blackjack):	62 16	_____		65 Mirage2000N: Rafale:		25 40	_____	
Number of warheads		2,100 (including 184 tactical)		Approx. 3,800 (including approx. 2,000 tactical)		225		Less than 300		Less than 250		

**Notes:**

1. Data is based on Military Balance 2014, the SIPRI database, etc.
2. In April 2014, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2014 — the number of deployed strategic warheads for the United States was 1,585 and the delivery vehicles involved 778 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic warheads for Russia was 1,512 and the vehicles delivery involved 498 missiles/aircraft.
3. In October 2010, the U.K.'s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be fewer than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be fewer than 180.

**Reference 2** Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
China	160	United States	613.9	1,030	United States	3,498
India	113	Russia	207.0	976	China	2,582
North Korea	102	China	142.3	892	Russia	1,555
United States	59	United Kingdom	65.6	139	India	937
Pakistan	55	India	47.0	212	Egypt	635
Republic of Korea	52	France	42.0	262	Republic of Korea	619
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	24.7	156	North Korea	603
Turkey	40	Turkey	23.7	226	Taiwan	499
Myanmar	38	Spain	22.3	161	Israel	481
Iran	35	Italy	20.3	178	Pakistan	443
Egypt	31	Taiwan	20.1	409	France	413
Indonesia	30	Republic of Korea	19.5	187	Turkey	386
Russia	29	Germany	19.2	111	Iran	340
Thailand	25	Brazil	17.6	106	United Kingdom	323
Colombia	22	Australia	17.1	96	Saudi Arabia	314
Japan	14	Japan	45.3	139	Japan	420

**Notes:**




1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2014 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2013–2014 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2013, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

**Reference 3** Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regular (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)	
United States	Volunteer	149		84	
Russia	Conscription / Volunteer	85		2,000	
United Kingdom	Volunteer	17		8	
France	Volunteer	22		3	
Germany	Volunteer	18		4	
Italy	Volunteer	18		2	
India	Volunteer	133		116	
China	Conscription	233		51	
North Korea	Conscription	119		60	
Republic of Korea	Conscription	66		450	
Egypt	Conscription	44		48	
Israel	Conscription	18		47	
Japan	Volunteer	Ground	14	3.1 (0.5)	
		Maritime	4.2	0.06	
		Air	4.3	0.06	

**Notes:**

1. Data taken is from Military Balance 2014 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces as of the end of FY2013. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.
3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the draft system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former.

**Reference 4 Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles****Reference 5 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People**

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on July 1, 2014)

Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has flourished as an economic power through continuous efforts of its people and built a stable and affluent livelihood. Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has also been cooperating with the international community and international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.), and has proactively contributed to their activities, adhering to the Charter of the United Nations. The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further fortify such a position.

During the 67 years since the Constitution of Japan came into effect, the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing to evolve, and Japan is confronted by complex and significant national security challenges. There exist no prospects of the realization of the so-called formal "U.N. forces", an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, even when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in the global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct influence on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been spreading and become more serious. No country can secure its own peace only by itself, and the international community also expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capability.

Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well as securing its people's lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to fulfill its responsibility, the Government, first and foremost, has to create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy with sufficient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with international law and giving emphasis to the rule of law.

Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and operate Japan's own defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan's ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the region. In particular, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts before they materialize and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and

enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses.

In accordance with the basic orientation presented by Prime Minister Abe at the May 15 press conference which took place after the report of "the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security" was submitted on the same day, discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the result of the discussions of the ruling coalition, the Government will promptly develop domestic legislation necessary for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, in accordance with the following basic policies:

1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack
  - (1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In such situations of infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, it is an even more important task to prepare and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), premised on the basic allocation of their roles.
  - (2) Specifically, in order to respond to various unlawful acts, under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, which include enhancing the respective agency's response capabilities, strengthening collaboration among agencies including information sharing, examining and developing concrete response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving exercises and training.
  - (3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement from the outside that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond because of the weapons possessed by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions to order public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among relevant agencies. At the same time, in order to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while internal administrative procedures are taken, the Government will also make concrete considerations on measures for issuing orders

swiftly and accelerating procedures in light of circumstances.

- (4) Moreover, for ensuring Japan's security, it is important for the SDF and the United States armed forces to respond seamlessly in close cooperation to a situation where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack depending on its circumstances. Assuming a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the United States armed forces and referring to the concept of "use of weapons" for the purpose of protecting its own weapons and other equipment under Article 95 of the SDF Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited "use of weapons" to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law, premised on request or consent by the United States.

2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community  
(1) So-called Logistics Support and "Ittaika with the Use of Force"

- A. So-called logistics support is an activity that does not in itself constitute a "use of force". For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution, there exist situations in which it is necessary for Japan to conduct such support activities to armed forces of other countries carrying out legitimate "use of force" based on the resolution. As for Japan's support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to "rear area" or so-called "non-combat area", etc. have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of "ititaika with the use of force" (forming an "integral part" of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the "use of force" which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an "integral part" of the use of force ("ititaika with the use of force") by other countries.
- B. The SDF, even under such legal frameworks, has steadily accumulated its records of various support activities, and the expectations to and trust in Japan have been growing. Amid a major change in the security environment, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play sufficient roles in wide-ranging support activities for peace and stability of the international community. It is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan's peace and security to enable the carrying out of such activities more than before without hindrance.
- C. The Government, while premising on the theory of so-called "Ititaika with the use of force" itself, based on the accumulation of discussions related to the "ititaika with the use of force" and considering factors such as the SDF's actual experiences to date and the reality of U.N. collective security measures, no longer takes the current framework uniformly limiting SDF's activities to such areas as "rear area" or so-called "non-combat area" where the issue of "ititaika with the use of force" does not arise. Instead, the Government takes the recognition that Japan's support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not "the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted" by a foreign country are not regarded as "ititaika with the use of force" by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan's security or for peace and stability of the international community:
- (a) Do not conduct support activities in "the scene where

combat activities are actually being conducted" by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support.

- (b) Immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes "the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted" due to changes of the situation.
- (2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities
- A. To date, Japan has developed necessary legislation and has conducted international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, Japan has limited the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities to so-called self-preservation type and protection of its own weapons and other equipment since use of weapons associated with so-called "kaketsuke-keigo" (coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack) or "use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions" could constitute the "use of force" prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons are directed against "a state or a quasi-state organization."
- B. From the perspective of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan needs to enhance its efforts to promote the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to be able to participate in international peace cooperation activities including peace keeping operations (PKOs) sufficiently and proactively. Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas and face risks of being involved in emergency situations such as terrorism, it is necessary to enable the rescuing of Japanese nationals abroad by use of weapons subject to the consent of acceptance from the territorial State which, under international law, has the obligation to extend protection to foreigners who are within its territories.
- C. Based on the above, the Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF's use of weapons associated with so-called "kaketsuke-keigo" and the "use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions" in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke "use of force" including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not invoke "use of force" including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State, through ensuring that "a state or a quasi-state organization" does not appear as the adversary:
- (a) As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., since "consent by the State to which the areas in which activities are conducted belong" and "consent by the parties to the conflict to activities conducted" are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, "a quasi-state organization" other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as the adversary. For more than 20 years, this has been demonstrated by Japan's experience of U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc. When the use of weapons for the execution of missions is expected to exceed self-preservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment including when the SDF is tasked with the maintenance of order such as the protection of population, which is deemed as an important mission in recent U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is necessary that consent from the parties to the conflict is stably maintained, especially because of the nature of the activities.
- (b) When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve "use of force" including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State's Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State's Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no "quasi-state organization" exists in that area.
- (c) The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of

- acceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State's Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council.
- (d) Use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraint of the strict principle of proportionality which is similar to the principle of police proportionality.

### 3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution

- (1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situations, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government's constitutional interpretation.

Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limit of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date.

- (2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit "use of force" in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of "the right (of the people) to live in peace" as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, "their (all the people's) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, "use of force" to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to "use of force" exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document "Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution" submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution.

- (3) To date, the Government has considered that "use of force" under this basic logic is permitted only when an "armed attack" against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc. as mentioned at the outset, in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan's survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan's survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan's survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense

in accordance with the basic logic of the Government's view to date.

- (4) As a matter of course, Japan's "use of force" must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned "use of force" permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this "use of force" includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan's survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan.
- (5) Moreover, even when "use of force" is permitted under the Constitution, since they are carried out to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, it is natural to require an assurance of democratic control. The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders of operations to the SDF for carrying out "use of force" permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.

### 4. The Way Forward for Developing Domestic Legislation

When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make a decision in accordance with deliberations, etc. at the National Security Council. Including such procedures, domestic legislation which serves as the legal basis is necessary in order to enable the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Based on the basic policies described above, the Government will herewith commence the tasks of drafting legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. The Government will give adequate consideration, and as soon as it completes its preparation, it will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations.

## Reference 6 Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

- (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
- (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
- (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.
- (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan – U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

## Reference 7 National Security Strategy

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

### I. Purpose

Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival are the primary responsibilities of the Government of Japan. As Japan's security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.

Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.

Based on such a recognition, the Government of Japan hereby sets forth this National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as “the Strategy”) in order to set out Japan’s fundamental policies pertaining to national security.

The Strategy first elaborates on Japan’s peaceful orientation to date and the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, examines its national interests and identifies its national security objectives. Furthermore, the Strategy identifies national security challenges Japan faces, taking into account the trends of the security environment surrounding Japan. Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner.

The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security, including sea, outer space, cyberspace, official development assistance (ODA) and energy.

Pursuant to the Strategy, and with the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach.

In addition, when implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy.

The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. Should any major changes in the situation occur, the NSC will review this Strategy in consideration of the security environment at the time, and make necessary revisions.

## II. Fundamental Principle of National Security

### 1. Principles Japan Upholds

Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system.

Surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with an immense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime state has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.”

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

In addition, Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.) with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Moreover, Japan has contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. In particular, Japan’s cooperation contributed to realizing stability, economic growth and democratization in many countries, especially those in Asia, including the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Furthermore, as a peace-loving nation, complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. In particular, Japan has continuously participated in U.N.

peacekeeping operations (PKO), as the role of military forces diversified after the end of the Cold War. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.”

The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further consolidate such a position.

At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.

Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold.

### 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives

In order to achieve the fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, the Government of Japan needs to define our national interests and national security objectives, examine them in the context of the constantly evolving security environment, and mobilize all possible means.

Japan’s national interests are, first of all, to maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded on freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition.

In addition, Japan’s national interests are to achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security. To this end, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential that Japan, as a maritime state, strengthens the free trade regime for accomplishing economic development through free trade and competition, and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability.

Similarly, the maintenance and protection of international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, are likewise in Japan’s national interests.

In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulfill our responsibility in the international community, Japan, adopting the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation as a fundamental principle, will seek to achieve the following national security objectives.

The first objective is to strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining its peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage.

The second objective is to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.

The third objective is to improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions.

## III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges

### 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges

- (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation  
Since the beginning of the twenty first century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing on an unprecedented scale, and this has substantially influenced the dynamics of international politics.

The primary drivers of this change in the balance of power are the emerging countries, including China and India. In particular, China is further increasing its presence in the international community. On the other hand, though its relative influence in the international community is changing, the U.S. remains the country that has the world's largest power as a whole, composed of its soft power originating from its values and culture, on top of its military and economic power. Furthermore, the U.S. has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (the "rebalance" policy).

While the change in the balance of power has encouraged the shift of the center of gravity of world politics and economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it has also been a reason for a weakening leadership in global governance, as exemplified by the stalled negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

In addition, while the rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has deepened interdependence among states, it has also invited a change in the relative influence between states and non-state actors, and brought about a complex impact on the global security environment.

Sovereign states remain the principal actors in the international community, and conflict and coordination between states continue to be the most significant factors affecting global stability. However, as cross-border flow of people, goods, capital, information and other items have been facilitated more easily by the advancement of globalization, non-state actors are beginning to play a more important role in decision-making in the international community.

In addition, the advancement of globalization and technological innovation bears negative impact. Terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors are posing serious threats to the security of any country. Today, these threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could instantly have a direct influence on the security of Japan.

- (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan best understands the tragedy of the use of nuclear weapons and shoulders the responsibility to realize "a world free of nuclear weapons."

The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC), and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, remain major threats to Japan and the international community. In particular, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea and the nuclear issue of Iran continue to pose grave threats to peace and stability, not only in each region but also in the entire international community. Moreover, there remain concerns over the acquisition and the use of WMD and related items by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, against which traditional deterrence may not function effectively.

- (3) Threat of International Terrorism

Terrorist attacks continue to occur around the world, and the threat of terrorism by international terrorist organizations remains serious. The advancement of globalization has made it easier for those organizations to share information and conspire within their own organizations and with other groups, and to secure geographical access and acquire arms.

International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms. International terrorist organizations are utilizing politically unstable and weakly governed countries and regions as bases for operation and training for terror activities. The ideologies of such terrorist organizations are also motivating other groups and individuals to commit terrorist acts.

Some international terrorist organizations designate Japan as their target. Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad.

Diversity of nationality of the perpetrators and victims in recent international terrorism cases has underscored the increasing importance of combating terrorism through international cooperation.

- (4) Risks to Global Commons

In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious.

While the seas are governed by international maritime law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. With regard to outer space and cyberspace, applicable norms remain to be developed due to the different positions among relevant countries.

Against such a backdrop, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has therefore become even more important to promote appropriate international rule-making over global commons and to make concerted efforts by the international community while respecting such rules.

"Open and Stable Seas" constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.

However, in recent years, the number of cases of conflict of interests between or among states over natural resources and the security of respective states is increasing. As a result, there is a growing risk of incidents at sea, and of possible escalation into unexpected situations.

In the South China Sea in particular, disputes that have arisen over sovereignty between coastal states and China cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation, and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In addition, vulnerability is also increasing in sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on which Japan is largely dependent for its natural and energy resources, due to various problems including regional conflicts and international terrorism in and around the coastal states, as well as piracy. Therefore, advancing efforts to address these issues is also important for securing the sea lanes.

Furthermore, the Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them.

While outer space has been utilized for civil purposes, from security perspective, the importance of outer space has dramatically increased in recent years, given its use for the reinforcement of capabilities for information gathering and surveillance, as well as for securing communication means for military purposes.

On the other hand, the congestion of outer space has heightened as more countries utilize outer space. There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space with an increasing amount of space debris caused by anti-satellite tests and satellite collisions amongst others, as well as with the development of counter-space weapons.

Cyberspace, a global domain comprised of information systems, telecommunications networks and others, provides a foundation for social, economic, military and other activities.

Meanwhile, risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to steal classified information, disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems, are becoming more serious.

In Japan, with an increasing level of connecting networks of social systems and various other elements, cyberspace is necessary for promoting both economic growth and innovation through the free flow of information in cyberspace. Protecting cyberspace from

the above-mentioned risks is vital to secure national security.

#### (5) Challenges to Human Security

Globalization has enabled people, goods, capital, and information to instantaneously move across borders in large quantities. As a result, international economic activities have expanded, thereby bringing prosperity to the international community.

In contrast, global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), common goals in the development field to be achieved by the international community, are not likely to be achieved in some regions and sectors. In addition, the increasing demand for energy, food, and water resources due to the population growth in developing countries and the expansion of economic scale could cause new conflicts.

These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community; therefore, Japan needs to promote necessary measures based on the principle of human security.

#### (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks

In today's global economy, no economy is self-sufficient and isolated from the world economy; thus the risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. While this trend is conspicuous in the financial economy, today, it is also witnessed in the real economy, as value chains and supply chains are established across borders with increasing international specialization.

Under these circumstances, there are concerns over fiscal problems and the slowdown in the growth of emerging economies. In some emerging economies and developing countries, visible signs of protectionism as well as reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules have been observed.

Furthermore, in recent years, with the advancement of technological innovation in energy sector, one has seen the rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries and growing global demand, especially in emerging economies, for energy and mineral resources, followed by the intensified competition for the acquisition of such resources. In addition, given the aggravating environmental problems arising from climate change, there are risks of crunches in global supply and demand as well as temporary shortages of supply in food and water.

### 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region

#### (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region

The shift in the global power balance has elevated the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the international community. While this shift provides opportunities for security cooperation, it has also given rise to regional issues and tensions.

In particular, the region of Northeast Asia is home to a host of actors, such as countries with large-scale military forces, or those possessing nuclear weapons or continuing with nuclear development. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. Countries in the region have contrasting political, economic, and social systems, and thus their security views are diverse, which constitutes another characteristic of the strategic environment of this region.

In this context, in addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations.

On the other hand, the Asia-Pacific region is also witnessing a rise in opportunities for bilateral exchanges and cooperation among countries in the region. In addition, there have been multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. These initiatives

are contributing to the development of mutual understanding and enhancement of joint response capabilities. Therefore, it is important to further promote and develop these multilayered initiatives for regional stability.

#### (2) North Korea's Military Buildup and Provocative Actions

In the Korean Peninsula, the large-scale military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea confront each other. While North Korea continues to face serious economic difficulties without any improvement in its human rights situation, North Korea heavily allocates its resources on military affairs today.

In addition, North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions in the Korean Peninsula including the use of provocative rhetoric, some of which are directed at Japan, thereby increasing the tension in the region.

In particular, North Korea's ballistic missiles development, including those with ranges covering the mainland of the U.S., along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons for warheads and equipping them to ballistic missiles, substantially aggravate the threat to the security of the region, including Japan. These concerns pose a serious challenge to the entire international community from the viewpoint of the non-proliferation of WMD and related materials.

As Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has been making efforts to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.

Furthermore, North Korea's abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan's sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility and a universal issue for the international community to address as a violation of fundamental human rights.

#### (3) China's Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas

There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. On the other hand, China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas through its continued increase in its military budget without sufficient transparency. In addition, China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan, including intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, China has shown the move that appears to unduly infringe the freedom of overflight above the high seas by establishing its own “Air Defense Identification Zone” over the East China Sea.

Such an external stance and military activities by China, coupled with a lack of transparency in its military affairs and security policy, have become an issue of concern to the international community including Japan; therefore, the Government of Japan needs to pay careful attention to this situation.

The relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has deepened in recent years, primarily in economic areas. Meanwhile, the military balance between the two sides has been changing. Thus, the cross-strait relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability.

### IV. Japan's Strategic Approaches to National Security

To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments.

Enhancing Japan's resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. This belief forms the core of the strategic approaches in the Strategy.

Moreover, in order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute

to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies.

In light of this, Japan will take the following concrete strategic approaches, centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy.

#### 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan's Capabilities and Roles

##### (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment

The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international community as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

This strategic approach first requires the capability to analyze the constantly changing security environment and the course that the international community is taking. On top of this, Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the international agenda and to proactively advance its national interests, without being confined to a reactionary position to events and incidents after they have already occurred. In doing so, it is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan's position in the international community, through effectively utilizing all strengths and features of the nation. In addition, by highlighting Japan's attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of Japan as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" to make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. In order to advance such vibrant diplomacy, Japan will strengthen the institutional capabilities through which it undertakes diplomacy. Such overall strengthening of diplomatic capability is critical to ensure the security of Japan.

##### (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan

Japan's defense force is the final guarantee of its national security which deters direct threats from reaching Japan and defeats any threat that reaches it. Japan will steadily develop its defense force.

To ensure peace and security in Japan amid the severe security environment surrounding the country, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power and the political, economic, and social situations; and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also advance not only the coordination within the government, but also coordination with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.

In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in the above-mentioned efforts, Japan will develop a streamlined planning and programming process, which includes the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium Term Defense Program, based on the Strategy to enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.

In addition, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people.

##### (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan's Territorial

#### Integrity

To fully protect its territories, in addition to building a comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.

Japan will also make a constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of its territories, and take effective measures.

In addition, Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders. Furthermore, from a national security viewpoint, Japan will study the situation of land ownership in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities, and review issues related to the use of such land.

##### (4) Ensuring Maritime Security

As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing "Open and Stable Seas," which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law. More concretely, Japan will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including anti-piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries.

Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities that are necessary for the above-mentioned measures, in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. At the same time, Japan will strive to enhance the frequency and the quality of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime security such as joint exercises.

In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East. In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.

##### (5) Strengthening Cyber Security

Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts in comprehensively promoting cross-cutting measures to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities threatening cyber security; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard its critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.

To this end, Japan will strengthen public-private partnership in the areas of system design, development and operations based on risk assessment, as well as identifying incidents, minimizing damages and their expansion, and analyzing the causes of and preventing similar incidents. In addition, Japan will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, protection of control systems, and response to the issues of supply chain risk.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen inter-agency cooperation and define the roles of relevant agencies so that it can reinforce its capability to protect cyberspace and respond to incidents as a nation at large. At the same time, Japan will promote a range of measures, including enhancing the ability and function to oversee, assess, apprehend, analyze, and internationally coordinate on cyber incidents, as well as reinforcing relevant agencies in charge of those tasks.

In promoting these measures, strengthening international partnership in a wide range of areas is essential. For this, Japan

will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation. Japan will also strengthen information sharing and promote cyber defense cooperation with relevant countries.

(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism

Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. Moreover, in order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as building a network where risk information held by private sectors can be shared more effectively and efficiently; and reinforcing the structure for analyzing the situation of international terrorism and overseas information-collecting capabilities.

(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities

In order to appropriately support decision-making on national security policies, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence, open source intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In addition, Japan will promote the utilization of geospatial intelligence with which various types of intelligence are combined.

Moreover, Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities by bolstering its human resources, including developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. Japan will thereby promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government's disposal.

Furthermore, Japan will operate the intelligence cycle more effectively through the timely provision of materials and intelligence to the NSC, which serves as the control tower of foreign and security policy, and through the appropriate utilization of intelligence in policy formulation.

In addition, under the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (\*provisional English translation), Japan will strengthen its counter intelligence functions by developing such intelligence protection system in order to facilitate intelligence functions throughout the Government.

(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

In cases that contribute to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner, including through the utilization and provision of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to disaster-stricken countries and sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment, while dealing with the rising costs of defense equipment. In this context, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes

The stable use of outer space is not only fundamental to the lives of the people and the economy, but is also crucial for national security. Japan will therefore maintain and improve the foundation of science, technology and industry that supports the development and utilization of outer space, and promote the utilization of outer space from a security perspective.

In particular, Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of

satellites, including ones Japan possesses for the operation of the SDF units, information-gathering and analysis, maritime domain awareness, telecommunication, positioning, navigation and timing. In addition, Japan will enhance a system for space situational awareness.

Furthermore, Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies such as satellite manufacturing.

(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities

The advanced technology of Japan constitutes the foundation of its economic strength and defense forces, and is also a valuable resource that the international community strongly seeks from Japan. Therefore, Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan's technological capabilities.

In promoting measures for strengthening its technological capabilities from a national security viewpoint, Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, including information on technology development. Japan will also make effective use of technology in the area of security, by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government.

Furthermore, Japan's outstanding energy-saving and other environment-related technologies play an important role in Japan's efforts to tackle global issues together with the international community. Therefore, Japan will proactively utilize these technologies in diplomacy as well.

2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

For more than 60 years, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, has played an indispensable role for peace and security in Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, the Alliance has also played a more critical role for peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's security. Likewise, for the U.S., the Alliance has served as the core of its alliance network with countries in the region, including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

In this context, the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been serving as a foundation for the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Such close alliance between Japan and the U.S. is underpinned by various factors, including that the two countries share common strategic interests and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. Furthermore, Japan's geostrategic importance in supporting the U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region underlies the close alliance of the two countries.

With the above-mentioned Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation, the two countries have been working closely at various levels, including at the summit and ministerial levels. The two countries address not only bilateral issues, but also the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, including North Korea, as well as global security issues, including counterterrorism measures and non-proliferation of WMD.

In the area of economy, Japan and the U.S. aim to achieve economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region in a rules-based and transparent manner, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which will be mentioned later in this document.

Thus, Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community.

As Japan strengthens its efforts in security as elaborated above, the U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.

In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a more multifaceted Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on this recognition, Japan will undertake the following initiatives:

(1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas

Japan ensures its national security by enhancing deterrence through the strengthening of its own defense capability, as well as by the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the extended deterrence provided by the U.S.

Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC), while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy.

In addition, Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the following efforts: advancing joint training, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces; working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy; strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-scale disaster response operations.

Moreover, in order to strengthen the foundation of the Alliance, including enhanced interoperability, Japan will advance multilayered initiatives with the U.S. such as defense equipment and technology cooperation and personnel exchanges.

(2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces

To maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, it is important for Japan to cooperate proactively with the U.S. to realize the optimal force posture of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, it is also important for Japan to reduce the impact of the U.S. forces in Japan on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

As part of this effort, while firmly supporting the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan including the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements. In addition, Japan will further promote the joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces, while taking into consideration relations with local communities.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement measures to reduce the impact on people living near the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan. In particular, Okinawa Prefecture is situated in a critically important location in terms of national security, and the stationing of the U.S. forces there significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In the meantime, as a large part of the facilities and areas for the exclusive use of the U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated in the prefecture, Japan will make utmost efforts to reduce the impact on Okinawa, including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan's Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community

As elaborated above, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance in all its aspects, including in political, economic and security areas is indispensable to improve the security environment surrounding Japan. On top of that, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the Asia-Pacific region through the following approaches, as it plays an important role in enhancing Japan's security environment.

(1) Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, such as the ROK, Australia, the countries of ASEAN, and India:

—The ROK is a neighboring country of the utmost geopolitical importance for the security of Japan. Close cooperation with the ROK is of great significance for peace and stability of the region, including in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. For this reason, Japan will construct future-oriented and multilayered relations and strengthen the foundation for security

cooperation with the ROK. In particular, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK is a key framework in realizing peace and stability in East Asia. Japan will strengthen this trilateral framework, including in cooperation on North Korean nuclear and missile issues. With regard to the issue over the sovereignty of Takeshima, Japan will make persevering diplomatic efforts, based on the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with international law.

—Australia is an important regional partner that shares not only universal values but also strategic interests with Japan. In addition to strengthening the mutually complementary economic relations between the two countries, Japan will also strengthen its strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. Japan will also promote a wide range of cooperation with Australia in its efforts to shape a regional order in the Asia-Pacific and to maintain and reinforce peace and stability in the international community. In so doing, Japan will utilize the trilateral framework among Japan, the U.S. and Australia, as necessary.

—The countries of ASEAN, where economic growth and democratization have been progressing and which embraces great cultural diversity, are located in the critical areas of sea lanes of communication of Japan. Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors, including politics and security based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Given the influence ASEAN has on peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, Japan will provide further assistance to their efforts towards maintaining and strengthening the unity of ASEAN. Furthermore, Japan appreciates the efforts by the countries concerned to settle disputes in the South China Sea not by force, but in accordance with the law and rules, as shown in their efforts towards the formulation of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China. Japan will support these efforts so that an effective and legally binding code of conduct is formulated.

—India is becoming increasingly influential, due to what is projected to become the world's largest population, and to high economic growth and potential. India is also geopolitically important for Japan, as it is positioned in the center of sea lanes of communication. Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership.

(2) Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. From a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan will strive to construct and enhance a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China in all areas, including politics, economy, finance, security, culture and personal exchanges. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its advancing military capabilities through its rapidly increasing military budget. As a part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense cooperation, Japan will seek to urge improvement in transparency of China's military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations. Furthermore, with regard to China's recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on its unique assertion in its relations with neighboring countries, including Japan, Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond firmly but in a calm manner without escalating the situation.

(3) With regard to the issues of North Korea, Japan will cooperate closely with relevant countries to urge North Korea to take concrete actions towards its denuclearization and other goals, based on the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. Concerning Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. In particular, it is the basic recognition of

- Japan that normalization of relations with North Korea will not be possible without resolving the abduction issue. Japan will make every effort to realize the safety and prompt return of all abductees at the earliest possible date, investigate the truth regarding the abductions, and transfer those who executed the abductions.
- (4) Under the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, it is critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in order to ensure its security. Based on this recognition, Japan will cooperate with Russia in securing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to the issue of the Northern Territories, the most important pending issue between the two countries, Japan will vigorously negotiate with Russia under a consistent policy of resolving the issue of the attribution of the four islands and concluding a peace treaty.
  - (5) In promoting the efforts mentioned above, Japan will actively utilize and engage in the further development of functional and multilayered frameworks for regional cooperation, starting from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN+3, ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and trilateral frameworks, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-U.S.-Australia and Japan-U.S.-India, as well as Japan-China-ROK, a grouping of three large neighboring economic powers. In addition, Japan will appropriately contribute to the creation of a more institutional security framework in East Asia in the future.
  - (6) Japan will also cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region. These partners include Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Southwest Asian nations, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. In particular, Japan will deepen its cooperation with the PICs, which possess vast exclusive economic zones and abundant maritime resources in the Pacific Ocean, in many areas including maritime cooperation, through such fora as the Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting (PALM).
  - (7) Furthermore, Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries outside the Asia-Pacific region that play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the international community.
- Europe has the influence to formulate international public opinions, the capacity to develop norms in major international frameworks and a large economy. Japan and European countries, especially the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, share universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and principles such as market economy. They are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At a time when the power balance of the international community is changing, in order to establish an international order based on universal values and rules, to effectively address global challenges, and to accomplish Japan's initiatives for a peaceful and prosperous international community, Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Japan has contributed to the democratization of East European countries and Baltic countries, and will engage in strengthening relations with them, as well as the Caucasus countries.
  - Emerging countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina and South Africa have been increasing their presence not only in the international economy, but also in international politics. Japan will therefore endeavor to further develop relations with such countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges.
  - Stability in the Middle East is an issue that is inseparably linked to the stable supply of energy, and therefore Japan's very survival and prosperity. Given that the Gulf States are the largest source of crude oil for Japan, in order to ensure the stability of the Middle East, Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with these countries, encompassing wide-ranging economic cooperation beyond resources and energy, as well as politics and security. In this context, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East, including the issue of democratization in Arab countries that stems from the "Arab Spring," the situation in Syria, Iran's nuclear issue, the Middle East peace process and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. In the same vein, Japan will also collaborate with other countries that play important roles in the Middle East, such as the U.S., European countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
  - Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth. In addition, Africa has been increasing its influence in the international community. Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, and promote cooperation in international fora.
4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community  
As a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community.
  - (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations  
The U.N. was established with the UNSC as the core of a collective security system for maintaining international peace and security. However, the system has not fully functioned as originally anticipated.  
Nevertheless, the U.N. has taken the lead on various efforts for peace and security of the world, backed by its legitimacy through universal participation by the Member States and its expertise. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, the role played by the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security has continued to grow.  
Building on the invaluable experiences of having served on numerous occasions as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.  
Moreover, Japan will actively contribute to diverse U.N.-led efforts, including U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and collective security measures; diplomatic efforts such as preventive diplomacy and mediation; seamless assistance efforts from the phase of post-conflict emergency humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction, as well as assistance through the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission.  
At the same time, one must be mindful that realizing the enhancement of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the U.N., including the strengthening of collective security functions, is an urgent challenge. Therefore, Japan will continue to strive to achieve the UNSC reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.
  - (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law  
Japan will continue to faithfully comply with international law as a guardian of the rule of law. In addition, in order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan's principles and positions based on fairness, transparency and reciprocity are duly reflected.  
Furthermore, Japan will actively support international judicial organs in terms of both human capital and finance. In addition, Japan will actively engage in assistance for the development of legal systems in other countries.  
In particular, Japan will involve itself in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace. While advancing policy coordination with countries with shared interests, Japan will contribute proactively to the development of international rules in the above-mentioned areas, and to the promotion of confidence building measures among countries of mutual interest. In addition, Japan will further strengthen capacity building efforts for developing countries in these fields. More concretely:  
—With regard to the sea, Japan will promote regional efforts and play a leading role in creating a shared recognition that reinforcement of

the maritime order governed by law and rules and not by coercion is indispensable for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole.

- With regard to outer space, emphasizing the concept of ensuring freedom of access and utilization of space, Japan will participate proactively in the efforts to formulate an international code of conduct that aims to prevent experiments of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and avoid collision of satellites, and consequently strive to ensure safe and stable use of outer space.
  - With regard to cyberspace, based on the recognition of ensuring the free flow of information in cyberspace, Japan will actively cooperate with like-minded countries in the development of international rules on the premise that existing international law applies to cyberspace. Japan will also vigorously support the capacity building efforts of developing countries in this area.
- (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation  
Japan, as the only country in the world to have suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue its vigorous efforts to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons.”

In view of the threat posed by progress in nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and being mindful of future trends in the balance of nuclear forces in the Asia-Pacific region together with the rapid advancement of military technologies, Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea's nuclear and missile development issues and Iran's nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement export control measures from a security perspective, including active participation in the discussions in the international export control regime, in coordination with other relevant countries, to prevent the proliferation of arms, as well as dual use items or technologies to countries of proliferation concern. In addition, Japan will engage in international efforts on conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons, and anti-personnel mines.

(4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation

Over the course of more than 20 years, Japan has dispatched SDF units and other personnel to various regions on international peace cooperation assignments, including in Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan. These contributions have been deeply appreciated both in Japan and by the international community.

Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities with its determination to contribute even more proactively to peace based on the principle of international cooperation, taking into account the appreciation and expectation Japan receives from the international community. In addition, when participating in PKO, Japan will endeavor to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including ODA projects.

Moreover, in order to implement seamless assistance in security-related areas, including through further strategic utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance, as well as coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Japan will develop a system that enables assistance to potential recipient organizations that cannot receive Japan's assistance under the current schemes.

Furthermore, Japan as a whole will proactively engage in training for peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries. When engaging in such efforts, Japan will consult closely with countries or organizations that have experience in the same fields, including the U.S., Australia and European countries.

- (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism  
Acts of terrorism are unjustifiable regardless of their motivation and must be firmly condemned. It is important for the international community as a whole to take a firm position against them.

Japan will promote international counter-terrorism efforts with the international community for national security. Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation; reinforcement of the international legal framework to stringently punish terrorists; and assistance

to developing countries which do not have sufficient capacity for counter-terrorism and other measures.

Furthermore, Japan must be aware that terrorism and transnational organized crime are closely linked in light of the situation whereby the proceeds of organized crime, such as illicit trafficking, the trade of arms and drugs, and kidnapping, form an important source of funding for terrorists. Therefore, Japan will enhance international cooperation and assistance for developing countries to prevent and combat transnational organized crime.

5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues

Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community, such as poverty, energy issues, widening disparity, climate change, natural disasters, and food-related issues, through the active and strategic utilization of ODA, as necessary.

(1) Sharing Universal Values

Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights including women's rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.

The wave of democratization that began in the countries of Eastern Europe and ASEAN in the 1990s and spread to the countries of the Arab world at the beginning of the 2010s has become an irreversible tide, coupled with the rapid development of globalization and market-oriented economic reforms.

On the other hand, as was observed in the “Arab Spring,” the process of democratization does not always proceed smoothly. As an advanced, liberal and democratic nation, based on the principle of human security, Japan will actively utilize its ODA in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights, and contribute to the enhancement of the growing international trend towards the protection of human rights, including through dialogues in the area of human rights.

Japan will also engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women, cooperating with the international community to implement measures to empower women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and promote their social advancement.

(2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security

Japan has garnered high recognition by the international community, by its proactive contribution to global development in the world through utilizing ODA. Addressing development issues contributes to the enhancement of the global security environment, and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

Against this backdrop, in order to contribute to the realization of human security, Japan will utilize its ODA in a strategic and effective manner. Japan will also strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, in areas such as poverty eradication, global health, education and water, in cooperation with diverse stakeholders, including international organizations and NGOs.

In addition, Japan will play a leading role in the formulation of new international development goals, namely the post-2015 development agenda. In this context, Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community, building on our initiatives on this agenda to date.

Moreover, Japan will share the lessons learned and experiences from the many natural disasters that it has experienced, including the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. Given the expanding scale, impact and frequency of disasters globally, Japan will take the lead in international cooperation on disaster management and ensure that communities around the world have a high degree of resilience to disasters.

(3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries

Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including eminent students and administrative officials who are expected to become future leaders. Japan will make use of such opportunities to learn from their knowledge and experience, as well as providing them with opportunities to be familiarized with Japanese systems, technologies and expertise. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to enhance mutual understanding with Japan, and ensure that these personnel can contribute to sustainable economic and social development in their home countries.

Japan will engage in efforts to maintain and develop such human networks to expand and reinforce the foundations of cooperation.

(4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System

The expansion of the open and rule-based international economic system, where Japan continues to be a major player, is essential for the world economy and Japan's economic prosperity.

In this regard, Japan will promote economic partnership, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China and the ROK, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), so as to achieve comprehensive and high-level trade agreements. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the growth of the global economy, which in turn, will also bring economic growth to Japan.

In addition, rule-making for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region through the above-mentioned efforts strengthens the vigor and prosperity in the region, and has a strategic importance of strengthening the foundation for a stable security environment in the region.

It is expected that the conclusion of such 21st-century economic partnership agreements will set new and attractive precedents of trade liberalization, and promote global-scale trade liberalization in the multilateral trade regime based on the WTO.

(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues

The stable supply of energy and other resources is essential for a vibrant Japanese economy and thus constitutes a challenge to national security. Promoting measures such as the diversification of supply sources is necessary for securing stable and low-cost resource supply. Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools to gain the understanding of countries concerned in this course.

In the area of climate change, Japan will increase its engagements towards emission reduction. Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming (the Actions for Cool Earth (ACE)) that utilizes its strengths in outstanding technologies on environment and energy, and its assistance to developing countries. At the same time, Japan will engage in establishing a fair and effective international framework with participation by all countries. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the achievement of emission reduction by the international community as a whole and to the resolution of climate change issues.

(6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges

People-to-people exchanges are significant as they enhance mutual understanding and friendship between countries and solidify national ties, while also helping to develop a stable and friendly security environment by deepening an appropriate understanding towards Japan in the international community.

In particular, Japan will implement measures to expand two-way youth exchanges and will seek to strengthen relations with various countries into the future. For example, Japan has recently marked 40 years of friendship and cooperation with ASEAN, where regional integration is advancing while maintaining cultural diversity. By further vitalizing exchange programs with ASEAN, Japan will further promote mutual understanding.

Moreover, through events of interest for the world, such as the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo, Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture, and will work to construct and deepen friendly relations at the individual level.

6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding

In order to fully ensure national security, in addition to strengthening key capabilities with diplomatic power and defense force at their core,

it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for these capabilities to be effectively demonstrated.

Furthermore, considering the importance of seeking a deeper understanding for Japan's security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security, Japan will advance the following measures.

(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases

Defense production and technological bases are one of the important factors that support defense forces through research, development, production, operation and maintenance of defense equipment. In order to develop, maintain and operate defense capability steadily with limited resources in the medium- to long-term, Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness.

(2) Boosting Communication Capabilities

In order to promote its security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its policy to the world and its people, and increase transparency. In this regard, it is necessary to deepen the understanding among the people of Japan regarding security policy and build cooperative relations and trust with other countries.

To this end, with the Prime Minister's office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages.

In addition, the Government as a whole will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks. In doing so, Japan will promote Japanese language education overseas, and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas.

At a time when the global security environment is becoming more complex and diverse, it becomes increasingly likely for countries to have conflicting interests. However, by precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan's position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the forum of international opinion, and contribute to the stability of the international community.

(3) Reinforcing the Social Base

In order to support national security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity. In addition, it is also essential that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity.

To that end, the Government of Japan will promote the following measures: foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region; raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty; and ensure the understanding and cooperation of residents around defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for the activities of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan, through advancing measures that widen the understanding of the general public about the current status of such activities.

(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base

In order to invigorate a national discussion and debate and contribute to high-quality policymaking on national security, Japan will seek to enhance and strengthen education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education, including through the dispatch of officials of relevant ministries. In addition, Japan will promote practical research on national security, and engage in deepening exchanges among the Government, higher education institutions and think tanks, thereby promoting the sharing of insight and knowledge.

Furthermore, Japan will promote the creation of experts and government officials that can make practical and constructive contributions to national security policy, thus broadening the pool of experts on national security.

## Reference 8 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)

Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond are included in the reference.

Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of FY2013.

(Additional reference)

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond

### I. NDPG's Objective

In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond" as new guidelines for Japan's national defense, based on "Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013" (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the "National Security Strategy" (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).

### II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it retains the largest national power.

There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called "gray-zone" situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite non-proliferation efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent security challenges.

In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally asserted their rights and took action based on their own assertion concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas.

Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation. In addition, military strategies and military balance in the future are anticipated to be significantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology.

2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in non-traditional security fields. In the meantime, gray-zone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations.

North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities.

North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire

region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities.

In particular, North Korea's ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea's nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan's security.

As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency concerning its military and security is not fully achieved.

In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan's airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an "Air Defense Identification Zone" based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas.

China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan.

As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security.

As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active.

The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the region in cooperation with allies and partners.

3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic, through strengthening an "Open and Stable Seas" order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity.

Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale disasters.

4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military

conflict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability.

### III. Japan's Basic Defense Policy

#### 1. Basic Policy

In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.

Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.

When implementing these measures, under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

#### 2. Japan's Own Efforts

Recognizing that a country's security depends first and foremost on its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned.

##### (1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture

Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others.

Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety.

In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will

increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises.

##### (2) Japan's defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and represent Japan's will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan.

In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force's (SDF's) total functions and capabilities against various situations.

Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including “gray zone” situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter “ISR”) activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan's territorial land, waters and airspace.

Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.

At the same time, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, non-traditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the diversified roles and increased opportunities of the defense force.

From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF's operation.

##### 3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and

presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with its allies, including Japan, and partner countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severer, it has become more important than ever for Japan's security to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective.

(1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

In order to ensure Japan's national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance's contingency response capabilities, while strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to "gray-zone" situations.

To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response and medium-to long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields

The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake.

In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance.

(3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there.

4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation

(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region

In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.

Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of

Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.

Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia.

Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks among Japan, the U.S. and ROK and among Japan, the U.S. and Australia.

As Chinese activities have a significant impact on regional security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China in order to enhance mutual understanding and will develop confidence-building measures to prevent unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan.

Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2"), high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding about the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability.

Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance. In addition, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the field of disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities.

As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including the Official Development Assistance, and aligning it with joint training and exercises and international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen cooperation with relevant countries which actively provide such support, thereby expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope.

Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan in cooperation with the United States and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises and play a major role in enhancing confidence-building measures among countries in the region, attaching importance to multilateral frameworks such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus.

(2) Cooperation with the international community

It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, there are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role not only in preventing and responding to conflicts and maintaining peace but also in supporting post-conflict reconstruction, building peace and promoting confidence-building and friendly relationships.

Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community.

Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance in order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conflicts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, while

regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries with which it shares security interests and with international organizations and other relevant bodies.

In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries and will work with them in responding to these challenges. Japan will also promote cooperation and exchanges with regard to equipment and technology with these countries and organizations.

In order to stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment based on the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities, including international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities, in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with comprehensive consideration given to the significance of the dispatch of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries.

With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility at organizations such as the local mission headquarters and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.

#### IV. Future Defense Forces

##### 1. The Role of the Defense Force

Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above, and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.

##### (1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations

In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of development at an early stage.

Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring.

At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation.

Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner.

When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are emphasized in particular:

##### a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan

In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan.

##### b. Response to an attack on remote islands

In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in

accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately.

##### c. Response to ballistic missile attacks

Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-layered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy the infiltrating units.

##### d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society’s growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives.

##### e. Responses to major disasters

Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer term, when required. Moreover, as well as providing a meticulous response to the needs of disaster-stricken citizens and local government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate partnerships and cooperation with local governments and the private sector, in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide livelihood support.

##### (2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and improvement of global security environments

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole including the vicinity of Japan.

Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance, effectively fulfilling its key role in initiatives focused on the stabilization of the security environment, including the building and strengthening of intra-regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security environment.

Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when engaging in the aforementioned initiatives.

##### a. Holding training and exercises

As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

##### b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative

relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace.

c. Promoting capacity building assistance

Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

d. Ensuring maritime security

As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an "Open and Stable Seas" order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country.

e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities

Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted overseas deployment.

f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation

Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF's knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of arms and goods and technology which could be diverted to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives.

2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces

(1) Basic approach

The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.

Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.

At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization.

(2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized

From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces.

a. ISR capabilities

In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.

b. Intelligence capabilities

Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its vicinity.

In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly capable personnel in information gathering analysis.

c. Transport capability

In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments among various means of transport, considering their respective characteristics.

d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities

In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, the SDF will take steps to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF's units such as basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control function in each regional army headquarters, and other measures.

Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services.

e. Response to an attack on remote islands

In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc.

Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan's remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands.

Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region.

In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

f. Response to ballistic missile attacks

To counter North Korea's improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the threat of ballistic missiles.

With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable

response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan's own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary.

g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace

While strengthening information collection capability using satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S.

As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that hinder efficient SDF activities.

h. Responses to major disasters, etc.

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach.

i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities

In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation.

From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti.

Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities.

3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table.

(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

- a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and international peace cooperation activities.

Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c. above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido,

given the excellent training environment there.

The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deploy ability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF.

- b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in order to prevent invasion of Japan's remote islands while still at sea, as far as possible.
- c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below.
- d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.

(2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)

- a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment, including the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and international peace cooperation activities etc.

Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of providing Japan with multi-layered defense against ballistic missile attacks.

- b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.
- c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.
- d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred to in a. above.

(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

- a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control units will be equipped with ground-based warning and control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct effective warning, surveillance and control in the air over long periods in the event of "gray zone" situations.
- b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will enable fighter aircraft units and air warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan.
- c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively carry out the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and international peace cooperation activities etc.
- d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. above, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the

surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (1) c. above.

## V. Basic Foundations for SDF

To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows.

### 1. Training and Exercises

Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises.

In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises.

### 2. Operational Infrastructure

The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively.

Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.

The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away.

The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition.

### 3. Personnel and Education

Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.

The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan's security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations as part of the government.

In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration

with local governments and relevant organizations.

In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel.

### 4. Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians.

The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities.

### 5. Defense Production and Technological Bases

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence.

At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan's defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of the defense industry.

In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.

With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-stricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this context, from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items.

Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.

### 6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment through introducing a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts and further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment.

Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system, and strive to achieve more rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment.

#### 7. Research and Development

The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation.

In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan's technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.

From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology effectively also in the field of security through regularly assessing the trend in science and technology including information related to technological development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government, industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense will strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be applied to defense (dual-use technologies), by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies.

The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives.

#### 8. Collaboration with Local Communities

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment support for them.

Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement and operation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy.

#### 9. Boosting Communication Capabilities

The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties.

#### 10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base

The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.

#### 11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF's joint operation functions and enhancing policy-making and communication functions.

#### VI. Additional Points

1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan's defense force over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense force will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment while advancing such initiatives in a timely and appropriate manner.
2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately.
3. In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan's defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.

Category		Present (as of the end of FY2013)	Future
GSDF	Authorized Number of personnel	approx. 159,000	159,000
	Active-Duty Personnel	approx. 151,000	151,000
	Reserve-Ready Personnel	approx. 8,000	8,000
	Major units	Rapid Deployment Units	Central Readiness Force 1 armored division 3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade
		Regional Deployment Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units	5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions)
		Submarine Units	5 divisions
		Minesweeping Units	5 divisions
		Patrol aircraft Units	1 flotilla 9 squadrons
ASDF	Major equipment	Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	47 (6)
		Submarines	16
		Combat Aircraft	approx. 170
			approx. 170
ASDF	Major units	Air Warning & Control Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)
		Fighter Aircraft Units	12 squadrons
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron
		Air Refueling/Transport Units	1 squadron
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	6 groups
ASDF	Major equipment	Combat aircraft	approx. 340
		Fighters	approx. 260

Notes: The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future.

Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above.

**Reference 9 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)**

(December 17, 2013 Approved by  
National Security Council and the Cabinet)

The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as shown in the attached document.

(Attachment)

Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

**I. Program Guidelines**

In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter “NDPG2013”), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be efficiently developed by comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the SDF's overall functions and capabilities against various scenarios.

Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following program guidelines:

1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security environment such as U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and others in the fields of non-traditional security). The SDF will steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and capabilities.
2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup in Japan's southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities.

At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of its activities.

3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness.
4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF's strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF

will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system.

5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for furthering smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
6. Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan's public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

**II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units**

1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades, an armored division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.

In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By establishing a coast observation unit, area security units in charge of initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established.

From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies.

2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG). Five divisions will consist of other destroyers as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued.
3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base.

To prevent the relative decline of Japan's air defense capabilities and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills.

4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013.

### III. Major Programs regarding SDF's Capabilities

#### 1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations

##### (1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan

In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take necessary measures after fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number of destroyers, the SDF will also introduce new, compact-type hull destroyers with additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft, and fixed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In addition, the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the establishment of a joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad areas. The SDF will also undertake organizational reform that integrate ground-based aerial search and rescue functions into the ASDF, which are currently performed by both the MSDF and ASDF.

##### (2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands

###### (a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure

With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering the current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C), the SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft as stated in (1), and establish one squadron consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-prepared surveillance posture will be maintained.

###### (b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority

For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two as stated in Section II-3, continue to facilitate procurement of fighter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its fighter aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.

###### (c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy

In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-

submarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting service-extension activities on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities as situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-to-ship guided missiles.

##### (d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response

In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) will continue to be procured. Besides the ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering the possibility of new multipurpose helicopters that will succeed the existing multipurpose helicopters (UH-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation.

The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles that support units' amphibious landing efforts on remote islands, and refitting existing Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding its acquisition. With a view to efficiently conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF's transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private sector and reserve personnel.

Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range.

##### (e) Development of C3I

From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed at establishing a command and control system which enables the dynamic operation of units across the country so as to immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands, the SDF will take steps to station GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. In addition, as stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite the establishment of the Ground Central Command, while promoting efficiency and rationalizing the command and control functions of each regional army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some regional army headquarters.

With regard to the information and communications

capabilities which serve as a foundation for nation-wide operations, and the goal of strengthening the communications infrastructure on remote islands, the SDF will extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance data link functions among the three services, upgrade the field communications systems, continue to promote the utilization of outer space for defense-related purposes, and develop an X-Band communications satellite with high performance. The SDF will take additional necessary measures after considering the necessity of further enhancements to its communications systems.

### (3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Given North Korea's improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles.

For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems.

Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture, and make an effort to establish the basis for deployment of the SDF to respond to a ballistic missile attack.

The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. Also, based on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., with a view to strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole by enhancing Japan's own deterrence and response capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures.

In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units. In sensitive locations such as where a number of nuclear power plants are located, the SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants.

### (4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace

#### (a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space

The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation including in

the area of personnel development with such organizations.

#### (b) Response to Cyber Attacks

To continuously ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks, with consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint operations and efficiency in resource allocations, the SDF will establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command and control systems and information communication networks of the three services, to strengthen capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with allies.

Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts.

To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises.

### (5) Response to Large-scale Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people's lives. In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private sector's efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF's disaster and deployment operations is affected.

### (6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence.

With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment, the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map or image, while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will

also reinforce its posture for gathering and analyzing information from overseas through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for collecting public information.

In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs from policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise manner, in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information gathering and analysis capabilities, through such efforts as the review of its recruitment efforts and the composition of its human resources to develop highly competent analysts, integration and enhancement of its cross-organizational intelligence curriculum, and regularization of the efforts to place the intelligence side personnel for a given period in the policy departments and operational sides.

Considering the importance of information security, under the current severe fiscal situation, and in pursuit of more efficient intelligence gathering, the MOD will promote the all-source analysis expected to create great synergies, through seeking to enhance the posture of and the effective collection management, and facilitating complete information sharing between those who need to know, including relevant government agencies.

## 2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments

From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The following elements will be particularly important to these efforts:

### (1) Holding Training and Exercises

In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation's resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative relationships with relevant countries.

### (2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring the stable use of outer space and cyberspace.

### (3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance

By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will help countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such fields as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries. Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient support in capacity building.

### (4) Ensuring Maritime Security

For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas”, which serve as the cornerstone of Japan's peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime state, and ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage a variety of opportunities to promote combined training and exercises with countries which share Japan's

goal of maintaining maritime security.

## (5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities

To immediately commence international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will reinforce its emergency response and transport capabilities. To steadily engage in its activities for the long term, the SDF will work to further ensure the safety of its activities by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which are highly appreciated at the SDF's activity areas, the SDF will work to facilitate international peace cooperation activities that more effectively meet the needs of the SDF's activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role in the field of international peace cooperation activity, and will send more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which would help Japan in making more contribution in the field.

The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds.

To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation in such operations.

## (6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation

In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as their means of delivery pose a severe threat to the peace and stability not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a whole, in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

## 3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability

### (1) Training and Exercises

To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, the SDF's joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of well-trained units stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training and exercises in the SDF's southwestern region, where only limited space is available for SDF training, and accounting for relations with local communities, the MOD will continue effort to expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF. In addition, actively engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad with U.S. Forces such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities.

Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations including civil protection on a regular basis in a tailored manner.

### (2) Operational Infrastructure

Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid deployment and response to various contingencies as well as

for ensuring a sustained response posture for the long term, the resiliency of military camps and bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF will strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as runways, information-communication infrastructure, and stable fuel supply. For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary measures will be taken with consideration especially to developing a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations, as well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted.

To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what activities hamper improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance.

### (3) Personnel and Education

Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale.

#### (a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution

Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman.

To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including systems used by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more appropriately with consideration to personnel's physical strength so as to maintain SDF's strength.

#### (b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF's strength.

To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program.

In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan's security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of situations.

### (c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support

In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.

As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment.

### (d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff

In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector's transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve personnel including those who have experience as ship crew. The SDF will also encourage the appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations. Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.

### (4) Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in the field of defense medical science.

### (5) Defense Production and Technology Base

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and

Japan's intention to maintain and reinforce above-mentioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan's defense production and technology base as a whole.

With a view to enhancing the technological capability and improving productivity of Japan's defense production and technology base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development, such as through international joint development and production with other countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses.

The MOD will promote international joint development and production and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benefit both manufacturers and the government.

#### (6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

To carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, a project manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project management including insertion of a technological perspective throughout the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate production, acquisition, sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual disposal. In relevant efforts, the MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector's knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs.

To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types and allow for the efficient acquisition of various equipment, the government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower costs, and establish a flexible system for accepting orders such as, the use of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective, globally competitive companies.

#### (7) Research and Development (R&D)

Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan's severe fiscal situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF.

In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles in view of replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle-range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft.

With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological advantage in the areas of strategically important fields, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes in battle field techniques, the potential for international joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations among major pieces of equipment.

From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientific technological trends including information relevant to technological development and gathering industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities.

In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration of the items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and development posture, and take necessary measures.

#### (8) Collaboration with Local Communities

As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.

Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders.

#### (9) Boosting Communication Capabilities

Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks with due consideration to consistency in the information content. Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be facilitated by such means as improvement of its English web site.

#### (10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base

To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD's headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the MOD faces in a timely and

appropriate manner.

#### (11) Promoting Reform of the MOD

The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its defense force build-up, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.

#### IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

##### 1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan's national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while strengthening Japan's own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.

Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.

Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.

Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.

##### 2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS).

#### V. Quantities of Major Procurement

The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment.

#### VI. Expenditures

1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in FY2013 prices.
2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next five years.
3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions.

#### VII. Other

While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.

Service	Equipment	Quantity
GSDF	Mobile Combat Vehicles	99
	Armored Vehicles	24
	Amphibious Vehicles	52
	Tilt-Rotor Aircraft	17
	Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA)	6
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles	9 companies
	Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles	5 companies
	Tanks	44
MSDF	Howitzers (expect mortars)	31
	Destroyers	5
	(Aegis-Equipped Destroyers)	(2)
	Submarines	5
	Other Ships	5
	Total	15
	(Tonnage)	(approx. 52,000 t)
	Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)	23
	Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K)	23
ASDF	Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)	9
	New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft	4
	Fighters (F-35A)	28
	Fighter Modernization (F-15)	26
	New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft	3
	Transport Aircraft (C-2)	10
Joint units	Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)	2 groups & education
	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	3

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above.

#### Reference 10 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 17, 2013)

1. The Government of Japan approved the "National Security Strategy", the "National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond" ("the new NDPG") and the "Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-2018)" through approval by the National Security Council (NSC) and the Cabinet today.  
These three documents serve as important pillars of the security policy of the Abe Administration, following the recent establishment of the National Security Council.
2. The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly tense. Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, and take national security measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society.  
Based on this view, the National Security Strategy centering on foreign policy and defense policy was formulated as fundamental policies pertaining to national security for the first time in Japan, based on the Prime Minister's instruction given in September.
3. The Strategy has "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation as the fundamental principle of national security.  
The Strategy clearly states that Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in the international community, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the region, coordinating closely with concerned countries including the U.S.
4. Under such a fundamental principle, the Strategy sets forth Japan's national interests and national security objectives, identifies national security challenges it faces, and clearly presents comprehensive measures as a strategic approach to appropriately respond to such challenges.  
Pursuant to the Strategy, and with the recently established National Security Council serving as the control tower, the Government of Japan intends to implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner, and take all measures to secure national security.
5. The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond was formulated as a document to set forth new guidelines for Japan's future national defense, based on Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013 that was approved by the Cabinet in January this year, and the

National Security Strategy.

6. The new NDPG states that under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. It also states that Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies, and that Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities.
  7. In order for Japan’s defense force to be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand, the new NDPG states that Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I), with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) operation.
  8. The Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-2018) was formulated to achieve the defense level to be obtained by Japan as set forth in the new NDPG in about 10 years, and is a plan to be achieved during the first five years.
  9. The new Medium Term Defense Program states that with a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities, as well as functions and capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. Under this policy, the Program sets forth major programs to effectively play the role of defense capabilities.
  10. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24,670 billion in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next five years.
  11. In order to fully secure Japan’s security, it is essential to enhance Japan’s domestic infrastructure as well as promote understanding in and outside Japan. The Government of Japan will report today’s decision to the Diet, and strive to proactively disseminate information.
- I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

**Reference 11** **Defense Minister’s Statement on the Approval of the “National Security Strategy”, the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond”, and the “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014 to FY2018)”**

(December 17, 2013)

1. Today, the National Security Council and the Cabinet approved Japan’s first “National Security Strategy”, and, based on this, the new “National Defense Program Guidelines (new NDPG)” and the new “Medium Term Defense Program (new MTDP)” were adopted.
2. The Strategy defines Japan’s basic policy on national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on its national interests from a long-term perspective. The fundamental principle of the Strategy is for Japan to contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation.

The Strategy calls for the building of a comprehensive defense architecture to firmly defend Japan, while clearly defining Japan’s defense force as the final guarantee of its national security. The MOD, in accordance with the Strategy, will develop a highly effective and joint defense force, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. At the same time, Japan will also

advance the coordination among government, local governments, and the private sector.

3. Specific details of Japan’s approach to its future national defense based on the Strategy are defined in the new NDPG. The reason for this modified approach to Japan’s defense capabilities found in the new NDPG is because the security environment surrounding Japan currently has grown even more severe when compared to the security environment at the time the previous NDPG was drawn up three years ago. In particular, the Asia-Pacific region, including the area surrounding Japan, has seen an increase in so-called “gray zone” situations; that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.

In particular, over the previous one-year period, North Korea has defiantly launched ballistic missiles and carried out nuclear tests, and made provocative statements citing specific locations in Japan as being within its missile target range. As a result, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development has become a serious and imminent threat to the Japan’s security.

Furthermore, China has shown a heavy-handed response, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. For example, Chinese government vessels have intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and Chinese aircraft intruded into Japan’s airspace. In addition, China has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations. These actions included a Chinese naval warship locking its fire control radar on a MSDF destroyer and China’s establishment of “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” based on its distinctive view. Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities.

4. Given this increasingly severe security environment, there are three pillars for Japan to maintain its sovereignty and independence, to defend its territorial integrity, to ensure the security of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to maintain Japan’s peace. These pillars are: (1) Japan’s own efforts; (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) active promotion of security cooperation.
5. First, the cornerstone behind protecting Japan’s peace and security is none other than Japan’s own individual efforts. As was stated earlier, amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, and the events requiring an SDF response have increased rapidly and such responses tend to be more prolonged. It is extremely important to prevent situations from becoming more serious and to minimize damages by effectively responding to situations as they emerge and escalate. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent monitoring and surveillance to detect various provocations early and the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture that can respond to conditions, including deploying units in a mobile manner.

From this perspective, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities.

6. As specific measures, the new NDPG draws out general SDF-wide functions and capabilities that should be emphasized particularly from a comprehensive perspective and requires capability assessments based on joint operations, so that the SDF can more respond more effectively to various scenarios, such as response to attacks on remote islands and response to ballistic missile attacks.

On top of this, the NDPG specifies important matters surrounding the development of the structure for each branch of the SDF and requires that limited resources be distributed flexibly and with priority. Through this, the goal is to build defense capabilities that are even better modulated than before while emphasizing quality and quantity, and clarifying the priority of defense force development.

7. In light of the above, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which

emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF's operation.

8. Second is the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan's own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan's national security, and play an extremely important role securing the pace and security of not only Japan, but the peace, security and prosperity of the region and international community as well.

Therefore, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and widely promote initiatives for strengthening collaboration between the SDF and U.S. Forces to heighten the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Japan will carry out measures that support the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. At the same time, initiatives will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities, especially Okinawa Prefecture, while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. Forces.

9. Third is active promotion of security cooperation with related countries. The international community today is faced with spread of international terrorism as well as problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace. This has caused an increase in the number of difficult security challenges that a single country can no longer respond to alone. Therefore, Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to ensuring the peace, security and prosperity of the world, proactively engaging in international peace cooperation activities and strengthening its bilateral and multilateral security cooperation,

following its stance of being a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

10. The new NDPG sets out targets for the buildup of Japan's defense force over the next decade or so, while the new MTDP establishes the primary programs and expenses for the initial five years. This will enable the efficient development of a highly effective and joint defense force. In doing so, particular emphasis will be given to strengthening the defense posture for the southwest region, and maritime supremacy and air superiority will be maintained to achieve an effective deterrent and response to various situations. Emphasis will be placed also on response capabilities for deploying units in a prompt manner, while considering the establishment of a broad logistical support infrastructure.

The expenditures required to implement the defense force development in the MTDP amount to approximately ¥24,670 billion in FY 2013 prices. This marks ¥1.280 billion increase over the previous MTDP. The development of defense capabilities from the new MTDP will save roughly ¥700 billion for this duration of this program in harmony with other measures taken by Government. The MOD will strive to steadily develop defense capabilities aimed at establishing a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, giving consideration to efficient resource allocation based on a continued approach that emphasises total optimization.

11. National defense would not be stand without the support of each and every citizen. With this in mind, the MOD and SDF will give their utmost efforts to safeguarding the people's lives and properties as well as Japan's territory, territorial waters and airspace, and to living up to the expectations and trust of the people. We sincerely wish to gain the understanding and support of all people of Japan.

#### Reference 12 Breakdown of the Procurement of Major Equipment in FY2014

Procurement type		FY2013 Number Procured	FY2013 Corrected Number Procured	FY2014	
				Number Procured	Amount (¥100 million)
Aircraft	GSDF	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	1 aircraft	1 aircraft	—
		Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	—	2 aircraft	—
		Attack helicopter (AH-64D)	1 aircraft	—	—
		Restoration of Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	(1 aircraft)	—	(1) 36
	MSDF	Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1)	2 aircraft	—	3 aircraft 594 (6)
		Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	—	—	4 aircraft 242 (2)
		Rescue amphibian (US-2)	1 aircraft	—	—
		Primary trainer (T-5)	3 aircraft	—	—
		Helicopter trainer (TH-135)	3 aircraft	—	2 aircraft 15
		Life extension of fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-3C)	(2 aircraft)	—	(3 aircraft) 15 (0.7)
		Life extension of lifespan of patrol helicopter (SH-60J)	(2 aircraft)	—	(2 aircraft) 12
		Capability improvement of radar mounted on fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-3C)	—	—	4 sets 9 (5)
		Capability improvement of infrared detection system on fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-3C)	—	—	4 sets 3
	ASDF	fighter aircraft (F-35A)	2 aircraft	—	4 aircraft 638 (425)
		Modernization of fighter aircraft (F-15)	(6 aircraft)	—	(12 aircraft) 151
		Upgrading of on-board NVG of fighter aircraft (F-15)	—	—	(1 aircraft) 0.8 (13)
		Improvement of air-to-air combat capability of fighter (F-2)	(12 aircraft)	—	(12 aircraft) 126
			—	—	(30 sets)
		Addition of JDAM function to fighter (F-2)	(11 aircraft)	—	(4 aircraft) 11
		Transport aircraft (C-2)	—	—	2 aircraft 398 (3)
		Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	—	—	3 aircraft 117 (4)
		Improvement in capability of Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) (E-767)	Upgrade (—)	—	—
			Parts (1 set)	—	(1 set) 137
Vessel	MSDF	Destroyer (DD)	1 vessel	—	1 vessel 729 (14)
		Submarine (SS)	—	—	1 vessel 517 (3)

Procurement type			FY2013 Number Procured	FY2013 Corrected Number Procured	FY2014	
					Number Procured	Amount (¥100 million)
Vessels	MSDF	Minesweeper ocean (MSO)	1 vessel	—	1 vessel	177 (9)
		Submarine rescue ship (ASR)	1 vessel	—	1 vessel	507 (26)
		Life extension of Hatsuyuki-class destroyer	( — )	—	(1 vessel)	6
			(3 vessel)	—	(4 vessel)	
		Life extension of Asagiri-class destroyer	(2 vessel)	—	(2 vessel)	42
			(4 vessel)	—	(3 vessel)	
		Life extension of Abukuma-class destroyer	( — )	—	(2 vessel)	25
			(4 vessel)	—	(4 vessel)	
		Life extension of Hatakaze-class destroyer	( — )	—	(1 vessel)	25
			(1 vessel)	—	( — )	
		Life extension of Oyashio-class submarine	(2 vessel)	—	(1 vessel)	5
			(1 vessel)	—	(2 vessel)	
		Life extension of Towada-class oiler	( — )	—	(2 vessel)	26
			(2 vessel)	—	(2 vessel)	
		Function improvement of short-range SAM systems on Takanami-class destroyers	—	—	( — )	39
			—	—	(5 vessel)	
		Life extension of Landing Craft Air Cushion	(2 vessel)	—	(2 vessel)	3
			( — )	—	( — )	
Missile	GSDF	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM)	—	—	1 company	175 (22)
		Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile	—	—	1 set	45 (18)
		Mid-range multi-purpose missile	11 sets	—	18 sets	72
		Type-12 surface-to-ship missile	4 vehicles	—	16 vehicles	309
	ASDF	Surface-to-air missile for base air defense	—	—	—	8
Firearms/vehicles	GSDF	9mm pistol	90 guns	—	—	—
		Type-89 rifle	6,949 guns	—	6,726 guns	18
		Anti-personnel sniper rifle	75 guns	—	50 guns	0.6
		5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	188 guns	—	—	—
		12.7-mm heavy machine gun	114 guns	—	—	—
		84-mm recoilless gun (B)	17 mortar	—	24 mortar	3
		81-mm mortar L16	5 mortar	—	1 mortar	0.1
		120-mm mortar RT	2 mortar	—	1 mortar	0.4
		Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	6 vehicles	—	6 vehicles	59
		Type-10 tank	14 vehicles	—	13 vehicles	134
		Light armored vehicle	44 vehicles	34 vehicles	30 vehicles	10
		Type-96 armored personnel carrier	11 vehicles	—	8 vehicles	12
		Type-87 reconnaissance combat vehicle	1 vehicle	—	—	—
		NBC reconnaissance vehicle	2 vehicles	—	1 vehicle	8
		Vehicle, communications equipment, facility equipment, etc.	—	49.6 billion yen	—	540 (18)
	ASDF	Light armored vehicle	1 vehicle	—	1 vehicle	0.3
BMD	MSDF	Upgrade of Aegis ships	(2 vessels)	—	(2vessels)	103

## Notes:

1. The procurement amount for FY2013 indicates the number that was envisioned in the original budget.
2. Price represents amount, excluding non-recurrent costs, needed for the production of equipment. The non-recurrent costs are indicated in parentheses in the amount column (external value).
3. "Number procured" indicates the number that is newly contracted in 2014. (The period for acquiring the items varies by equipment, but can take between two to five years.)
4. The number in brackets represents the number related to upgrading the existing commissioned equipment.
5. Regarding the number for the improvement of air-to-air combat capability of fighters (F-2) and improvement in capability of Airborne Warning And Control Systems (E-767), the upper figure represents the number of services of aircraft modified, while the lower figure represents the number of parts, etc. necessary for the improvement. One set to be procured for improvement in the capability of airborne warning and control system (E-767) in FY2014 indicates a portion of the parts, etc. necessary for improving the capabilities of four aircraft. Regarding the volume of procurement for the life extension of vessels, the upper figure represents the number of ships subject to life extension work and the lower figure represents the number of parts procured for life extension work.
6. The number of procurements for capability improvement of Aegis ships in FY2014 represents the number of procurements of parts, etc., for upgrading two Atago-class destroyers with Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability, which started in FY2012.

**Reference 13 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned and Their Performance Specifications**

Number

(As of March 31, 2014)

Type	Recoilless Guns	Mortars	Field Artillery	Rocket Launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft Machine Guns	Tanks	Armored Vehicles
Approximate number owned	2,710	1,100	500	600	50	690	970

Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

**Performance Specifications and Data**

Type	Item	Artillery	Total Weight (ton)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity/No. of Operators (persons)
Tanks	Type-10 tank	120-mm anti-tank gun	Approx.44	Approx.70	3
	Type-90 tank	120-mm anti-tank gun	Approx.50	Approx.70	3
Armed vehicles	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher	Approx.15	Approx.100	10
	Type-89 armored combat vehicle	35-mm machine gun	Approx.27	Approx.70	10
	Type-82 command and communication vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Approx.14	Approx.100	8
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	25-mm machine gun	Approx.15	Approx.100	5
Field artillery	155-mm howitzer FH70	155-mm howitzer	Approx.9.6	Approx.16	9
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155-mm howitzer	Approx.40	Approx.49	4
	203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203-mm howitzer	Approx.28	Approx.54	5
Anti-aircraft machine guns	Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35-mm anti-aircraft machine gun	Approx.38	Approx.53	3

Notes: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit. The maximum speed indicated above is the maximum speed of the howitzer with the supplementary power unit activated.

**Reference 14 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications**

(As of March 31, 2014)

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	2	290	2(5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	7	300	2(8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	70	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	84	140	1(3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	34	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H /J	Utility	141	120	2(11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	58	150/140	3(55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	36	150	2(12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		AH-64D	Combat	10	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-3C	Patrol	73	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	43	150	3	20/15	16/3	Turboshaft, twin-engine
		SH-60K	Patrol	42	140	4	20/16	16/3	Turboshaft, twin-engine
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	6	150	8	30/22	24/8	Turboshaft, triple engine
		MCH-101	Minesweeping and transport	5	150	4	23/20	19/5	Turboshaft, triple engine
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Fighter	201	mach 2.5	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engine
		F-4EJ	Fighter	60	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine
		F-2A/B	Fighter	92	mach 2	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, single-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	13	mach 2.2	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engine

Service	Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
ASDF	Fixed-wing	C-1	Transport	26	440	5(60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	15	340	6(92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		KC-767	Aerial refueling Transport	4	460	4-8(200)	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine
		KC-130H	Addition of aerial refueling functions	1	340	6(92)	30	40	Turboprop, quadruple-engine
		E-2C	Early warning	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engine
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engine
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	15	150	3(55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engine

## Notes

1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2014.
2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
3. F-4EJs include 56 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

**Reference 15** Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data

## Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2014)

Category	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	47	222
Submarine	16	45
Mine warfare ship	29	27
Patrol combatant craft	6	1
Amphibious ship	11	28
Auxiliary ship	30	126
Total	139	449

Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

## Performance Specifications and Data

Category	Class	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry		
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Atago	7,750	30	5-inch gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hyuga	13,950	30	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set	ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set		
	Souryu	2,950	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set		
Minesweeper	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set	

Category	Class	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry		
Minesweeper	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
	Hirashima	570	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1	SSM system × 1 set	
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2	

**Reference 16 Guided Missile Specifications**

(As of March 31, 2014)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Antiballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx.300	Approx.5.2	Approx.26	Program + command + radar homing
	SM-3	MSDF	Approx.1,500	Approx.6.6	Approx.35	Command + IR image homing
Antiaircraft and antimissile	Patriot (PAC-2)	ASDF	Approx.900	Approx.5.3	Approx.41	Program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx.640	Approx.5.0	Approx.36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx.570	Approx.4.9	Approx.32	Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)		Approx.100	Approx.2.7/2.9	Approx.16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDF/ASDF	Approx.100	Approx.2.7	Approx.16	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)		Approx.12	Approx.1.4	Approx.8	Image + IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)	GSDF	Approx.13	Approx.1.5	Approx.8	IR image homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)		Approx.12	Approx.1.4	Approx.8	Image + IR homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx.630	Approx.4.5	Approx.34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx.710	Approx.4.7	Approx.34	Command + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx.230	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)		Approx.300	Approx.3.8	Approx.25	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)	ASDF	Approx.230	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx.89	Approx.2.9	Approx.13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx.91	Approx.3.0	Approx.13	IR homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)		Approx.220	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B)		Approx.220	Approx.3.7	Approx.20	Radar homing
	Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)		Approx.95	Approx.3.1	Approx.13	IR homing
Antiship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDF	Approx.660	Approx.5.1	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx.680	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx.680	Approx.4.6	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx.520	Approx.3.9	Approx.34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx.660	Approx.5.1	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)	ASDF	Approx.510	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)		Approx.600	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx.540	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)		Approx.530	Approx.4.0	Approx.35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS
Antitank	Type-87 anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx.12	Approx.1.1	Approx.11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx.11	Approx.0.9	Approx.12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx.18	Approx.1.2	Approx.15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Antilanding craft and antitank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx.33	Approx.1.6	Approx.15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx.59	Approx.2.0	Approx.16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Middle range multi-purpose missile		Approx.26	Approx.1.4	Approx.14	IR image homing Laser homing
	Hellfire	MSDF	Approx.48	Approx.1.6	Approx.18	Laser homing

**Reference 17 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)**

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item Fiscal year	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	△ 0.8	8,107	△ 2.8	1,349	△ 3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	△ 0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	△ 2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
2007	5,219,000	829,088	4.0	469,784	1.3	47,818 48,016	△ 0.2 △ 0.3	0.916 0.916	5.77 5.79	10.2 10.2
2008	5,269,000	830,613	0.2	472,845	0.7	47,426 47,796	△ 0.8 △ 0.5	0.900 0.907	5.71 5.75	10.0 10.1
2009	5,102,000	885,480	6.6	517,310	9.4	47,028 47,741	△ 0.8 △ 0.1	0.922 0.936	5.31 5.39	9.1 9.2
2010	4,752,000	922,992	4.2	534,542	3.3	46,826 47,903	△ 0.4 0.3	0.985 1.008	5.07 5.19	8.76 8.96
2011	4,838,000	924,116	0.1	540,780	1.2	46,625 47,752	△ 0.4 △ 0.3	0.964 0.987	5.05 5.17	8.62 8.83
2012	4,796,000	903,339	△ 2.2	512,450	△ 5.2	46,453 47,138	△ 0.4 △ 1.3	0.969 0.983	5.14 5.22	9.06 9.20
2013	4,877,000	926,115	2.5	527,311	2.9	46,804 47,538	0.8 0.8	0.960 0.960	5.05 5.13	8.88 9.02
2014	5,004,000	958,823	3.5	564,697	7.1	47,838 48,848	2.2 2.8	0.956 0.976	4.99 5.09	8.47 8.65

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2007 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, and 12 billion yen in FY2014) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, and 89.0 billion yen in FY2014), while the lower figures include them.

**Reference 18 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)**

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item Fiscal year	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
2007	829,088	47,818 48,016	5.8 5.8	211,409	25.5	52,743	6.4	69,473	8.4
2008	830,613	47,426 47,796	5.7 5.8	217,824	26.2	53,122	6.4	67,352	8.1
2009	885,480	47,028 47,741	5.3 5.4	248,344	28.0	53,104	6.0	70,701	8.0
2010	922,992	46,826 47,903	5.1 5.2	272,686	29.5	55,872	6.1	57,731	6.3
2011	924,116	46,625 47,752	5.0 5.2	287,079	31.1	55,100	6.0	49,743	5.4
2012	903,339	46,453 47,138	5.1 5.2	263,901	29.2	54,057	6.0	45,734	5.1
2013	926,115	46,804 47,538	5.1 5.1	291,224	31.4	53,687	5.8	52,853	5.7
2014	958,823	47,838 48,848	5.0 5.1	305,175	31.8	54,421	5.7	59,685	6.2

Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul figures.

2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, and 12.0 billion FY2014) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, and 89.0 billion yen FY2014), while the lower figures include them.

**Reference 19 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)**

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	20,850	44.5 43.5	20,916	44.9 43.8	20,701	44.6 43.9	19,896	42.5 41.9	20,930	43.8 42.8
Materials	25,975 27,053	55.5 56.5	25,709 26,836	55.1 56.2	25,751 26,437	55.4 56.1	26,908 27,642	57.5 58.1	26,909 27,918	56.2 57.2
Equipment acquisition	7,738	16.5 16.1	7,800	16.7 16.3	7,565	16.3 16.0	7,442	15.9 15.7	7,964	16.6 16.3
R&D	1,588	3.4 3.3	851	1.8 1.8	944	2.0 2.0	1,541	3.3 3.2	1,477	3.1 3.0
Facility improvement	1,343	2.9 2.8	1,198	2.6 2.5	999	2.1 2.1	950	2.0 2.0	950	2.0 1.9
Maintenance	10,181	21.8 21.3	10,713	23.0 22.4	11,057	23.8 23.5	11,134	23.8 23.4	11,361	23.7 23.3
Base countermeasures	4,365	9.3 9.1	4,337	9.3 9.1	4,418	9.5 9.4	4,381	9.4 9.2	4,397	9.2 9.0
The cost for SACO-related projects	169	0.4	101	0.2	86	0.2	88	0.2	120	0.2
U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)	909	1.9	1,027	2.1	599	1.3	646	1.4	890	1.8
Others	760	1.6 1.9	810	1.7 1.7	769	1.7 1.6	1,460	3.1 3.1	760	1.6 1.6
Total	46,825 47,903	100	46,625 47,752	100	46,453 47,138	100	46,804 47,538	100	47,838 48,848	100

- Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.  
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.  
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.  
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.  
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.  
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.  
7. The "others" category in FY2013 includes an expenditure amounting to 68.9 billion yen which is necessary to be carried over to the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake.  
8. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.  
9. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, and 12.0 billion yen in FY2014) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, and 89.0 billion yen in FY2014), while the lower figures include them.

**Reference 20 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries**

Country	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014	
Japan (100 million yen)	46,826 47,903 △ 0.4% 0.3%		46,625 47,752 △ 0.4% △ 0.3%		46,453 47,138 △ 0.4% △ 1.3%		46,804 47,538 0.8% 0.8%		47,838 48,848 2.2% 2.8%	
U.S. (U.S. \$1 million)	666,703 4.7%		678,064 1.7%		650,851 △ 4.0%		607,795 △ 6.6%		593,344 △ 2.4%	
China (100 million yuan)	5,191 9.8%		5,836 12.4%		6,503 11.4%		7,202 10.7%		8,082 12.2%	
Russia (RR 100 million)	12,570.141 3.4%		15,170.906 20.7%		18,465.847 21.7%		21,064.62 14.1%		24,881.341 18.1%	
Republic of Korea (100 million won)	295,627 2.0%		314,031 6.2%		329,576 5.0%		344,970 4.7%		357,057 3.5%	
Australia (1 million Australian dollar)	26,897 1.0%		26,560 △ 1.3%		24,217 △ 8.8%		25,434 5.0%		29,303 15.2%	
U.K. (GBP 1 million)	39,461 △ 2.0%		37,169 △ 5.8%		34,260 △ 7.8%		34,800 1.6%		34,300 △ 1.4%	
France (€1 million)	37,145 △ 0.5%		37,409 0.7%		38,001 1.6%		38,124 0.3%		—	

- Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.  
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.  
3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table FY2015. Figures for FY2014 are estimated values.  
4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress.  
5. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by Australian Department of Defence.  
6. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2012 are based on U.K. Defence Statistics 2013 published by Ministry of Defence. The figure for FY2013 and 2014 is the expected amount announced in the budget message.  
7. French defense expenditures for FY2014 are undisclosed as of June 2014.  
8. In Japan, the figures in the upper row represent SACO-related expenditures (16.9 billion yen for FY2010, 10.1 billion yen for FY2011, 8.6 billion yen for FY2012, 8.8 billion yen for FY2013, and 12.0 billion yen for FY2014) and the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment from which the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community are excluded (90.9 billion yen for FY2010, 102.7 billion yen for FY2011, 59.9 billion yen for FY2012, 64.6 billion yen for FY2013, and 89.0 billion yen for FY2014). The figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget which includes the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community.

**Reference 21 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces**

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1)Authorized by: Prime Minister (2)Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of selfdefense)</li> <li>○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation)</li> <li>○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)</li> </ul>
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) <sup>1</sup> (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Establishment of positions and defense purpose facilities in the intended deployment area</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1)Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or person—delegated authority by the Minister; services—Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: supplies—not required; services—required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law</li> <li>○ Provision of services as an action measure</li> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents provided for in the Civil Protection Law, emergent measures, traffic control, etc.</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law use of weapons<sup>2</sup></li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1)Authorized by: Prime Minister (2)Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> <li>○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard</li> </ul>
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty</li> </ul>
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1)Authorized by: Prime Minister (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1)Authorized by: Prime Minister (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Counter-Piracy Operations (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law and Anti-Piracy Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counter-piracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (the Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.)</li> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Use of weapons</li> </ul>
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters <sup>3</sup>	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law evacuation, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation)</li> <li>○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)</li> </ul>
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)</li> <li>○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)</li> </ul>

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Same as in disaster dispatch
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required	○ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) <sup>4</sup>
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)		(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required	○ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situation occurs in a foreign country	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened	○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspections Operations Law)	When a situation that may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan	(1)Authorized by: supplies —Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services/ rear area search and rescue activities/ship inspection operations—Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3)Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (in accordance with the implementation guidelines formulated based on the Basic Plan)	○ Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)		(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: not required (3)Additional requirements:request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	○ International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)	When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law	(1)Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2)Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement so-called core operations of the peacekeeping force (prior consent required in principle) (3)Additional requirements: Request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

(All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law)

Notes:

1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).
2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.
3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.
4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

## Reference 22 Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Defense operation	Article 88, Self- Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self- Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self- Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations	Article 8 (2), Anti- Piracy Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.
		If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self- Defense Forces Law	The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan. <sup>1</sup>
Transportation of Japanese National Oversea	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese and foreign nationals to be evacuated under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. SDF personnel and others engaged.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Guarding weapons, etc.	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Panel Code.
Guarding facilities	Guarding facilities	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Notes: 1. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

**Reference 23 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)**


FY	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Number of Dispatches	559	529	586	520	555
Personnel	33,700	39,646	43,494	12,410	89,049
Vehicles	3,909	6,637	12,177	2,068	7,949
Aircraft	885	649	968	684	1,255
Vessels	126	2	2	1	51

The Scale of the SDF's Engagement in Disaster Relief Operations Associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake (2010–2011)

	Total
Personnel	10,664,870
Aircraft	50,179
Vessels	4,818

**Reference 24 Main points regarding areas of improvement and the future direction for the lessons learned in relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake**

Activities in relation to the Great East Japan Earthquake were addressed by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces using all of their strength. Therefore, the matters to be improved span 10 areas and 32 points ranging from decision-making to organizational operation. The points, which have been compiled cross-sectionally based on the details of each area of improvement, are as follows.



Building of systems and capabilities that can more effectively respond to various disasters including large-scale earthquakes in the future.

**Reference 25 Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2013)**

- (1) Implementation of integrated disaster prevention exercises by the Self-Defense Forces (training to respond to earthquakes along the Nankai Trough)
- (2) Implementation of operational training by the Ministry of Defense Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters
- (3) Participation in "Disaster Prevention Day" operational training by the Government Headquarters
- (4) Participation in government's role-playing simulation exercise
- (5) FY2013 integrated nuclear disaster prevention training
- (6) Participation in tsunami disaster prevention training
- (7) Participation in nuclear disaster prevention training
- (8) Participation in wide-area medical transport training
- (9) Participation in training in collaboration with the Shizuoka Prefecture comprehensive disaster reduction drills
- (10) Participation in training in collaboration with the Nine Cities and Prefectures joint disaster prevention training
- (11) Participation in training in collaboration with the Kinki Region joint disaster prevention training
- (12) Participation in training in collaboration with the Tokai Region wide-area collaboration disaster prevention training
- (13) Participation in other general disaster prevention training implemented by local government, etc.

**Reference 26** Employment situation of retired SDF Regular Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government (as of April 30, 2014: 304 persons)

Prefectural Government	Employment situation
Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government (two persons), Obihiro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (three persons), Bibai City Government, Sapporo City Government (two persons), Shikabe Town Government, Bihoro Town Government (two persons), Tomakomai City Government, Hokuto City Government, Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kushiro City Government, Kushiro Town Government, Nayoro City Government, Kitami City Government, Nanae Town Government, Rumoi City Government, Engaru Town Government, Takigawa City Government, Akabira City Government, Kitahiroshima City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Shibecha Town Government, Shiraoi Town Government, Teshikaga Town Government, Shikaoi Town Government, Hakodate City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Memuro Town Government, Shinhidaka Town Government, Naganuma Town Government
Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Oirase Town Government
Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government, Hanamaki City Government, Shiwa Town Government, Takizawa Village Office, Tono Town Government, Hachimantai City Government, Kuji City Government, Morioka City Government
Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government (two persons), Tagajo City Government, Oohira Village Office
Akita	Akita Prefectural Government, Daisen City Government, Yokote City Government, Senboku City Government, Odate City Government
Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government (two persons), Higashine City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government
Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government
Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government (two persons), Ryugasaki City Government
Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government
Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government (four persons), Shibukawa City Government
Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government, Soka City Government (two persons), Saitama City Government, Wako City Government
Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government, Urayasu City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Isumi City Government, Narashino City Government, Funabashi City Government, Matsudo City Government, Katsuura City Government, Narita City Government, Oamishirasato City Government
Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Arakawa Ward Office, Adachi Ward Office, Shinagawa Ward Office
Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government, Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Sagami-hara City Government, Zama City Government
Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government, Tainai City Government
Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government
Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Komatsu City Government
Fukui	Fukui Prefectural Government, Fukui City Government
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Minami-alps City Government, Fujiyoshida City Government
Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government, Ina City Government, Matsumoto City Government
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Kaizu City Government
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government (four persons), Ito City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Oyama Town Government, Fukuroi City Government, Shizuoka City Government, Makinohara City Government, Izunokuni City Government

Prefectural Government	Employment situation
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government, Seto Town Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Miyoshi City Government, Mihama Town Government, Taketoyo Town Government, Aisai City Government, Toyohashi City Government, Gamagori City Government, Tobishima Village Office, Ama City Government, Obu City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Oharu Town Office, Ama County, Nishio City Government, Tokai City Government, Handa City Government, Toyoake City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Minamichita Town Office
Mie	Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Ise City Government, Kameyama City Government, Nabari City Government, Shima City Government, Toba City Government, Kuwana City Government, Yokkaichi City Government
Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government, Takashima City Government
Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government, Seika Town Government, Kizugawa City Government, Yawata City Government
Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government, Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Izumi City Government, Hirakata City Government, Izumisano City Government, Toyono Town Government, Toyono County
Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government, Akashi City Government, Toyooka City Government, Miki City Government
Nara	Nara Prefectural Government, Nara City Government (four persons), Gojo City Government
Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government
Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government (two persons), Tottori City Government
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Izumo City Government, Hamada City Government
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government
hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons)
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Shunan City Government, Hohu City Government, Nagato City Government
Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons), Komatsushima City Government (three persons), Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government
Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakade City Government, Zentsuji City Government
Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons), Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government
Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government
Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government, Nogata City Government, Kasuga City Government, Tagawa City Government, Nakagawa Town Government, Dazaifu City Government, Chikuzen Town Government, Onjo City Government, Munakata City Government, Kasuya Town Government
Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (two persons), Karatsu City Government
Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Sasebo City Government (two persons), Nagasaki City Government, Omura City Government (two persons), Minamishimabara City Government, Shimabara City Government
Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Kikuchi City Government
Oita	Oita Prefectural Government (three persons), Saiki City Government
Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government, Nobeoka City Government, Ebino City Government, Tsuno Town Office, Kobayashi City Government
Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (three persons), Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Kirishima City Government, Taramizu City Government

\* Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of April 30, 2014 (part-time personnel included).

**Reference 27** Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2013)

Types of Exercise	Date	Location
Field exercise	November 7, 2013	Aomori Prefecture
	January 17, 2014	Okinawa Prefecture
	January 28, 2014	Aichi Prefecture
Simulation exercise	September 13, 2013	Tokyo
	October 31, 2013	Chiba Prefecture
	January 9, 2014	Ehime Prefecture
	January 10, 2014	Toyama Prefecture
	February 4, 2014	Kumamoto Prefecture
	February 6, 2014	Tokushima Prefecture
	February 7, 2014	Kagawa Prefecture
	February 13, 2014	Fukui Prefecture
	February 14, 2014	Niigata Prefecture

Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007.  
Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.  
Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.  
Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010.  
Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.  
Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012.

Prefectures that Conducted Joint Exercises More than Once

Number of Times Conducted	Location
Twice	Hokkaido Prefecture (2006, 2011), Nagano Prefecture (2007, 2008), Iwate Prefecture (2009, 2010), Akita Prefecture (2008, 2009), Chiba Prefecture (2007, 2013), Kanagawa Prefecture (2008, 2010), Aichi Prefecture (2007, 2013), Gifu Prefecture (2007, 2011), Kyoto Prefecture (2007, 2010), Shiga Prefecture (2008, 2012), Mie Prefecture (2008, 2012), Hyogo Prefecture (2009, 2011), Okayama Prefecture (2008, 2012), Yamaguchi Prefecture (2007, 2008), Kagawa Prefecture (2009, 2013), Fukuoka Prefecture (2006, 2011), Nagasaki Prefecture (2008, 2011), Kagoshima Prefecture (2007, 2012)
Three times	Yamagata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012), Niigata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2013), Aomori Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2013), Ibaraki Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2010), Saitama Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2010), Tokyo (2006, 2009, 2014), Saga Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2011), Kumamoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2013), Miyazaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012), Okinawa Prefecture (2009, 2012, 2013)
Four times	Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013), Tottori Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2006, 2008)
Six times	Tokushima Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013)
Eight times	Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013)

**Reference 28 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2010)**

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
May 25, 2010	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Kitazawa Secretary of Defense Gates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed that both countries would continue to work closely to find a solution regarding the issue of the relocation of MCAS Futenma</li> <li>Regarding the sinking incident of the ROK vessel, Minister Kitazawa announced that Japan also denounces North Korea and intends to work closely with international society including the U.S. and ROK</li> <li>Regarding the recent activities of Chinese vessels, Minister Kitazawa explained his desire for wide ranging Japan-U.S. cooperation under the given conditions, and concurred with Secretary Gates on the importance of such cooperation</li> <li>Agreed on steady cooperation across a wide range of areas for the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Also agreed to strengthen ties between the defense ministers</li> </ul>
Oct. 11, 2010	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Hanoi	Minister of Defense Kitazawa Secretary of Defense Gates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exchanged opinions on regional situation, U.S. forces realignment, HNS, etc.</li> <li>Reaffirmed the strengthening of the foundations of the Japan-U.S. Alliance</li> </ul>
Jan 13, 2011	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Kitazawa Secretary of Defense Gates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reaffirmed the importance of Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation</li> <li>Concurred on accelerating discussions for deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance so that the two countries can show their joint vision for the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the 21st century in the field of security</li> <li>Reaffirmed their commitment to implement the May 2010 Japan-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the MCAS Futenma</li> <li>Confirmed the progress of work undertaken to add Guam as one of the relocation sites for aircraft training</li> <li>Exchanged opinions on HNS and BMD</li> </ul>
Jun. 3, 2011	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/Singapore	Minister of Defense Kitazawa Secretary of Defense Gates	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expressed gratitude to the U.S. for its assistance in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, and confirmed that Japan-U.S. joint training, etc. over the long time have led to a closer collaboration</li> <li>Exchanged opinions on transfer of SM-3 block II A to a third country by the U.S. and relocation of MCAS Futenma</li> </ul>
Jun. 21, 2011	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") Meeting/ Washington D.C.	Minister of Defense Kitazawa Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Secretary of Defense Gates Secretary of State Clinton	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Revalidated and updated the Common Strategic Objectives in 2005 and 2007</li> <li>Agreed to deepen and expand Alliance security and defense cooperation</li> <li>Determined that the Futenma Replacement Facility is to have two runways aligned in a "V"-plan, noting that completion of the FRF and the Marine relocation will not meet the previously targeted date of 2014 while confirming the commitment to complete those projects at the earliest possible date after 2014</li> <li>Agreed on enhancing capabilities to respond to a wide variety of contingencies in the future, based on the Japan-U.S. joint responses on the Great East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear power plant accident</li> </ul>
Oct. 25, 2011	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Ichikawa Secretary of Defense Panetta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed on energetically promoting Japan-U.S. Dynamic Defense Cooperation</li> <li>Agreed to advance the relocation and the return of MCAS Futenma as quickly as possible</li> <li>Exchanged opinions on cooperation in space and cyberspace etc.</li> </ul>
Aug. 3, 2012	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Morimoto Secretary of Defense Panetta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed on the importance of future research and discussion on the Guidelines</li> <li>Agreed to accelerate deliberations on Japan-U.S. dynamic defense cooperation</li> <li>Exchanged opinions on cooperation in equipment and technology, and BMD</li> <li>Agreed to implement agreements in the "2+2" joint statement on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>Exchanged opinions on Ospreys</li> </ul>
Sep. 17, 2012	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Morimoto Secretary of Defense Panetta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reaffirmed Japan-U.S. collaboration on dynamic defense cooperation</li> <li>Reaffirmed the importance of research and discussion on the Guidelines</li> <li>Agreed to continue Japan-U.S. adjustments concerning X-Band radars (TPY-2 radar)</li> <li>Exchanged opinions on Ospreys</li> <li>Agreed to make every effort to implement agreements in the "2+2" joint statement on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> </ul>
Apr. 29, 2013	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed on the significance of taking the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship up to the next step</li> <li>Confirmed from the U.S. that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and statement against unilateral actions forcefully trying to change the status quo on it</li> <li>Welcomed the progress of discussion on perceptions of strategic environment, which were presupposed for reviewing the Guidelines, and agreed to continue intensive discussions</li> <li>Confirmed the establishment of defense ISR working group and confirmed progress in deliberation on joint warning and surveillance activities from peacetime</li> <li>Agreed to accelerate the works toward early deployment of TPY-2 radar to Japan</li> <li>Agreed to steadily make progress on the USFJ realignment</li> </ul>
Aug. 28, 2013	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei)	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue</li> <li>Confirmed the importance of further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the area of cyber security</li> <li>Welcomed the progress of bilateral discussions on strategic environment perspective, which serve as a basis for the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and agreed to vigorously continue their discussion</li> <li>Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>Following the crash accident of an HH-60 helicopter, Japan requested the U.S. to pay due consideration for public safety, take safety measures and investigate the cause of the accident. Secretary Hagel stated that he will ensure utmost safety of local areas</li> <li>Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey.</li> </ul>
Oct. 3, 2013	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue</li> <li>Confirmed to develop trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK</li> <li>Welcomed the establishment of the "Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG)" as a framework between Japanese and U.S. defense officials</li> <li>Agreed to vigorously continue their discussion on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation</li> <li>Agreed to accelerate work for the early deployment of a TPY-2 radar system</li> <li>Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey</li> </ul>
	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2") (Tokyo)	Minister of Defense Onodera Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Hagel Secretary of State Kerry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance</li> <li>Welcomed Japanese efforts to prepare to establish its National Security Council (NSC) and issue its National Security Strategy (NSS), to reexamine the legal basis for its security, to expand its defense budget, to review its National Defense Program Guidelines, and to strengthen its capability to defend its sovereign territory</li> <li>Directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to complete work on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation before the end of 2014</li> <li>Agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and space</li> <li>Agreed to strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK</li> <li>Confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma</li> <li>Announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement</li> <li>Confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan, such as U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned aircraft, has strategic significance</li> </ul>
Apr. 6, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue</li> <li>Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas</li> <li>Agreed to advance trilateral cooperation, including cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia and among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, and also to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries</li> <li>Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation</li> <li>Secretary Hagel stated that he plans to deploy two additional BMD (ballistic missile defense)-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017</li> <li>Minister Onodera explained the gist of "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," and he welcomed Japan's effort in this area</li> <li>Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would further accelerate specific cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa</li> <li>Welcomed the recent progress in the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> </ul>
May. 31, 2014	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas</li> <li>Minister Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base and the additional deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar system to Japan</li> <li>Agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries</li> <li>Minister Onodera explained that the Japanese government has begun domestic discussions on Japan's defense policy. The U.S. welcomed and supported such efforts by Japan</li> <li>Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation</li> <li>Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan</li> <li>Agreed to promptly and steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility</li> <li>Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will accelerate specific cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa</li> </ul>

**Reference 29 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation  
(September 23, 1997)**

(New York, September 23, 1997)

**I. The Aim of the Guidelines**

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

**II. Basic Premises and Principles**

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan–U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the United States will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

**III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances**

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the “National Defense Program Outline.” In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward-deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

**1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations**

Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

**2. Various Types of Security Cooperation**

Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

When either or both Governments participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

**3. Bilateral Programs**

Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

**IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan**

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

**1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent**

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an armed attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

**2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place**
**(1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions**

(a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.

(b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing

this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

- (c) The United States will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.
- (2) Concept of Operations
  - (a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan
 

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.
  - (b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication
 

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.
  - (c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan
 

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.
  - (d) Responses to Other Threats
    - (i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.
    - (ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.
- (3) Activities and Requirements for Operations
  - (a) Command and Coordination
 

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command and control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.
  - (b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism
 

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics

support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

- (c) Communication and Electronics
 

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.
- (d) Intelligence Activities
 

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.
- (e) Logistics Support Activities
 

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

  - (i) Supply
 

The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.
  - (ii) Transportation
 

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.
  - (iii) Maintenance
 

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan. The United States will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.
  - (iv) Facilities
 

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.
  - (v) Medical Services
 

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

## V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

### 1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination

center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

## 2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

### (1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

#### (a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a low of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the low; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

#### (b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

#### (c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arise with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

#### (d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

### (2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

#### (a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of

SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

#### (b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

#### (3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

## VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the United States to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

### 1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

#### (1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas

surrounding Japan.

Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of

coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved.

They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

**VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines**

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan–U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The schedule omitted: See Reference 30)

**Reference 30** Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields		Examples of Items for Cooperation
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area</li> <li>○Medical services, communications and, transportation in the affected area</li> <li>○Relief and transfer operations for refugees and provision of emergency materials to refugees</li> </ul>
	Search and rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and in waters around Japan, and information sharing related to such operations</li> </ul>
	Noncombatant evacuation operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Information sharing and communication with, and assembly and transportation of noncombatants</li> <li>○Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants</li> <li>○Customs, immigration, and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan</li> <li>○Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation, and medical services in Japan</li> </ul>
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections</li> <li>○Intelligence sharing</li> </ul>
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Use of facilities	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels</li> <li>○Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports</li> <li>○Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels</li> <li>○Use of SDF facilities by U.S. aircraft</li> <li>○Provisions of training and exercise areas</li> <li>○Construction of offices, accommodations, etc., inside U.S. facilities and areas</li> </ul>	
	Rear area support	Supplies
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports</li> <li>○Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. facilities and areas</li> </ul>
		Transportation
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Land, sea, and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan</li> <li>○Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas</li> <li>○Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL</li> </ul>
		Maintenance
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles</li> <li>○Provision of parts for repair</li> <li>○Temporary provision of equipment and materials for maintenance</li> </ul>
		Medical Services
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Medical treatment of sick and wounded individuals staying in Japan</li> <li>○Transport of sick and wounded individuals staying in Japan</li> <li>○Provision of medical supplies and hygiene equipment</li> </ul>
	Security	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○Security of U.S. facilities and areas</li> <li>○Seas surveillance around U.S. facilities and areas</li> <li>○Security of transportation routes inside Japan</li> <li>○Information and intelligence sharing</li> </ul>	

Functions and Fields			Examples of Items for Cooperation
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Rear area support	Communications	○ Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies
		Others	○ Support for port entry and exit by U.S. vessels ○ Loading and unloading of materials at SDF facilities, civilian airports and ports ○ Sewage disposal, water supply, and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas ○ Temporary increase in the number of workers at U.S. facilities and properties
Japan-U.S. cooperation	Surveillance		○ Intelligence sharing
	Minesweeping		○ Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas round Japan, and intelligence sharing on mines
	Sea and airspace management		○ Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic ○ Air traffic and airspace management in and around Japan

### Reference 31 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2013

#### Joint Training

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise (command post exercise)	Jan. 15 – Feb. 4, 2014	At locations of participating units, including the Ichigaya District and Yokota Air Base of U.S. Forces in Japan	The internal bureaus of the Ministry of Defense; Staff Office of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Defense Intelligence Headquarters; District Armies; Central Readiness Force (CRF); Ground Materiel Control Command (GMCC); Self Defense Fleet; various MSDF districts; MSDF Communications Command; Maritime Material Command; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; Communications and System Wing (ACSW); Air Material Command; and Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command (C4SC), etc. Totaling approximately 6,500 personnel	Pacific Command; Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan; U.S. Army, Japan; U.S. Navy, Japan; U.S. Air Force, Japan; and U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, etc. Totaling approximately 600 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Joint training in the U.S. (field training)	May. 29 – Jun. 26, 2013	Camp Pendleton, California, the U.S., and surrounding sea areas	Joint Staff Council; GSDF Western Army; Self Defense Fleet; Air Defense Command, etc. Totaling approximately 1,000 personnel	I Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Third Fleet, etc.	Training and exercise for coordination with U.S. forces as well as for a series of actions related to operations to deal with the invasion of islands

#### Ground Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Japan-U.S. joint District Army command post exercise (YS-64)	Jun. 14 – 30, 2013	Fort Shafter	Northern Army, etc. Totaling approximately 160 personnel	First Army; U.S. Army, Pacific Command; U.S. Army, Japan, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Army in the U.S.	Sep. 4 – 24, 2013	Yakima Training Center, Washington	First Division Totaling approximately 500 personnel	3-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 5-20 Infantry Battalion Approximately 750 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 1	Oct. 8 – 18, 2013	Aibano training area	Third Division Totaling approximately 150 personnel	3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment Approximately 80 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Japan-U.S. joint District Army field training (YS-65)	Nov. 29 – Dec. 12, 2013	Camp Higashi-Chitose, etc.	Northern Army, etc. Totaling approximately 4,500 personnel	First Army; U.S. Army, Pacific Command; U.S. Army, Japan; III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), etc. Totaling approximately 1,500 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S.	Jan. 16 – Mar. 4, 2014	Coronado Naval Base and Camp Pendleton, California, etc.	Western Army Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 270 personnel	I Marine Expeditionary Force Totaling approximately 500 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination
Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 2	Feb. 25 – Mar. 8, 2014	Sekiyama Training Area and Soumahara Training Area	Twelfth Brigade Totaling approximately 200 personnel	2nd Battalion, 4th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 170 personnel	Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination

#### Marine Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Minesweeping special training	Jul. 18 – 30, 2013	Mutsu Bay	26 vessels, eight aircraft	One vessel, one aircraft, nine underwater disposal personnel	Minesweeping training
Sanitation special training	Oct. 2, 2013	U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka and surround areas	Yokosuka District, etc. Totaling approximately 200 personnel	U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, etc. Totaling approximately 350 personnel	Sanitation training
Antisubmarine special training	Oct. 14 – 18, 2013	Sea areas surrounding Okinawa	Two vessels, several aircraft	Three vessels	Antisubmarine training
Minesweeping special training	Nov. 18 – 28, 2013	Hyuga-nada	27 vessels, three aircraft	Six underwater disposal personnel	Minesweeping training
Base security special training	Dec. 10 – 12, 2013	U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka and within Yokosuka Port	Yokosuka District Headquarters, etc. Totaling approximately 170 personnel	U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka Military Police Totaling approximately 40 personnel	Japan-U.S. coordination in base security, etc.
Antisubmarine special training	Feb. 8 – 16, 2014	Sea areas from off the Tokai region to off the Shikoku region	13 vessels, several aircraft	One vessel	Antisubmarine training
BMD special training	Feb. 25 – 28, 2014	Yokosuka	Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters, two vessels, etc.	Seventh Fleet Headquarters, several vessels, etc.	BMD training
Japan-U.S. joint command post exercise	Mar. 3 – 13, 2014	U.S. Naval Academy	Maritime Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 30 personnel	U.S. Navy, Japan, Headquarters, etc. Totaling approximately 40 personnel	Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination

## Air Self-Defense Force

Training Designation	Date	Location	Japan	United States	Reference
Air defense combat training Tactical air transport training Midair refueling training	Jul. 25 – Aug. 30, 2013	Elmendorf Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, as well as surrounding airspace	Aircraft: 10	Aircraft: —	Enhancement of joint response capabilities
Air defense combat training	Apr. 4–5, 2013	Airspace around Okinawa	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 11	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Jun. 17–21, 2013	Airspace off the Shikoku region	Aircraft: 11	Aircraft: 8	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Jul. 8–12, 2013	Airspace north of Hokkaido and airspace east of Misawa	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 8	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training	Aug. 27–28, 2013	Airspace around Okinawa	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 11	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Dec. 9–13, 2013	Airspace off Komatsu	Aircraft: 6	Aircraft: 6	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training	Jan. 21–23, 2013	Airspace around Okinawa	Aircraft: 11	Aircraft: 19	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills
Air defense combat training	Feb. 26–27, 2013	Airspace west of Akita and airspace east of Misawa	Aircraft: 12	Aircraft: 10	Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills

## Reference 32 Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

Item	Summary	Time the intergovernmental agreement was concluded to implement joint research and development	Time of completion
Ducted Rocket Engine	Research into basic technology for the secondary combustion of solid fuel through the injection of air from an external sources	September 1992	January 1999
Advanced Steel Technology	Research into basic technology for the welding of extra-high-strength steel used in the pressure hulls of submarines and others	October 1995	January 2002
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials	Research into basic technology related to diesel engine using ceramic materials	October 1995	October 2002
Eye-Safe Laser Radar	Research into basic technology related to LIDAR systems using eye-safe frequencies	September 1996	September 2001
Ejection Seat	Modification work to supplement combat aircraft ejector seats with pilot restraint devices and seat-stabilizing equipment	March 1998	March 2003
Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology	Research into basic technology related to thrust-controllable propulsion devices made up of solid fuel and liquid oxidizers	May 1998	May 2005
Shallow Water Acoustic Technology	Research related to the analysis of characteristics of transmittance of sound waves in shallow sea regions, and the reflection of sound waves on the seabed	June 1999	February 2003
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	Research related to principal missile components (infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, second stage rocket motor, and nose cone) for the Navy's Theater Wide Defense System (Current Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System)	August 1999	March 2008
Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery	Research related to the development of gunpowder that avoids unintentional secondary explosions of the gunpowder at the time of bombing	March 2000	January 2004
Avionics Aboard the Follow on Aircraft to the P-3C	Research into onboard avionics of the MSDF's next P-3C fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (P-X) and the U.S. Navy's future Multi-purpose Maritime Aircraft (MMA) for better interoperability	March 2002	September 2006
Software Radio	Research into basic technologies of software radio, which enables primary radio functions through software	March 2002	March 2007
Advanced Hull Material/Structural Technology	Research into hull system of vessels improved in its stealth feature and survivability by utilizing advanced materials/structural technology	April 2005	August 2010
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on the Phased Array Radar technology for ships that apply high-power semiconductor devices	April 2006	November 2009
Combat System for Ship	Research on improving the information processing ability by applying open architecture technology to the combat system for ships	April 2006	November 2009
Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor	Development of enhanced antiballistic missiles	June 2006	Ongoing
Human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust	Research on the effects aircraft fuel (JP-4 and/or JP-8) and/or engine exhaust on people	March 2007	Ongoing
Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector	Research on palm-sized automated chemical agent detector with simplified control and treating methods, and quick and accurate detection, and its test evaluation technique	March 2008	March 2013
Image gyro for airborne applications	Research on Image-based positioning and navigation technology which will complement and enhance current navigation system and GPS	February 2010	Ongoing

Item	Summary	Time the intergovernmental agreement was concluded to implement joint research and development	Time of completion
Hybrid electric propulsion	Research on the technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor	February 2010	Ongoing
High-speed multi-hull vessel optimization	Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) with featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area	March 2014	Ongoing

### Reference 33 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

#### Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

#### Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

#### Key Implementation Details

##### 1. Realignment on Okinawa

##### (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

##### (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

##### (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
  - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
  - aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
  - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

- (d) Relationships among Initiatives
- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
  - Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
  - The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
  - Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
  - In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
    - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagami-hara Housing Area.
    - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
    - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
  - A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.
  - The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
    - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
    - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
    - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
    - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
  - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
    - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
    - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.
4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
  - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
  - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
  - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
  - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
  - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
  - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
  - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
  - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
  - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.

## 6. Training Relocation

- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
- Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
- The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
- Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
- In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
- At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
- The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. (Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

## Reference 34 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

(April 27, 2012)

The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan Alliance, supported by a robust U.S. military presence in Japan, including U.S. Marine Corps forces in Okinawa, continues to provide the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of peace, security, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

In view of the increasingly uncertain security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers reiterated their commitment to advance the Common Strategic Objectives set forth in the June 21, 2011 SCC Joint Statement. The Ministers also expressed their intention to enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation in line with that Joint Statement and to identify ways to strengthen engagement with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Government of Japan welcomed the January 2012 announcement by the U.S. Government of the new Strategic Guidance for the Department of Defense, which states the U.S. intent to rebalance defense priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region, and also welcomed U.S. efforts to advance its diplomatic engagement in the region.

To achieve the goals of the shared partnership between the two countries, the SCC decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 1, 2006 SCC Document entitled, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Realignment Roadmap). As part of these adjustments, the Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility.

The Ministers affirmed that these adjustments are necessary to realize a U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable. The adjustments, moreover, do not alter the fundamental goals of the Realignment Roadmap, which are to maintain deterrence and mitigate the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. The adjustments also strengthen interoperability between U.S. forces and the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and support the development of Guam as a strategic hub.

The Ministers also affirmed that the unit composition described in Section I would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Furthermore, the Ministers underscored that the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance would be strengthened through Japan’s efforts, such as development of a dynamic defense force and enhancement of its defense posture in areas including the Southwestern Islands. They also noted that bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, including timely and effective joint training, joint surveillance and reconnaissance activities, as well as joint and shared use of facilities, would strengthen deterrence.

### I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa

The Ministers announced their intent to adjust the composition of U.S. Marine Corps units in Okinawa and Guam. Because the authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Okinawa has grown slightly since the Realignment Roadmap, and in order to maximize the operational capability of the departing and remaining units, both governments have decided on certain adjustments to the end-state composition of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam and Okinawa.

The United States plans to locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and intends to establish a rotational presence in Australia in order to establish a geographically distributed force posture while sustaining the forward presence of U.S. Marine Corps forces in the region. This revised posture will ensure a more capable U.S. Marine Corps presence in these locations, strengthening deterrence and enabling flexible and rapid responses to various contingencies. The Ministers confirmed that these steps would contribute to Japan’s defense and to peace and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

The Ministers confirmed that a total of approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines, along with their associated dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. U.S. Marine Corps forces remaining in Okinawa are to consist of the III MEF Headquarters; the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters; the 3rd Marine Logistics Group Headquarters; the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit; and base sustainment elements of Marine Corps Installations Pacific, along with

essential aviation, ground and support units. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to achieve an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap. Consistent with the usual practice of Alliance consultations, the U.S. Government is to notify the Government of Japan of changes to the organizational structure of the U.S. Marine Corps units in Okinawa.

The United States is working to establish an operational U.S. Marine Corps presence in Guam consisting of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade Headquarters; the 4th Marine Regiment; and elements of aviation, ground and support units from III MEF. A base sustainment unit is also to be established there. The authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel.

In conjunction with these adjustments, the U.S. Government also informed the Government of Japan that it is establishing a U.S. Marine Corps rotational presence in Australia, with other U.S. Marines moving to Hawaii to enhance operational capability there. In executing these moves, the U.S. government reaffirmed its commitment to sustain its current military presence and enhance military capability in the Western Pacific.

To reinforce the long-term sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa mentioned above is to occur when appropriate facilities are available to receive them. Recognizing the strong desires of Okinawa residents, these relocations are to be completed as soon as possible while ensuring operational capability throughout the process.

The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam described above is \$8.6 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2012 dollars. In order to expedite the establishment of an operational U.S. Marine Corps presence in Guam, and considering the aforementioned unit composition, the two governments reaffirmed that Japan's financial commitment is to be the direct cash contribution as stipulated in Article 1 of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. The two governments affirmed that other forms of Japanese financial support to Guam relocation would not be utilized. Any contributions from Japan to develop training areas as referred to in Section II are to be a part of the aforementioned commitment. The remaining costs and any additional costs are to be borne by the U.S. Government. Any funds already transferred by the Government of Japan to the U.S. Government under the 2009 Guam International Agreement are to be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. The two governments are to complete a bilateral cost breakdown. They are also to consult regarding further actions to be taken in light of the 2009 Guam International Agreement. The Ministers noted the importance of continued consultations on the programmatic and technical details of these initiatives with the legislative branches on both sides.

## II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity

The Ministers confirmed the great importance of working together to promote peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and enhancing effective, efficient and creative cooperation.

In this context, the U.S. Government plans to continue to help allies and partners in the region to build their capacity with training and exercises. The Government of Japan, for its part, plans to take various measures to promote safety in the region, including strategic use of official development assistance, for example through providing coastal states with patrol boats.

In order to develop Guam as a strategic hub and mitigate the impact of the U.S. military presence on local communities, both governments plan to explore new efforts to promote bilateral dynamic defense cooperation in the region based on the assessment of the changing security environment. The two governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by U.S. forces and the JSDF. Both governments are to identify specific areas of cooperation in this regard by the end of 2012.

## III. Consolidation of Bases and Land Returns in Okinawa

The total or partial return of the following six facilities and areas remains unchanged from the Realignment Roadmap:

- Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester): Total return.
- Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster): Partial return and consolidation of

remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.

- Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma: Total return.
- Makimato Service Area (Camp Kinser): Total return.
- Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging area, to be constructed at Urasoe).
- Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1: Total return.

The United States committed to return lands on Okinawa as designated U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa, and as facilities become available for units and other tenant activities relocating to locations in Okinawa. The Government of Japan noted its responsibility to relocate all functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, including the housing necessary to support the remaining U.S. Marine Corps units, in coordination with the U.S. Government. Coordination with local communities is to take place as necessary.

Land of the aforementioned facilities and areas is to be returned as early as it becomes possible. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.

In order to reduce the impact of U.S. forces on Okinawa as early as possible, both governments affirmed that the following areas utilized by U.S. forces are eligible for return:

- The Ministers confirmed that the following areas are eligible for immediate return upon completion of necessary procedures:
  - West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)
  - The north access road of Makimato Service Area (Camp Kinser)
  - Area near Gate 5 on Makimato Service Area
  - A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (after the provision of a replacement warehouse at another location)
- The Ministers confirmed that the following areas are eligible for return once the replacement facilities in Okinawa are provided:
  - Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)
  - Lower Plaza Housing area, a part of Kishaba Housing area, and the Industrial Corridor of Camp Zukeran
  - Elements of Makimato Service Area, including the preponderance of the storage area
  - Naha Port
  - Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1
- The Ministers confirmed that the following areas are eligible for return as U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan:
  - Additional elements of Camp Zukeran
  - The remainder of Makimato Service Area

A consolidation plan, including sequencing of relocation steps, is to be jointly developed for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa, with a particular focus on determining the end-state of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster), by the end of 2012. This effort should consider the land usage at Camp Zukeran required by this revised unit composition, as well as the possible impact of the joint and shared use of facilities on Okinawa. The Ministers noted that joint and shared use of facilities was a key objective of the Realignment Roadmap. This consolidation plan would be available for public release as soon as possible. The Ministers welcomed the formation of a working group, which is to include appropriate officials of their respective capitals, to develop and oversee this consolidation plan.

## IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma

The Ministers resolve to continue to work toward the relocation of MCAS Futenma in a way that meets the criteria: operationally viable, politically feasible, financially responsible, and strategically sound. The Ministers reaffirmed their view that the FRF, planned for construction at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters, remains the only viable solution that has been identified to date.

The Ministers confirmed their commitment to resolve the issue of the FRF as soon as possible in order to avoid the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma, while maintaining Alliance capabilities.

Both governments expressed their commitment to contribute mutually to necessary refurbishment projects at MCAS Futenma, such

as those to sustain its safe mission capability until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment, on a case-by case-basis and consistent with existing bilateral arrangements, including Host Nation Support. Bilateral discussion of specific refurbishment projects is to be conducted through a channel separate from the one used to discuss realignment initiatives, with initial refurbishment projects to be identified by the end of 2012.

## Conclusion

The Ministers welcomed the close and fruitful cooperation embodied in this Joint Statement, and they directed that the adjusted realignment package should be implemented expeditiously, in consultation with the legislative branches on both sides. They further expressed confidence that the package would be a solid foundation for a deeper and broader U.S.-Japan Alliance. The Ministers noted a number of significant achievements with realignment initiatives since the last SCC meeting in

June 2011, including: progress in the environmental impact assessment process regarding the FRF; the expansion of aviation training relocation programs to Guam; the relocation of the Japan Air Self Defense Force

(JASDF) Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base; and progress in the relocation of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Camp Zama. The Ministers expressed their intent to achieve further progress on realignment goals and more broadly to evaluate Alliance roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC), in order to fortify the Alliance for the evolving challenges of the regional and global security environment.

## Reference 35 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities

October 3, 2013

By Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida  
Minister of Defense Onodera

Secretary of State Kerry  
Secretary of Defense Hagel

## I Overview

On October 3, 2013, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) convened in Tokyo, with the participation of both the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan's Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defense. On the occasion of this historic meeting, the SCC reaffirmed the indispensable role our two countries play in the maintenance of international peace and security and reconfirmed our Alliance's commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. The two sides also set forth a strategic vision that, reflecting our shared values of democracy, the rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for human rights, will effectively promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

At the SCC meeting, the Ministers exchanged views on the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and decided upon several steps to upgrade significantly the capability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Our strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities is to be based on revising the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, expanding security and defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and approving new measures that support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The United States also welcomed Japan's determination to contribute more proactively to regional and global peace and security. The Ministers stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation with regional and international partners.

As the United States continues to implement its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region it intends to strengthen military capabilities that allow our Alliance to respond to future global and regional security challenges, including in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace. The Ministers stressed that the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is to ensure that the U.S. presence maintains deterrence and provides for the capabilities to defend Japan and respond to regional contingencies, while remaining politically sustainable.

In this context, the Ministers reiterated the ongoing mutual commitment to complete the agreements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and relocating U.S. Marines to Guam, and welcomed the progress made in that regard.

Japan's security policy continues to reflect its long-standing commitment to regional and global peace and stability, as well as its intention to make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community. At the same time, Japan will continue coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Japan is also preparing to establish its National Security Council and to issue its National Security Strategy. In addition, it is reexamining the legal basis for its security including the matter of exercising its right of collective self-defense, expanding its defense budget, reviewing its National Defense Program Guidelines, strengthening its capability to defend its sovereign territory, and broadening regional contributions, including capacity-building efforts vis-à-vis Southeast Asian countries. The United States welcomed these efforts and reiterated its commitment to collaborate closely with Japan.

To accomplish our shared strategic vision for the Alliance against the backdrop of a complex regional security environment, the Ministers recognized that the Alliance is the cornerstone of peace and security in the region. Over the next decade, the Alliance intends to continue to address security challenges through close cooperation and a more interoperable and flexible force posture that enables side-by-side and agile contingency response and crisis management. The Ministers affirmed that the Alliance should remain well positioned to deal with a

range of persistent and emerging threats to peace and security, as well as challenges to international norms. Among these are: North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and man-made and natural disasters. As stated in the 2011 SCC Joint Statement, the Ministers continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments.

The United States and Japan resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance in which our two countries can jointly and ably rise to meet the regional and global challenges of the 21st century, by investing in cutting-edge capabilities, improving interoperability, modernizing force structure, and adapting Alliance roles and missions to meet contemporary and future security realities. To this end, our Alliance should emphasize improved cooperation and coordination, including on information security, equipment and technology, cyber security, and space security, in order to broaden and deepen cooperation across a wide range of Alliance issues.

## II. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

The Ministers pledged to continue deepening the Alliance and directed work on a robust agenda to ensure the Alliance's credibility into the future. Among the tasks before us are revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, expanding our ballistic missile defense capabilities, improving cooperation on emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace, as well as strengthening information security and equipment acquisition collaboration, in order to broaden cooperation across a wide range of Alliance issues.

- **Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation** Recognizing the implications of the evolving regional and global security environment, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense

Cooperation, to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. The Ministers identified several objectives for this revision, including:

- Sensuring the Alliance's capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation;
- expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement;
- promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values;
- enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more flexible, timely, and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations;
- describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities;
- evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and
- exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives. The Ministers directed that this task for the SDC be completed before the end of 2014.

### • BMD Cooperation

The Ministers confirmed their commitment to enhance the ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities of both countries and welcomed recent progress in this area, including the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative development program. They confirmed their intention to designate the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system, consistent with the May 1, 2006, SCC Document: "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." The SCC members also affirmed the continuing goal of expanding bilateral cooperation in this area.

### • Cooperation in Cyberspace

The first U.S.-Japan Cyber Dialogue, held in May 2013, affirmed that the United States and Japan share common objectives in international cyber fora, especially the application of norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace. The Ministers stressed the need for close coordination with the private sector in addressing challenges to the safe and secure use of cyberspace. In particular, the Ministers recognized the need to promote a whole-of-government approach to shared threats in cyberspace.

The Ministers welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a new Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) charged with fostering increased cyber defense cooperation with the improvement of individual cyber capabilities and interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces, which will also contribute to whole-of-government cybersecurity efforts.

### • Cooperation in Space

The Ministers underscored the importance of utilizing capabilities for improved bilateral information collection and sharing related to space situational awareness (SSA) and space-based maritime domain awareness. Specifically, the Ministers welcomed the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan SSA Sharing Agreement and highlighted progress on efforts toward two-way sharing of SSA information. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the commitment of both countries to an early realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the United States.

The SCC members also expressed their desire to improve maritime domain awareness by leveraging satellite capabilities and look forward to future whole-of-government exercises and dialogues on this topic. The Ministers welcomed the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on Space to coordinate strategic-level cooperation that promotes long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security in space. The Ministers also affirmed continued support for multilateral efforts to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

### • Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities

The Ministers welcomed the establishment of a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group and reaffirmed its mission of encouraging closer Alliance interoperability and information sharing between the U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. They welcomed further progress toward bilateral ISR operations during peace time and contingencies.

### • Joint/Shared Use of Facilities

In order to improve the flexibility and resiliency of the Alliance, as well as to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces posture in areas, including Japan's southwestern islands, the Ministers welcomed the efforts of the Joint/Shared Use Working Group. Progress in realizing the joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and areas strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities.

### • Bilateral Planning

The Ministers welcomed progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed efforts toward refining bilateral plans so that the U.S.-Japan Alliance can better defend Japan and respond to the range of regional challenges in an evolving security environment. Key components of this effort include strengthening bilateral whole-of-government mechanisms for peacetime and crisis coordination and improving contingency access by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces to facilities in Japan.

### • Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

The Ministers welcomed the new linkage established between bilateral discussions at the Systems and Technology Forum and dialogue on Roles, Missions, and Capabilities. This initiative addresses the evolving challenges of the regional and global security environment by enabling increased cooperation in the acquisition of defense systems with Alliance strategy and capability needs. Moreover, through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

### • Extended Deterrence Dialogue

The Ministers noted with satisfaction the meaningful outcome of

bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogues. This process reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussions of nuclear and conventional capabilities, and helps to promote regional stability from a near- and long-term perspective. The Ministers also confirmed their Governments' continued commitment to holding the dialogue on a regular basis.

- **Information Security**

Enhanced information security continues to reinforce the bilateral relationship of trust and enable broader information sharing between both countries in terms of quality and quantity. The Ministers confirmed the critical role that information security plays in Alliance cooperation and reflected on the considerable progress in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information made through Bilateral Information Security Consultations. The SCC members particularly welcomed the serious efforts by Japan in establishing a legal framework for further ensuring information security and underscored the importance of closer collaboration. The ultimate aim is to enable our Governments to interact in real time to address opportunities and crises alike through a dynamic, secure exchange of information.

- **Joint Training and Exercises**

In order to enhance and improve effectiveness, interoperability, readiness, mobility, and sustainability of the operations of the U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces, and to strengthen deterrence of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Ministers welcomed progress in peace time bilateral defense cooperation, such as the expansion of timely and effective bilateral training. Bilateral and multilateral exercises, both hosted by Japan and in areas outside of Japan, have improved interoperability and sharpened our ability to deter aggression, defend Japan, and maintain regional peace and security. The Ministers recognized the significant efforts to continue training of Okinawa based U.S. forces at locations outside of Okinawa.

The Ministers decided to take advantage of the following opportunities to increase training outside of Okinawa, including in mainland Japan, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance:

- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) drills;
- Flight training, through frameworks such as the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR) program;
- Artillery Relocation Training, which is under consultation for improvement to better reflect current and future contingency environments;
- Other bilateral and trilateral/multilateral training with the partners in the Asia-Pacific region; and o MV-22 Osprey, with its unique capabilities, to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region, to reduce the amount of time located and training in Okinawa. In addition to the above mentioned exercises, the Ministers noted, for example, participation of MV-22 Ospreys in exercise FOREST LIGHT, and flight training by MV-22 Ospreys, such as low-level flight training, in-flight refueling training, and logistical support training.

- **Host Nation Support**

The Ministers affirmed the continuing importance of the Host Nation Support (HNS) provided by Japan to the continued effectiveness of the Alliance for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

### III. Regional Engagement

The Ministers noted that in an increasingly integrated global economy, trilateral and multilateral cooperation is essential. They affirmed that in the next decade, the Alliance is to reinforce a system of international partnerships and multilateral cooperation that preserves and promotes a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Asia-Pacific region. The United States and Japan are committed to working together to increase security capacity regionally in Southeast Asia and globally. Our mutual cooperation is to expand over time, and we are committed to working in partnership with other like-minded countries to build sustainable patterns of cooperation.

- **Regional Capacity Building**

The SCC members resolved to build on early efforts to collaborate on partnership capacity building projects in the Asia Pacific region.

Cooperating in these efforts is to help ensure regional stability by promoting regional partner security capacities and helping other nations develop their own defense and law enforcement capabilities. The Ministers welcomed the strategic use of Official Development Assistance by Japan, such as providing coastal patrol vessels and training for maritime safety to regional partners, and recognized the importance of such endeavors in promoting regional peace and stability.

- **Maritime Security**

The Ministers affirmed their intent to cooperate further in maritime security and counter-piracy to protect the freedom of navigation, ensure safe and secure sea lines of communication, and promote related customary international law and international agreements.

- **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief**

Recalling the prompt and effective response by the United States and Japan to recent humanitarian and natural disasters worldwide, the Ministers encouraged efforts to extend bilateral cooperation as well as to promote trilateral and multilateral coordination in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and other operations as the circumstances allow, through joint exercises and mutual logistics support.

- **Trilateral Cooperation**

The Ministers affirmed the importance of security and defense cooperation among allies and partners in the region and noted in particular the success of the trilateral dialogues carried out regularly with Australia and the Republic of Korea. These trilateral dialogues advance our shared security interests, promote common values, and enhance the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region.

Trilateral cooperation seeks to improve regional security and defense capacities—including humanitarian and disaster relief—in order to support regional peace and stability, helps to promote the freedom of navigation and regional maritime security, and acts as a stabilizing regional presence by building confidence and encouraging transparency in the region. The Ministers urged an increase in the sharing of information among regional allies, including information on operations, plans, exercises, and capabilities, in order to bolster trilateral cooperative efforts further.

- **Multilateral Cooperation**

The Ministers noted the importance of working together, along with other regional partners, to strengthen institutions that promote economic and security cooperation based on internationally accepted rules and norms, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

### IV. Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

The Ministers confirmed that agreements on Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan should be implemented as soon as possible while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to ensure the return of the facilities and areas as described in the April 2013 Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa. The Ministers reaffirmed that approximately 9,000 U.S. Marines are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan.

The Ministers reconfirmed that the realignment plan described in the 2012 SCC Joint Statement will realize a U.S. force posture in the region that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. This realignment plan will provide the strength, flexibility, and deterrent capacity to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities.

- **Realignment on Okinawa**

The Ministers welcomed the progress on land returns based on the April 2013 Consolidation Plan and stressed their determination to continue efforts toward implementation. In particular, they welcomed the completion of the land return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in August 2013, and the Joint Committee agreements on an area near Gate 5 of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), the West Futenma Housing area, a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering

Compound, and Shirahi River Area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster). These returns are ahead of schedule. Japan welcomed the proactive efforts taken by the United States as shown in the Consolidation Plan that resulted in the creation of an additional land return decision beyond those specified in the April 2012 SCC Joint Statement. The return of a portion of land along the Shirahi River on Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) will enable the local community to develop better flood control measures in the area.

As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station

(MCAS) Futenma. The SCC members reaffirmed the strong commitment of both Governments to the plan and underscored their determination to achieve its completion, which would permit the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomed recent developments including the submission of the request for approval of public water reclamation permit to Okinawa Prefecture by the Government of Japan in March 2013.

The Ministers directed the Joint Committee to reach an arrangement in principle for the partial lifting of restrictions for a portion of the Hotel-Hotel training area off of the east coast of Okinawa, as decided in previous SCC statements, by the end of November 2013. The two sides committed to continue to consult on other possible measures.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to protect the environment and confirmed the importance of making further efforts in environmental matters. Bearing this in mind, the Ministers decided to reach a substantial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating local authorities' planning of land use prior to its return.

- Iwakuni

Regarding MCAS Iwakuni, the Ministers confirmed that the bilateral consultations on the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated and concluded as soon as possible. In addition, the SCC Members affirmed that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni. The Ministers also acknowledged that the relocation of elements of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017.

- Guam

The Ministers confirmed that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, contributes to sustaining the forward presence of U.S. forces and facilitates the development of Guam as a strategic hub, while also mitigating the impact on Okinawa. The Ministers announced the signing today of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement, which forms the basis for the bilateral cooperation necessary to achieve these goals of the relocation.

The Ministers noted the significance of Japanese cash contributions to the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which benefit the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units to Guam and by enabling the shared use of these training areas by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. The Ministers directed that consultations on the terms and conditions of such use be initiated within this year.

The Ministers also completed work reflecting the breakdown of costs associated with developing facilities, including training areas, and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands supporting the relocation of U.S. Marines.

The Ministers reconfirmed the relocation plan described in the 2012 SCC Joint Statement. Under the plan, U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the first half of the 2020s. The Ministers confirmed that this plan's progress depends on various factors, such as measures taken by the two governments to secure appropriate funding. This plan also facilitates progress in implementing the April 2013 Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa.

- Advanced Capabilities

The Ministers confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan has strategic significance and further contributes to the security of Japan and the region. The United States intends to continue to modernize its capabilities. These advanced capabilities include, but are not limited to:

- The U.S. Marine Corps introductions of two squadrons of MV-22 aircraft as a replacement for the CH-46 helicopter.
- The first deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft outside of the United States beginning in December 2013 as part of the gradual phase-out of the P-3 aircraft.
- The U.S. Air Force plans, beginning in spring 2014, to begin to deploy Global Hawk unmanned aircraft rotationally.
- The U.S. Marine Corps is beginning to deploy the F-35B aircraft in 2017, the first time these aircraft will be forward-deployed outside of the United States.

**Reference 36 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ**

Item	Outline	Ground
Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) <sup>1</sup>	Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor costs	Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987	Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)
	Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1996)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
	The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period	Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)
Utilities costs	Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
	The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001	Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)
	The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010	Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)
	The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ, will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period	Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)
Training relocation costs	Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the Government of Japan have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996	Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)

Notes: 1. Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the "Criteria for adopting FIP projects" to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows:  
 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors. 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others).

**Reference 37 Outline of 23 Issues**

(As of March 31, 2014)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
	20. Awase Meadows Golf Course	47			◎		Returned on July 31, 2010
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on November 30, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62					Returned on September 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of the eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
	16 facilities, 19 issues	811	6	7	3	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Change agreed on December 21, 2001
Futenma Air Station	21. Lands along eastern side	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on September 5, 2013
	4 facilities, 4 issues	210	3	1	0	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the "Area" column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.

2. A single circle in the "Classification" column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.

3. The numbers in the "Scope" column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.

4. "SCC" in the "Classification" column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

## Reference 38 The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With

this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time.

### Return Land:

— Futenma Air Station — See attached.

— Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

- Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
- Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

- Aha Training Area  
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area  
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site  
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield  
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae  
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station  
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area  
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port  
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).
- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)  
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

#### **Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104  
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery fire required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
- Parachute drop training  
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads  
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

#### **Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:**

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station  
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft  
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.

- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base  
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base  
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station  
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

#### **Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:**

- Accident reports  
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements  
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas  
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles  
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
- Supplemental automobile insurance  
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
- Payment for claims  
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
  - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
  - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
  - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.
- Quarantine procedures  
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
- Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen  
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.
- Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

## The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

### 1. Introduction

- a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

### 2. Decisions of the SCC

- a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
- b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
- c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
- d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
- e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

### 3. Guiding Principles

- a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

- b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
- c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
- d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
- e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
- f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

### 4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

- a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules) — supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
- b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
- c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

### 5. The Next Steps

- a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
- b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
- c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

**Reference 39** State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completed in December 1998 (cancellation of joint use)</li> </ul>
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on land return after the HLZ was relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities were relocated to Camp Hansen</li> <li>July 2011: Totally returned (approximately 60 ha)</li> </ul>
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen</li> <li>June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m<sup>2</sup>) was returned</li> <li>December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53 ha])</li> </ul>
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the return of the Sobe Communication Site</li> <li>July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha)</li> <li>December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield totally returned [approximately 191 ha])</li> </ul>
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station</li> <li>September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion)</li> <li>October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station</li> </ul>
Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and others</li> <li>December 1998–March 2000: Environmental survey (past year survey)</li> <li>November 2002–March 2004: Environmental survey (continuous environmental survey)</li> <li>February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the change of agreement in April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter)</li> <li>February–March 2007: Environmental impact assessment document was released and examined</li> <li>March 2007: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (three out of six)</li> <li>July 2007: Construction of HLZs started</li> <li>January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (the remaining three)</li> </ul>
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* April 2013: Conditions for return were fulfilled in the “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa” and were described as possible to return during the FY2022 or later following the completion of necessary procedures.</li> </ul>
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2002: Youth center was furnished</li> <li>March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38 ha)</li> <li>January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities</li> <li>December 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital</li> <li>February 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (HLZ, etc.) of the Naval Hospital</li> <li>December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (Utility) of the Naval Hospital</li> <li>May 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BEQ, etc.)</li> <li>October 2009, The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (First water tank facility)</li> <li>October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (Second water tank facility)</li> <li>September 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.)</li> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	<p>(Phase I: Golf Range Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>July 2002: Two high rises were furnished</li> <li>July 2006: An underpass was furnished</li> </ul> <p>(Phase II: Sada Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished</li> </ul> <p>(Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished</li> </ul> <p>(Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others</li> <li>February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished</li> <li>* May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation</li> </ul>
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997</li> </ul>
Parachute Drop Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000</li> </ul>
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2000: Furnished</li> </ul>

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished</li> <li>• February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp</li> <li>• October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on site preparation, implementation of construction of parking apron and taxiway.</li> <li>• April 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of parking and utilities.</li> </ul>
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*	* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational bases for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.

#### Reference 40 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

##### List of Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas

Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures	
West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2014 or later
The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2013 or later
Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2014 or later
A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2019 or later <sup>1</sup>
Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement of Facilities in Okinawa are Provided	
Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)	JFY2025 or later
Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later
The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	JFY2024 or later <sup>2,3</sup>
Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area	JFY2025 or later
Naha Port	JFY2028 or later
Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1	JFY2022 or later
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma	JFY2022 or later
Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan	
Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)	—
The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)	JFY2024 or later <sup>4</sup>

##### Note:

1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing.

2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.

4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.

**Reference 41 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam**

(Signed on February 17, 2009)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Affirming that Japan–the United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives,

Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–the United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance,

Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self- Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam,

Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar (\$10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars (\$6,090,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly,

Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam—estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars (\$3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars (\$1,000,000,000) for a road,

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1**

1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to

as “the Relocation”) subject to Paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.

2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”).

**Article 2**

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement.

**Article 3**

The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America.

**Article 4**

The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

**Article 5**

The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

**Article 6**

The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in Paragraph 1. (a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

**Article 7**

1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements.  
(b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.
2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars).
3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese

fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in Paragraph 3. (b) of this Article.

- (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year.
- 4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in Paragraph 4. (b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
- (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
- 5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions.

#### Article 8

The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

#### Article 9

- 1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in Paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
- 2. United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan's financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

#### Article 10

The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

#### Article 11

This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged.

#### Reference 42

#### Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

(Signed on October 3, 2013)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Recalling the Joint Statement of Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee, dated April 27, 2012, which announced, inter alia, that the two governments are to consult regarding further actions to be taken in light of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, signed at Tokyo on February 17, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"), Desiring to amend the Agreement, Have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

The fifth to ninth paragraphs of the preamble of the Agreement shall be deleted, and the following six paragraphs shall be inserted immediately after the fourth paragraph:

"Recalling that Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap and, as part of the adjustments, decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as "III MEF") personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, in its Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as "the Joint Statement"),

Recognizing that the Joint Statement confirmed that a total of approximately 9,000 personnel of III MEF, along with their dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan,

Reaffirming that the Joint Statement confirmed that, of the preliminarily estimated eight billion, six hundred million United States dollars (\$8,600,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan is to provide up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars (\$2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) (equivalent to three billion, one hundred twenty-one million, eight hundred eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred fifty-five United States dollars (\$3,121,887,855) in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be completed as soon as possible,

Reaffirming further that the Joint Statement confirmed that the United States is to fund the remaining costs and any additional costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam,

Recalling that the Joint Statement announced that the two Governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces,

Recalling that, under the plans outlined in the Roadmap as adjusted, the Joint Statement, and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa published in April, 2013, a part of the consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depends on the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa,

and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on Japan's direct cash contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure as well as necessary measures by the Government of the United States of America,"

#### Article 2

The phrase "approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents" in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase "the III MEF personnel and their dependents".

## Article 3

The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 2 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”.

## Article 4

Article 3 of the Agreement shall be deleted.

## Article 5

The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 4 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”, and the following sentence shall be inserted at the end of Article 4 of the Agreement:

“Such facilities may include training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.”

## Article 6

Article 4 of the Agreement shall be renumbered as Article 3, and the following Article shall be inserted immediately after renumbered Article 3:

## “Article 4

The Government of the United States of America, with the intent to provide reasonable access, shall favorably consider requests by the Government of Japan to use training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, including those whose development has been funded with Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest.”

## Article 7

Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following:

“2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds for the Relocation, which may include (1) United States funds and (2) Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement.

## Article 8

It is confirmed that the Agreement as amended by this Protocol applies to cash contributions made either before or after the entry into force of this Protocol by the Government of Japan in accordance with paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement, their accrued interest, and the projects funded by the cash contributions.

## Article 9

This Protocol shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement.

**Reference 43 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)**

(Apr. 1, 2009–Jun. 30, 2014)

	Dialogue	Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ministerial Meeting</li> <li>• Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM Plus)</li> <li>• Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM Plus WG)</li> <li>• Experts’ Working Group (EWG)                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maritime security EWG</li> <li>• Military medicine EWG</li> <li>• Counter-terrorism EWG</li> <li>• Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief EWG</li> <li>• Peacekeeping operations EWG</li> <li>• Humanitarian mine action EWG</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> <li>○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Senior Officials’ Meeting (ARF-SOM)</li> <li>• Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	(Oct. 10, Aug.13) (Apr. 11, Apr. 12, Apr. 13, Apr. 14) (Dec. 10, Feb. 11, Feb. 12, Feb. 13, Mar. 13, Feb. 14)  (Jul. 11, Feb. 12, Sep. 12, Nov.12, May 13, Sep.13, Jan.14, Jun.14) (Jul. 11, Jul. 12, Oct. 13, Jun. 14) (Sep. 11, Apr. 12, Mar.13) (Nov. 11, Aug. 12, Jan.14) (Nov. 11, Jun. 12, Nov.12, Apr.13, Feb.14) (Jun. 14)  (May 09, May 10, Jun. 11, May 12, May 13, Jun 14) (Apr. 09, Nov. 09, Mar. 10, Nov. 10, Apr. 11, Dec. 11, May 12, Mar. 13, Apr. 14)
	Hosted by the private sector <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)</li> </ul>	(May 09, Jun 10, Jun. 11, Jun. 12, Jun. 13, Jun. 14)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Minister-level Meeting</li> <li>○ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges</li> <li>○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)</li> <li>○ Subcommittee of Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)</li> <li>○ International Seminar for Military Science</li> <li>○ International Conference of Cadets</li> </ul>	(Mar. 10, Sep. 11, Mar. 13, Feb.14) (Mar. 10, Sep. 11, Mar. 13) (Oct. 09, Sep. 10, Mar. 12, Oct. 12, Oct. 13)  (Jul. 09)  (Jul. 09, Jul. 10, Jul. 11, Jul. 12) (Mar. 10, Mar. 11, Feb. 12, Feb. 13)

**Reference 44 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY2013)**

(Number of students)

Institution	Country	Thailand	Philippines	Indonesia	India	United States	Pakistan	France	Viet Nam	Republic of Korea	Mongolia	Australia	Cambodia	Timor	Sub total
National Institute for Defense Studies		1		1	1	3				1		1			9
National Defense Academy		5	2	4		5		8	11	4	3	1	2	2	49
Ground Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		1			1	3	4			3	1	1	1		15
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		1								1					2
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		2								4					7
Joint Staff College										1					1
Total		10	2	5	2	11	4	8	11	14	4	3	3	2	81

**Reference 45 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense**

(Apr. 1, 2009 – Jun. 30, 2014)

Security Dialogue		Outline	Recent Situations
Internal Bureau and others	Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Minister-level Meeting	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, since 2009. Vice -ministerial level officials from Defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	The 5th consultation was held in Okinawa in February 2014, with the participation of 10 countries in the ASEAN region and the ASEAN secretariat. Frank and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the topics of “Future Direction of Capacity Building Efforts” and “Possible Equipment-technology Cooperation among Japan and ASEAN Member States to Respond to Non-traditional Security Issues.”
	Tokyo seminar on common security challenges	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, since 2009. It is a seminar open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as common security challenges and policies for promoting regional cooperation thereby making a venue for open discussion toward the promotion of regional cooperation.	With the participation of intellectuals from inside and outside Japan and defense authorities, discussions were held on the topic entitled “Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Future Role of Japan and ASEAN.” The event contributed to efforts to improve the security environment and promoted regional dialogue and cooperation in March 2013.
	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.	With the participation of 21 countries in the Asia-Pacific region (including Japan) and the EU, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 18th Forum was held in October 2013. Opinions were exchanged on “Peace-time Military Efforts to Prepare for Large-scale Disasters” and “Role of Regional Frameworks in HA/DR.”
Hosted by Ministry of Defense GSDF	Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.	With the participation of the militaries and five civilian organizations in 25 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the most countries in the past, opinions were exchanged in August 2013 on the theme of “the Army cooperation for improving viable HA/DR toward further stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”
	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 17th MLST meeting was held in November 2013, and the participants were working-level officials in charge of logistics sent from the armies in 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and the EU, the most countries in the past. Keynote speech and opinion exchanges were held on the topics regarding logistic cooperation on humanitarian support and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region.
	Army Command and General Staff College seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units	With the participation of students from air force colleges in 15 countries in Asia-Pacific region, the 13th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held on August 2013. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of the leadership teamwork in the multinational peace cooperation activities in the multilateral environment.
MSDF	Multi-national seminar for students of the Command and Staff Course (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program for Officers of the Next Generations (WPNS STEP))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with staffs of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacific region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/ research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange between participating countries and mutual understanding.	The 17th seminar was held in February 2014 with participants from 14 countries, and the main theme of the event was “the challenges to the future of maritime security in Asia-Pacific region.” Opinions were exchanged on the theme of traditional security and transnational issues, humanitarian support, disaster relief, PKO. Japan Coast Guard also participated as a part of interministerial cooperation.
	Multi-national seminar for students of the Command and Staff Course (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program for Officers of the Next Generations (WPNS STEP))	WPNS SONG (Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation), hosted by the MSDF and which has been held every year since 2000, was made a bigger event by doubling the number of days it was held to two weeks and expanding invitation to include countries in Middle East and South Asia. The objectives of this event are to promote mutual understanding among participants and to provide education to the participating military officers on the current status of the MSDF and Japanese culture and history, while providing an opportunity to exchange opinions regarding regional security and leadership in the navy.	With the participation of young naval personnel from 22 countries, the second program was held in October 2013. Lectures on Japan’s security policies and the current status of the MSDF were given, and presentations were made by the participants, as well as opinions being exchanged.

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	ASDF	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996, with participation by officials related to air force academies mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education.	The 18th International Air Force Education Seminar was held on November 2013, inviting six countries on the main theme of "Leadership education in air force academies in each country" and "Overview of air force doctrine in each country."
		Air Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.	With the participation of students from air force colleges in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the 12th seminar was held in October 2012. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "The current status, issues and future direction of the Air Force in each country (including international peacekeeping activities)."
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides an opportunity to invite instructors of military academies in the Asia-Pacific regions and to discuss international affairs and security.	The 18th International Seminar on Defense Science Seminar was held on July 2013, inviting 17 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Military capabilities and functions that should be strengthened to meet the enlarging and diversifying role and duties of the military and education of military academy."
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	In March 2014, 17 countries were invited to the 17th conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of "Leadership and the way cadets should be."
	National Institute for Defense Studies	International Security Symposium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.	In November 2013, researchers and businesspersons were invited from the United States, Australia, ROK, U.K., Sweden and India, along with specialists in Japan, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Potential multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region beyond the differences in viewing security."
		International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	In October 2012, researchers and businesspersons were invited from the United States, Australia, ROK, U.K., Sweden and India, along with specialists in Japan, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Directions and challenges to overcome for innovation of military capabilities."
		International Forum on War History	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	In September 2012, researchers were invited from the United States, U.K., Australia and Japan to exchange opinions on the theme of "Defense of the Wider Realm :the Diplomacy and Strategy of the Protection of Islands in War."
		Asia-Pacific Security Workshop	Giving workshop-style group study sessions to discuss arising security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common.	In December 2012, researchers were invited from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan and China, to exchange opinions on the theme of "Security outlook of the Asia Pacific countries and its implications for the defense sector."

#### Reference 46 Other Multilateral Security Dialogue

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureaus and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated on the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
	Putrajaya Forum		This event, hosted by the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security and participated in by national defense experts from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its first event in 2010.
	Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD)		This event, hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia (organized by the Indonesian Defence University) and participated in by the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its first event in 2011.
	Joint Staff	Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic- support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
		Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
		Land Forces Pacific (LFP)	LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The JGSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the "Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. Cooperation on HA/DR," which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.
	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	MSDF	Asia Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated on the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The JMSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
		Indian Ocean Naval Symposium	This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.
	Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence	Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)	Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-la Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
	Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did not take place in 2011.
	Munich Security Conference		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official's level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.
	Halifax International Security Forum		Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.

**Reference 47 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)**

(April 1, 2011–June 30, 2014)

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Cobra Gold	February 2012 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.	Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
	February 2013 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.	Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
	February 2014 (Thailand)	Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.	Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
Pacific Partnership	June–July 2011 (Timor-Leste, Micronesia)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, etc.	Approximately 10 personnel
	June–July 2012 (Philippines, Vietnam)	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, etc.	1 vessel 6 aircraft (personnel transportation) Approximately 50 personnel
	June–July 2012 (Tonga, Papua New Guinea)	Japan, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.	1 vessel, 2 aircraft (personnel transportation), Approximately 40 personnel
ARF-DIREx	May 2013 (Thailand)	Japan, Thailand, ROK, ARF countries	Approximately 50 participants from Joint Staff office, Ground Staff office, Internal Bureau, Central Readiness Force, Middle Army, and Air Support Command, DSF Hanshin Hospital 1 aircraft
Asean Disaster Relief Operating Exercises	April–May 2014 (Thailand)	Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Cambodia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, China, U.S., France, EU, Canada	7 personnel
ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise	June 2013 (Brunei)	Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Northeastern Army
	Military Medicine Meeting October 2013 (Singapore)	Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos	Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office

Exercise		Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
ADDM Anti-Terrorism Exercise		September 2013 (Indonesia)	Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Russia, U.S., ROK, Philippines, Myanmar, Japan,	3 personnel from Joint Staff office, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.
Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Training	Ayala Guardian 11	June 2011 (Thailand)	Japan, Thailand, U.S., Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, Vietnam, etc.	Approximately 10 personnel including observers
	Shanti Doot-3	February–March 2012 (Bangladesh)	Japan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, etc.	4 personnel
	Shanti Prayas-2	March–April 2013 (Nepal)	Japan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, ROK, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.	Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff office, School of Joint Staff office, Central Readiness Force, Northern Army
Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)		July 2011 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Cambodia, India, ROK, Indonesia	2 personnel
		August 2012 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, India, Singapore	2 personnel
		August 2013 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, U.K., France, India, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Nepal	Approximately 4 personnel including observers
		June–July 2014 (Mongolia)	Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Canada, Germany, U.K., India, Indonesia, ROK, Nepal, Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, France, Tajikistan	Approximately 8 personnel including observers
American-Filipino Bilateral Training (Balikatan 12)		April 2012 (Philippines)	Japan, U.S., Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia	3 personnel
Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention		May 2012 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, U.K.	Approximately 20 personnel
		May 2013 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, China, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.	Approximately 40 personnel
		May 2014 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.	Approximately 30 personnel
Australiar Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013)		September. 8–November. 8 2013 (Australia)	Japan, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Thailand, U.S., France, Spain, Tonga, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan	1 vessel
ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (part of the Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training described above)		September. 29–October. 8 2013 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, U.S., New Zealand, China, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Singapore	1 vessel
Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Training		September. 20–28 2013 (Yokosuka, Sagami Bay)	Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.	3 vessel, etc.
Western Pacific Minesweeping Training		February 12–March 8, 2013 (New Zealand)	Japan, U.S., China, ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.	7 personnel
KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy		March 20–April 9, 2014 (Indonesia)	Japan, U.S., China, ROK, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.	1 vessel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training		July 2011 (Waters around Brunei)	Japan, U.S., Australia	1 vessel
		June 2012 (Kyushu, southeastern waters)		2 vessel 1 aircraft
		September 2012 (Waters around Australia)		2 aircraft
		June 22–26 2013 (Waters around Guam)		1 vessel 2 aircraft
Japan-U.S.-Korea Trilateral Training		June 2012 (Korean peninsula, southern waters)	Japan, U.S., ROK	3 vessel
		August 2012 (Waters around Hawaii)		2 vessel
		May 15 2013 (waters west of Kyushu)		2 vessel
		October 10–11 2013 (waters west of Kyushu)		2 vessel
		December 11 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)		2 vessel
Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)		August-September 2012 (Australia)	Japan, Australia, etc.	1 vessel 2 aircraft
Multilateral Minesweeper Training Co-Hosted by the U.S. and U.K.		October 2011 (Waters around Bahrain)	Japan, U.S., U.K.	2 vessels
U.S.-Hosted International Minesweeper Training		September 2012 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	2 vessels
		May 4–29 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)	Japan, U.S., etc.	6 personnel
Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)		February 2012, February 2013, February 2014 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)	Japan, U.S., Australia	2 aircraft Approximately 430 personnel

Exercise	Period (Venue)	Participating countries	Participating SDF units, etc.
Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Exercise Souther Jackaroo)	May 2013, May 2014 (Australia)	Japan, U.S., Australia	Approximately 30 personnel
RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)	June-August 2012 (Surrounding ocean areas and airspace of Hawaii and surrounding ocean areas of the U.S. West Coast )	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, ROK, Russia, U.K., etc.	3 vessel 3 aircraft
	June-August 2014 (Surrounding ocean areas and airspace of Hawaii and surrounding ocean areas of the U.S. West Coast )	Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, China, ROK, U.K., etc.	2 vessel, 3 aircraft Northeastern Army, etc.

#### Reference 48 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Jun. 2011	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi (ADMM-Plus)) ☆ Both sides concurred on the importance of moving into a phase of concrete implementation for future defense cooperation, such as joint training and the use of ACSA in areas such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief
	Jun. 2012	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ 1) Both sides concurred on the vision of Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation, 2) Agreement on disaster prevention and disaster relief between Japan and Australia. 3) Concurred on deepening discussion at "2+2" meetings about strengthening of Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation Meeting between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Japan) and Australian Defense Minister (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Agreement reached to promote international peace cooperation and technical cooperation
	Sep. 2012	4th Japan-Australia "2+2" meeting (Sydney) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) regional security situation and 2) Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation
	Sep. 2012	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) their security policies, and 2) Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Sep. 2012	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) Japan-Australia defense cooperation and 2) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation
	Jun. 2013	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 12th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Agreement reached to advance Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Jul. 2013	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Confirmed the regional situations and the progress of Japan-Australia defense cooperation, and exchanged views regarding the future Japan-Australia defense cooperation as well as Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation
	Apr. 2014	Attendance of Prime Minister of Australia to Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) and a special meeting of the National Security Council (Four Ministers Meeting) ☆ Agreement was reached on 1) Strengthening of defense cooperation in a real term, 2) Commencement of negotiation towards the agreement of a framework regarding defense equipment and technical cooperation
	Apr. 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Perth) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation including the areas of equipment and technologies
	May 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation
	Jun. 2014	5th Japan-Australia "2+2" Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ 1) Agreement reached to strongly oppose the use or force of power to change the status quo unilaterally, 2) Confirmed a substantive agreement on the Agreement negotiation regarding the transfer of the defense equipment and technology
	Jun. 2014	Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Agreement reached to promote the strengthening of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation such as an expansion of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training
	Feb. 2011	Visit to Australia by Chief of Joint Staff
	Feb. 2011	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2011	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force
	May 2012	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy
	Jun. 2012	Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2012	Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2012	Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Defence Force
	Feb. 2013	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2013	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Ground Force
	Mar. 2014	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Apr. 2011	12th Japan-Australia Politico-Military Consultations (PM)
	Nov. 2011	16th Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)
	Aug. 2012	13th Japan-Australia Politico-Military Consultations (PM)
	Nov. 2012	17th Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)
	Feb. 2014	18th Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Jul. 2011	Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (ASDF)
	Jun. 2012	Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF)
	Jun. 2013	Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF)
	Sep. 2013	Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF)
	May 2011	Dispatch of observers to Australian Army-sponsored shooting convention
	Jul. 2011	Visit to Misawa Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (F/A-18, C-17)
	Mar. 2012	Dispatch of ASDF transport aircraft (C-130) to Australia
	Sep. 2012	Participation in the Australian hosted multinational joint maritime exercise "Kakadu 12"
	Feb. 2013	Dispatching ASDF aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767) to Australia
	May 2013	Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army
	Sep. 2013	Participation of an Australian Navy fleet in the Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Training hosted by Japan.
		Japan participated in the International Fleet Review to commemorate the centenary of the Royal Australian Navy's fleet into Sydney, Australian Navy-hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013) and ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise
	May 2014	Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army

Japan—U.S.—Australia trilateral cooperation	Jun. 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Joint Statement issued and trilateral cooperation in regional security and stability confirmed
	Jun. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 12th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued and promotion of dynamic and versatile trilateral defense cooperation confirmed
	May 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued
	Jan. 2011	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Feb. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	Jul. 2011	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF)
	Feb. 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF)
	Jun. 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF)
	Sep. 2012	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF)
	Feb. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF)
	May 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia firing training (GSDF)
	Jun. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF)
	Feb. 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF)
	May 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (GSDF)
	Jan. 2011	Participation of Australian Air Force as observers in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises "Cope North Guam"
	Feb. 2011	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)
	Feb. 2012	Participation of Australian Army as observers in Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercises
	Dec. 2012	Participation of Major General of Australian Army as Vice Commander of U.S. Pacific Command in Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercises
	Feb. 2013	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)
	Jul. 2013	1st Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)
	Mar. 2014	Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Canberra) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)
	Jul. 2014	2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff)

#### Reference 49 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Jan. 2011	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) ☆ Exchange of views regarding the issue of North Korea and defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and ROK
	Jun. 2011	Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchanged opinions on North Korea issue, Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchange
	Jul. 2011	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, the ROK's Navy
	Oct. 2011	Visit to Japan by Chairman, the ROK's Joint Chiefs of Staff
	Nov. 2011	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (ROK)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Nov. 2013	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (ROK)
	Mar. 2014	Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Indonesia)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Jul. 2011	19th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Assistant Vice Minister talks)
	May 2013	20th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Assistant Vice Minister talks)
	Jul. 2011	Visit to the ROK by Commander of the Western Air Defense Force
	Sep. 2011	Japan-ROK commanders' course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Oct. 2011	Participation in the Gyeongju Military Cultural Festival by the GSDF Central Band
		Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Nov. 2011	Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise
	Nov. 2011	Visit to the ROK by Commanding General of the Western Army
	Nov. 2011	Japan-ROK commanders' course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF)
	Nov. 2011	Visit to the ROK by MSDF patrol aircraft P-3C (MSDF)
	Nov. 2011	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ASDF)
	Mar. 2012	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Mar. 2012	Japan-ROK basic level officer exchange (ROK) (GSDF)
	Apr. 2012	Visit to Japan by the ROK Army Second Field Army Commander (GSDF)
	Nov. 2012	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF)
		Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
	Dec. 2012	Japan-ROK basic level officer exchange (ROK) (GSDF)
	Apr. 2013	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Sep. 2013	Participation of Korean Navel vessel in a submarine rescue training in the western Pacific Ocean hosted by Japan
Japan—U.S.—ROK trilateral cooperation	Oct. 2013	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Oct. 2013	Japan-ROK commander's course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF)
	Oct. 2013	Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (Japan) (GSDF)
	Dec. 2013	Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise (MSDF)
		Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF)
	Mar. 2014	Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF)
	Jan. 2012	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks
	Jun. 2012	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ A press release was issued. Three ministers shared a common recognition on the regional security situation while reaffirmed the value of trilateral defense cooperation
	Jun. 2012	Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Aug. 2012	Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Jan. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks
	Apr. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK basic level officer exchange (ROK) (GSDF)
	May 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Jun. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 12th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. Three ministers shared a recognition of the regional security situation, while agreed to expand the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral defense cooperation
	Oct. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Dec. 2013	Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (MSDF)
		Japan-U.S.-ROK basic level officer exchange (Japan) (GSDF)
	Apr. 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK basic level officer exchange (ROK) (GSDF)
	Apr. 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks
	May 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The Ministers shared a recognition of the regional security situation including North Korea, while agreed to continue the close Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation
	Jul. 2014	Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting

**Reference 50 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)**

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Nov. 2011	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Opinions exchanged regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, as well as the maritime security and regional situation (Joint press release issued)
	Dec. 2011	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi) ☆ Expansion of cooperation in the field of maritime security welcomed
	May 2013	Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Japan-India Joint Statement issued and establishment of working group to facilitate bilateral cooperation concerning regular exercises between MSDF and Indian Navy as well as US-2 decided.
	Jan. 2014	Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) ☆ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries, bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, as well as regional and global security issues, etc. Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi)
	Feb. 2011	Visit to India by the GSDF Chief of Staff
	Oct. 2012	2nd Japan-India Vice-Ministerial "2+2" Dialogue (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-India Defense Policy Dialogue (Tokyo)
	Nov. 2012	Visit to India by the ASDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Feb. 2013	Visit to India by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	May 2013	Visit to India by the GSDF Chief of Staff
Unit-level exchange, etc.	May 2011	8th Japan-India Comprehensive Security Dialogue, 7th Japan-India Military-Military Talks
	Aug. 2011	Japan-India training exercise observer (Japan) (GSDF)
	Jan. 2012	Japan-India training exercise observer (India) (GSDF)
	Jun. 2012	First Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF)
	Dec. 2013	Second Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF)

**Reference 51 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)**

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Jan. 2011	12th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by defense/foreign affairs deputy ministers)
	Jun. 2011	Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Both defense authorities concurred on the importance of moving the dialogue forward in a calm manner, promoting Japan-China defense exchanges stably, which leads to the basic focus of "strategic mutual relationship" further enhancing bilateral trust and friendship and improving transparency of defense policies
	Jul. 2011	☆ Concurred on holding the 3rd Working-Level Talks at an earliest possible time towards establishing a maritime liaison mechanism between defense authorities
	Nov. 2011	Japan-China Summit Meeting (Beijing) ☆ Concurred on the importance of developing a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" is important. "High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs" was established as a platform for interactions between maritime-related organizations of the two countries
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Jun. 2012	3rd Working-Level Talks on Maritime Communication Mechanism between Japan and China's defense authorities
	Apr. 2013	1st Japan-China Senior Officials Meeting
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Dec. 2011	Visit to China by the MSDF destroyer Kirisame
	Mar. 2012	Visit to China by Commanding General of the GSDF Middle Army
	Apr. 2013	First Japan-China Security Subcommittee
	Apr. 2014	Visit to China by the MSDF Chief of Staff (WPNS (Qingdao))

**Reference 52 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)**

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Jun. 2011	Meeting between Minister of Defense and Russian Deputy Prime Minister (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Agreement reached that developing mutual understanding and strengthening a trustful relationship through defense exchanges are vital
	Sep. 2012	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Russia (Vladivostok APEC)) ☆ Concurred on deepening Japan-Russia cooperation in the fields of security and defense
	Apr. 2013	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow) ☆ Agreement reached to hold Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) Agreement reached to expand exchanges between defense officials and forces of the two countries as well as to seek new areas of cooperation including counter-terrorism and counter-piracy measures
	Nov. 2013	Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the future Japan-Russia defense cooperation and exchange as well as defense policies of both countries
	Nov. 2013	Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding security and defense policies of both countries based on the security situation in Asia-Pacific region, cooperation within the region based on a multilateral framework, and deployment of a missile defense system in the region, etc.
	Feb. 2014	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Sochi)
	Jun. 2012	Visit to Russia by Chief of Joint Staff
	Aug. 2012	Visit to Russia by the ASDF Chief of Staff
	Aug. 2013	Visit to Russia by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2014	Visit to Russia by the GSDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Apr. 2012	6th Japan-Russia Security Talks
	Sep. 2012	11th Japan-Russia Consultation between defense authorities
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Sep. 2011	12th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises
	Aug. 2012	Visit to Japan by Russian Navy's vessels
	Sep. 2012	13th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises
	Jul. 2013	Visit to Japan by the delegation of the Russian Ground Forces, Eastern Military District
	Dec. 2013	14th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises
	Mar. 2014	Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army

**Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)**

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Brunei	Feb. 2012 May 2012	Visit to Brunei by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Bruneian Deputy Minister of Defense
	Cambodia	Aug. 2013	Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bandar Seri Begawan, Second ADMM-Plus))
	Indonesia	Jan. 2011 Jan. 2011	Visit to Indonesia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Unveil the statue of General Sudirman donated by Indonesia before the meeting. At the meeting two ministers exchanged opinions on the ARF disaster field training exercise, Japan-Indonesia defense cooperation and regional security cooperation
		Jun. 2011	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchange opinions on Japan-Indonesia defense cooperation and regional situation and concurred that both sides closely cooperate in the fields of disaster relief and maritime security, while deepening Japan-Indonesia defense cooperation
		Jun. 2011	Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Concurred on regular holding of Defence Minister meetings, holding of consultations on policy and security issues between the authorities of defense and foreign affairs and cooperation in the field of defense
		Sep. 2011	Visit to Indonesia by the ASDF Chief
		Nov. 2011	Visit to Indonesia by the MSDF Chief
		Feb. 2012	Visit to Indonesia by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
		Jun. 2012	Meeting between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and Indonesian Minister of Defence (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchange opinions on ADMM-Plus-related cooperation and memorandum on defense cooperation
		Sep. 2012	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force
		Jan. 2013	Visit to Indonesia by the GSDF Chief
		Jun. 2013	Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 12th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Agreement reached to advance cooperation in the area of defense
		Apr. 2014	Visit to Indonesia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		Jun. 2014	Visit to Indonesia by the ASDF Chief
	Laos	Mar. 2012	Japan-Laos Summit Meeting ☆ Confirmed the promotion of exchange in the fields of security and defence
		Jun. 2012	Meeting between Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and Laotian Vice-Minister of National Defense (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	Malaysia	Jan. 2011	Visit to Malaysia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		Jan. 2013	Visit to Malaysia by the ASDF Chief of Staff
		Apr. 2014	Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting
		Jun. 2014	Visit to Malaysia by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	Myanmar	Feb. 2012	Visit to Myanmar by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
		Apr. 2014	Visit to Myanmar by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
		May 2014	Visit to Myanmar by Chief of Joint Staff
	Philippines	Jan. 2011 Sep. 2011	Visit the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting ☆ Issued Japan-Philippines joint statement and concurred on assigning a bilateral strategic partnership. In the joint statement, both countries concurred on the promotion of exchange and cooperation between their defense authorities including mutual visits by the MSDF Chief of Staff and the Flag Officers in Command of the Philippine Navy, and holding consultations between the chiefs of staff of the MSDF and the Philippine Navy
		Nov. 2011	Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff
		Apr. 2012	Visit to Japan by Flag Officers in Command of the Philippine Navy
		Jun. 2012	Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff
		Jun. 2012	Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Visit to the Pacific Partnership 2012, etc.)
		Jul. 2012	Japan-Philippine Defense Ministerial Meeting ☆ Signed a statement of intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and the Philippines and the regional situation
		Sep. 2012	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines
		May 2013	Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
		June 2013	Visit to Japan by Flag Officers in Command of the Philippine Navy
		June 2014	Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff
	Singapore	Jan. 2011	Visit to Singapore by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
		Feb. 2011	Visit to Singapore by GSDF Chief of Staff
		Jun. 2011	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Singapore expressed strong interest towards lessons learned in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and two ministers concurred on the recognition that capabilities to respond to disaster should be regionally improved while sharing such information among countries in the region
		Jun. 2012	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and the Singaporean Minister of Defence (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Confirmed that both countries would work cooperatively as joint chair countries to serve for ADMM-Plus military medicine EWG
		Jul. 2012	Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting
		Oct. 2012	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting
		Jan. 2013	Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff
		Jun. 2013	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 12th Shangri-La Dialogue)
		Sep. 2013	Visit to Japan by Flag Officers in Command of the Singapore Navy.
		Dec. 2013	Visit to Singapore by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
		Feb. 2014	Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff
		May 2014	Visit to Singapore by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		May 2014	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	Thailand	Jan. 2011	Visit to Thailand by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		Jan. 2011	Visit to Thailand by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
		Jun. 2011	Visit to Thailand by the MSDF Chief
		Jan. 2012	Visit to Thailand by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		Nov. 2012	Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Army Commander
		Jan. 2013	Visit to Thailand by the GSDF Chief
		Jan. 2013	Visit to Thailand by the ASDF Chief
		Sep. 2013	Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations as well as Japan-Thailand defense cooperation and exchange
		Oct. 2013	Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Air Force Commander

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Timor-Leste	Oct. 2011 Mar. 2012	Visit to Japan by the Deputy Prime Minister of Timor-Leste. Visit to Japan by Timor-Leste's Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Security
	Vietnam	Jun. 2011	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchange views on Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and regional situations including the South China Sea. Both sides concurred on realization of Defense Minister Thanh's visit to Japan in 2011 and deepening defense cooperation of both countries
		Sep. 2011	Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff
		Oct. 2011	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Carry out the exchange of opinions on the state of security-related affairs at regional and international level, including maritime security ☆ Concurred on strengthening Japan-Vietnam strategic talks including the routinization of high-level mutual-visits and talks among Administrative Vice-Minister-level personnel ☆ Signing of the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange
		Dec. 2011	Visit to Japan by the Vietnamese Naval Commander
		Jan. 2012	Visit to Vietnam by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
		May. 2012	Visit to Vietnam by the Chief of Joint Staff
		Jun. 2012	Japan-Vietnam Administrative Vice-Minister level meeting (Singapore, 11th Shangri-La Dialogue)
		Jun. 2012	Visit to Japan by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defense and Air Force
		Nov. 2012	1st Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi)
		Apr. 2013	Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People's Army
		May. 2013	Visit to Vietnam by MSDF Chief of Staff
		May. 2013	Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff
		Aug. 2013	Visit to Vietnam by the GSDF Chief of Staff
		Sep. 2013	Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations as well as Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchange
	Jun. 2014	Japan-Vietnam Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue)	
	Multilateral National Security Talks etc., Held at Bilateral Meetings	Jul. 2011	7th PACC (Singapore, Chief of Joint Staff-level meeting is as below) Chief of the General Staff of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Commander of the Singaporean Army, Commander of the Thai Army, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army of Vietnam
		Sep. 2011	3rd Japan-ASEAN member-state defense authorities Vice-Minister-level dialogue (Tokyo, Vice-Minister-level meeting is as below) Cambodia Secretary of Defense, Indonesia Deputy Secretary of Defense, Malaysia Deputy Secretary of Defense, Myanmar, Senior Vice Minister of Defense, Philippine Deputy Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Deputy Secretary of Defense
		Oct. 2011	14th CHOD (Hawaii, Chief of Joint Staff-level meeting is as below): Commander of the Defense Force of Malaysia, Commander of the Singaporean National Military
		Jun. 2012	11th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore, Chief of Joint Staff-level meeting is as below) Chief of the General Staff of the Filipino National Armed Forces, Commander of the Singaporean National Military
		Nov. 2012	15th CHOD (Sydney, Chief of Joint Staff-level meeting is as below) Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippine
		Mar. 2013	The 4th Meeting of Senior Defense Officials on Common Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo) included vice-ministerial meetings with Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia
		May. 2013	IMDEX2013 (Singapore, MSDF Chief of Staff-level Meeting is as follows) Singapore Navy Commander, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff
		Jul. 2013	8th PACC (New Zealand, GSDF Chief of Staff-level Meeting is as follows) Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Chief of Australian Air Force, New Zealand Army Commander, Royal Thai Army Commander
		Dec. 2013	International Maritime Security Symposium (Jakarta, MSDF Chief of Staff-level Meeting is as follows) Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, U.S. Chief of Naval Operation, Pakistan Navy Chief of Staff
		Feb. 2014	5th Japan-ASEAN member-state defense authorities Vice-Minister-level dialogue (Okinawa, Vice-Minister-level meeting is as follows) Malaysia Deputy Secretary of Defense, Brunei Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cambodia Deputy Secretary of Defense, Myanmar Vice-Defense Minister, Philippine Deputy Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Deputy Secretary of Defense
Feb. 2014		ASDF Chief of Staff participated in the Asia-Pacific Region Security Meeting and Singapore Air Show	
Apr. 2014		14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Qingdao, MSDF Chief of Staff-level Meeting is as follows) Chief of Naval Operation, Australian Chief of Navy, the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, New Zealand Royal Navy Commander, etc.	
Regular discussions between defense ministry High-level talks between heads of state and defense representatives	Cambodia	Feb. 2012	2nd Japan-Cambodia Military-Military Consultation (MM) Chief of Naval Operation, Australian Chief of Navy, the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, Royal Canadian Navy Commander, New Zealand Royal Navy Commander, Chilean Navy Commander
		May 2013	2nd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM)
	Indonesia	Nov. 2011	1st Japan-Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 4th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM)
		July 2013	2nd Japan-Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 5h Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM)
	Philippines	Mar. 2012	5th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 5th Japan-Philippines Military-Military Consultation (MM)
		May 2013	6th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 6th Japan-Philippines Military-Military Consultation (MM)
	Singapore	Nov. 2011	12th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM)
	Thailand	Sep. 2011	10th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 10th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM)
		Mar. 2013	11th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 11th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM)
	Vietnam	Nov. 2012 Dec. 2012	7th Japan-Vietnam Military-Military Consultation (MM), 2nd Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue 3rd Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue
Malaysia	Jul. 2011	3rd Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM)	
	Nov. 2012	4th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM)	
	Oct. 2013	5th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM)	
Myanmar	Nov. 2013	Japan-Myanmar-Military Consultation (MM)	
Unit-level exchange, etc.	Southeast Asian Member States and Multilateral Exchanges etc.	Feb. 2011	Participation in Cobra Gold 11 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)
		Mar. 2011	Participation in ARF-DiREx 2011 hosted by Japan and Indonesia (Indonesia)
		Jul. 2011	Participation of the US-2 rescue seaplane and destroyer Shimakaze in the Brunei International Naval Review
		Feb. 2012	Participation in Cobra Gold 12 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)
		Feb. 2012	Exchange between Japanese and Singapore troops (Singapore) (GSDF)
		Mar. 2013	Participation in Cobra Gold 13 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)
		Feb. 2014	Participation in Cobra Gold 14 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand)

**Reference 54 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom (Past Three Years)**

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Apr. 2011 Jun. 2011	Visit to Japan by the U.K. Minister of State for Defence (in charge of equipment, support and technology) Japan-U.K. Defense administrative Vice-Minister Meeting (Singapore, 10th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchange views on responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Japan-U.K. defense cooperation
	Oct. 2011	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Both parties concurred that their cooperative relationship is strengthening in terms of defense cooperation and exchanges. Also, agreement reached to take initiatives to develop new defense cooperation
	Apr. 2012	Japan-U.K. Summit (Tokyo) ☆ Negotiation initiated between two governments regarding Information Security Agreement. Support for signing a defense cooperation memorandum, decided to identify adequate defense equipment, etc., for joint development and production of defense equipment
	Jun. 2012	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and U.K. Defence Minister ☆ Exchanged Memorandum relating to defense cooperation. Confirmed to work cooperatively in areas including those for equipment and technologies
	Jan. 2013	Japan-U.K. Vice-Ministerial Meeting (London) ☆ Exchanged views on Japan-U.K. defense cooperation, including the fields of equipment and cyberspace
	Jun. 2013	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 12th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchanged views on progress of defense cooperation between Japan and U.K. and on regional situation
	Jul. 2013	Visit to Japan by the U.K. Minister of State for Defence (in charge of equipment, support and technology)
	Sep. 2013	Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Defense
	May. 2014	Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Defense
	May. 2014	Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue) ☆ Exchanged views on progress of defense cooperation between Japan and U.K. and on regional situation
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Mar. 2011	Visit to Japan by the first Minister of Navy and the U.K. Royal Navy Chief of Staff
	Aug. 2011	Visit to Japan by the U.K. Royal Air Force Chief of Staff
	Feb. 2012	Visit to the U.K. by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	Jun. 2012	Visit to the U.K. by the GSDF Chief of Staff
	Dec. 2013	Visit to Japan by the First Minister of Navy and the U.K. Royal Navy Chief of Staff
	Mar. 2014	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the U.K. Army
	Apr. 2014	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Defence Staff
	Jul. 2014	Visit to the U.K. by the ASDF Chief of Staff
Unit-level exchange, etc	Feb. 2011	11th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 7th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities
	Jan. 2013	12th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities
	Dec. 2013	13th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities
	Oct. 2011	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (MSDF)
	Feb. 2012	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (U.K.) (GSDF)
	Feb. 2012	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (GSDF)
	Jul. 2013	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (ASDF)
	Nov. 2013	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (MSDF)
	May. 2014	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (MSDF)
	Jul. 2014	Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (U.K.) (ASDF)

**Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Nations and Others (Past Three Years)**

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Belgium	Mar. 2014	Visit to Belgium by the Chief of Joint Staff
	France	Oct. 2011	Japan-France Summit ☆ Conclusion of Japan-France Information Security Agreement
		Jun. 2012	Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and French Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Concurred pursuing the possible cooperation in the areas of equipment and technologies
		Jun. 2013	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the situation of Japan-France defense cooperation exchange and regional situations
		Aug. 2013	Visit to France by the MSDF Chief of Staff
		Jan. 2014	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Paris) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France defense cooperation and exchange
		Jan. 2014	Meeting between Japanese and French Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France security and defense cooperation
		Mar. 2014	Visit to France by the Chief of Joint Staff
		Jun. 2014	Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and defense policies
		Jun. 2014	Visit to France by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
	Germany	Feb. 2012	Visit to Germany by the GSDF Chief of Staff
		Feb. 2012	Visit to Germany by the MSDF Chief of Staff
		Apr. 2013	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of German Army
		Mar. 2014	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Navy
	Italy	Feb. 2011	Visit to Italy by the MSDF Chief of Staff
		Jun. 2012	Visit to Japan by Italian Minister of Defense ☆ Signed Statement of Intent on defense exchanges and cooperation. Concurred on advancing the bilateral cooperation into a new level
		May. 2013	Visit to Italy by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
		Mar. 2014	Visit to Italy by the Chief of Joint Staff
		May. 2014	Visit to Italy by the Minister of Defense
	Spain	Jan. 2013	Japan-Spain Vice-Ministerial Meeting
	Poland	Mar. 2013	Japan-Poland Defense Ministerial Meeting
	Norway	May. 2012	Visit to Norway by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense
	Sweden	May. 2012	Visit to Sweden by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense

High-level talks between heads of state and defense	Turkey	Feb. 2011 Jul. 2012 Mar. 2013	Visit to Turkey by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Turkey by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense ☆Signed the statement of intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting
	Kazakhstan	Jul. 2012	Visit to Kazakhstan by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
	Canada	May. 2011 Aug. 2011 Jun. 2012 Mar. 2014	Visit to Japan by Canada's Chief of the Naval Staff Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial "2+2" Dialogue Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial "2+2" Dialogue (Ottawa)
	Mongolia	Jan. 2012 Nov. 2012 Aug. 2013 Nov. 2013 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014	Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Mongolia) ☆The memorandum regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges signed ☆Concurred on promoting defense exchanges through high-level interactions such as vice-ministerial and chief of staff meetings ☆Both parties confirmed the importance of strengthening cooperative relations regarding United States PKO and other activities Japan-Mongolia Defense Vice-Ministerial Consultation (Mongolia) Visit to Mongolia by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Mongolia Defense Vice-Ministerial Consultation (Japan) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Japan) Visit to Mongolia by the GSDF Chief of Staff
	New Zealand	Feb. 2011 Oct. 2011 May. 2013 Jul. 2013 Aug. 2013 Jun. 2014	Visit to New Zealand by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by New Zealand Army Commander Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander Visit to New Zealand by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 13th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	Nepal	Jan. 2011	Visit to Nepal by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Defense
	Bahrain	Apr. 2012 May. 2012	The memorandum regarding Japan-Bahrain defense exchange signed Visit to Bahrain by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Defence
	Pakistan	Feb. 2013	Visit to Pakistan by MSDF Chief of Staff
	Middle East	Jul. 2011 May. 2012 Nov. 2012 Feb. 2013 Mar. 2013 Feb. 2014	Visit to Republic of Djibouti by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Israel, Norway and Sweden by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Defense Visit to Djibouti, Jordan and Israel by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Defense Visit to Japan by Saudi Arabian Commander of the RSNF Visit to Japan by Saudi Arabian Deputy Defense Minister Visit to UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman by the MSDF Chief of Staff
	Multi-country	Jul. 2011 Oct. 2011 Sep. 2012 May. 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Apr. 2014	7th PACC (Singapore) 20th International Sea Power Symposium (Newport) 13th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Kuala Lumpur) IMDEX2013 (Singapore) 8th PACC (New Zealand) International Maritime Security Symposium (Jakarta) 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Qingdao)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	Canada	Apr. 2012 Jun. 2014	7th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities
	France	Jul. 2011 Jan. 2012 Feb. 2013	14th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 14th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities 15th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities 16th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 15th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities
	Germany	Nov. 2011 Sep. 2012	13th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities 11th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities
	Italy	Sep. 2012 Jun. 2013	1st Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities 2nd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities
	Pakistan	Aug. 2012	Sixth Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities
	NATO	Oct. 2011 May. 2012 Feb. 2014	11th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting 12th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting 13th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting
	Sweden	Dec. 2011 Dec. 2012	1st Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities 2nd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities
	Norway	Feb. 2013	1st Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities
	Pakistan	Aug. 2012	6th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities
	Mongolia	Jan. 2013	1st Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities 1st Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities

**Reference 56** Keynote Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the 13th IISS Asian Security Summit “Shangri-La Dialogue”

June 1, 2014

Keynote address by Prime Minister Abe:  
“Peace and prosperity in Asia, forevermore”

In the speech, Prime Minister Abe emphasized that “rule of law” is particularly important in order for the Asia-Pacific region, a global center for growth, to fully demonstrate its latent potential and to ensure its peace and stability. The major points of the address were as follows.

- (1) Based on the perspective of thorough respect of the “rule of law” at sea, Prime Minister Abe advocated the three principles of (i) making and clarifying claims based on international law, (ii) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims, and (iii) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means. He supported the effort made by the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to resolve the issues in the situations in the South China Sea, and proposed that the relevant countries agree not to take unilateral action, and return to the spirit and provisions of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Further, Prime Minister Abe called for the People’s Republic of China to put the communication mechanism into action, which was agreed upon by Japan and China in order to prevent unexpected situations.

**Reference 57** Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy

**1. Purpose of the Legislation**

To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people’s lives.

**2. Definition of Acts of Piracy**

Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan’s territorial waters, etc.:

- (1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons

**3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy**

A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows:

- (1) 2 (1) – (4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death.
- (2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years
- (3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years

- (2) Prime Minister Abe proposed to create a permanent committee in order to further enhance the East Asia Summit, as the premier forum taking up regional politics and security. He announced that Japan will combine various options within its assistance menu, including strategic use of ODA (provision of patrol vessels, dispatch of experts, etc.), support for capacity building by the Self-Defense Forces, and defense equipment and technology cooperation based on the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” to seamlessly support the capacity of ASEAN countries in safeguarding the seas.
- (3) Prime Minister Abe also explained Japan’s policy from the standpoint of “Proactive Contributor to Peace” and the current status of the consideration on the “reconstruction of the legal basis for security,” by introducing an example of “Kaketsuke-keigo,” (use of weapons for coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) in United Nations peacekeeping operations.
- (4) Lastly, Prime Minister Abe, touching upon Japan’s initiatives in various fields including development assistance, peace building, support for women, people-to-people exchanges, etc., declared that Japan’s orientation as a peace loving country will never sway and Japan will continue to walk the “path of peace and prosperity” together with its partners in the region.

(Excerpt from Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)

**4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy**

- (1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy.
- (2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

**5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy**

- (1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency).
- (2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters.
- (3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded.
- (4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel.

**Reference 58 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities**

Item	International Peace Cooperation Law	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	○ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts toward international peace	○ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	○ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	○ Provision under Article 84-4 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	○ International peacekeeping activities ○ International humanitarian assistance ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security	○ Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	○ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq) <sup>1</sup> ○ High seas and the airspace above <sup>1</sup>	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required) <sup>1</sup> ○ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above <sup>1</sup>
Diet Approval	○ In principle, prior approval in the Diet session is required for the SDF to conduct peace keeping missions <sup>2</sup>	○ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures <sup>2</sup>	(Note 3)
Diet Report	○ Prompt report on the details of the operation plan is required	○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.

2. In case the Diet is closed, an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.

3. As prescribed by Law, (1) The category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) The area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to once again obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to the Diet approval.

**Reference 59 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities**

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(As of June 30, 2014)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	Jan. 2004–Jul. 2006	Approx. 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	Jun.–Sep. 2006	Approx. 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	Feb. 20–Apr. 8, 2004	Approx. 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	Dec. 2003–Feb. 2009	Approx. 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Nov. 2001–Nov. 2007	Approx. 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.		–	• Transportation of materials

(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	Jan. 2008–Feb. 2010	Approx. 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel (As of June 2014)	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF (Maritime Force)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	Mar. 2009–	Approx. 400	• Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.
MSDF (Air Unit)	Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden	May 2009–	Approx. 120	• Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.
GSDF (Air Unit)			Approx. 70	• Security of activity base and P-3C
Local Coordination Center	Djibouti	Jul. 2012–	3	• Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation

## (5) International Peace Cooperation Activities

			Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
PKO	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	8	16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire</li> <li>• Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border</li> </ul>
		Engineer unit	Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993	600	1200	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure</li> <li>• Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups</li> <li>• Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 – Jan. 1995	5	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Draft mid- and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters</li> </ul>
		Transport coordination unit	May 1993 – Jan. 1995	48	144	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport</li> </ul>
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	Sep. – Dec. 1994	260		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies</li> </ul>
		Air transport unit	Sep. – Dec. 1994	118		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo)</li> <li>• Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009 Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013	1st-3th personnel: 2 14th-17th personnel: 3	38	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters</li> </ul>
		Transport unit	Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012	1st-33rd personnel: 43	1463	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transport food and other supplies</li> </ul>
			Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013	34th personnel: 44		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance</li> </ul>
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor- Leste	Air transport unit	Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000	113		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR</li> <li>• Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel</li> </ul>
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	Oct. 2001	138		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISSET) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004	1st personnel: 10 2nd personnel: 7	17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters</li> </ul>
		Engineer unit	Mar. 2002 – Jun. 2004	1st and 2nd personnel: 680 3rd personnel: 522 4th personnel: 405	2287	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities</li> <li>• Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance</li> <li>• Public welfare support operations</li> </ul>
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	Mar. – Apr. 2003	50		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR</li> </ul>
Humanitarian aid	Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	Jul. – Aug. 2003	98		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	Mar. 2007 – Jan. 2011	6	24	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	Oct. 2008 – Sep. 2011	2	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector</li> <li>• Database management</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013	2	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items</li> </ul>
		Engineer unit	Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013	1st personnel: 203 2nd personnel: 346 3rd and 4th personnel: 330 5th and 6th personnel: 317 7th personnel: 297 Removal support personnel: 44	2184	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	Military liaison officer	Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012	2	8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste</li> </ul>
PKO	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Headquarters staff	Nov. 2011 –	3	15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics</li> <li>• Management of database</li> <li>• Planning and coordination of engineering duties</li> </ul>
		Engineer Unit	Jan. 2012 –	1st personnel: approx 210 2nd – approx. 330 4th personnel: approx. 330 5th and 6th personnel: approx. 400	1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel)</li> <li>• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities</li> <li>• Coordination regarding logistics</li> </ul>
		Joint Coordination Center	Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013	1st personnel: approx. 30 2nd – 4th personnel: approx. 20	90	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities</li> <li>• Coordination regarding logistics</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).

2. And advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

## (6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	Nov. 13–Dec. 9, 1998	80	• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics in the Republic of Honduras
	Air transport unit		105	• Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc., between Japan and Honduras • Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras
Transportation of resources required for international disaster relief activities in Iran (earthquake disaster)	Maritime transport unit	Sep. 23–Nov. 22, 1999	426	• Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g., temporary dwellings)
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	Feb. 5–11, 2001	16	• Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78	• Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.
International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake, tsunami)	Air transport unit	Dec. 30, 2003–Jan. 6, 2004	31	• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	Dec. 28, 2004–Jan. 1, 2005	590	• Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	Jan. 6–Mar. 23, 2005	22	• Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities • Communication and coordination with relevant organizations and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228	• Air transport of aid materials • Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593	• Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Transport and aid materials
	Air transport unit		82	• Air transport of aid materials
International disaster relief activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	Aug. 5–10, 2005	346	• Rescue of a Russian submarine
International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (earthquake disaster)	Air support unit	Oct. 12–Dec. 2, 2005	147	• Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114	• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)	Medical support unit	Jun. 1–22, 2006	149	• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85	• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Oct. 5–17, 2009	12	• Medical treatment
	Joint liaison office		21	• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others
International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Jan. 18–Feb. 16, 2010	104	• Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		97	• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Joint liaison office		33	• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others
International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (floods)	Air support unit	Aug. 20–Oct. 10, 2010	184	• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies by air
	Joint operations coordination center		27	• Coordination with related organizations in Pakistan and other related countries
	Marine convoy		154	• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by sea
	Air transport unit		149	• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by air
Transportation of resources and personnel necessary for the implementation of international disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)	Air transport unit	Feb. 23–Mar. 3, 2011	40	• Transportation of international disaster relief teams by air
International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)	Joint Operations Coordination Center	Nov. 12–Dec. 13, 2013	1,086	• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others
	Medical assistance unit/Air support unit			• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials
	Maritime dispatched unit			• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
	Airlift unit			• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.
The International Disaster Relief Activities for the Missing Malaysian Airplane	Joint Coordination Center	Mar. 11–Apr. 28, 2014	137	• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and others.
	MSDF Patrol aircraft unit			• Rescue operations including searching
	ASDF Airlift unit			• Rescue operations including searching

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.  
2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

**Reference 60 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations**

(As of June 30, 2014)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997–Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004–Aug. 1, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General) <sup>1</sup>
Jun. 23, 1997–Jun. 25, 2000	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Oct. 1, 2002–Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005–Jul. 11, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009–Jan. 8, 2013	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Aug. 27, 2013–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF officer (Captain)
Dec. 2, 2002–Jun. 1, 2005	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005–Nov. 27, 2008	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Jan. 16, 2011–Jan. 15, 2014	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Sep. 18, 2013–	Formed unit Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

**Reference 61 Changes in Procured Amounts of Equipment and Other Procurements**

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Procurement Type Fiscal Year	Domestic Procurement (A)	Imports			Total (E=A+D)	Domestic Procurement Ratio (%) (A/E)
		Commercial Imports (B)	Foreign Military Sales (C)	Subtotal (D=B+C)		
2008	19,382	1,153	642	1,795	21,177	91.5
2009	18,219	1,290	620	1,911	20,130	90.5
2010	17,611	1,023	551	1,574	19,185	91.8
2011	21,746	1,471	589	2,060	23,806	91.3
2012	20,672	1,216	1,372	2,588	23,259	88.9

Notes: 1. Figures for "Domestic Procurement," "Commercial Imports," and "Foreign Military Sales" are based on the results of the Survey of Equipment Procurement Contract Amounts for the year in question.  
 2. "Foreign Military Sales" refers to the amount of equipment procured from the U.S. Government under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement.  
 3. Figures are rounded up or down, and may not tally precisely.

**Reference 62 The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.**

- The export of arms needs a license from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)\* and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

\*Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

**1. The Three Principles on Arms Export**

On April 21, 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting. (Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

- (1) Communist Bloc countries
- (2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions
- (3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

**2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export**

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

**(1) The Government's Policy**

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

- (i) The export of "arms" to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.
  - (ii) The export of "arms" to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
  - (iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms."
- (2) Definition of Arms
- The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.
- (i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No. 205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.
  - (ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle." Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying fi rearms, etc., for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms."

Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No.109" in (3) of 1) and "the items from No. 197 to No. 205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "the Item No.1."

## Reference 63 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)

The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Principles on Arms Exports") and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.

Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation.

From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government's existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures.

An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as "peace contribution and international cooperation"). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan's ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan's defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan's enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.

On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized.

In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense

equipment and technology.

### 1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when:

- 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded,
- 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or
- 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack).

### 2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure

In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan's security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as "the ally and partners"), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan's security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.

Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan's security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).

### 3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties

In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licensor.

Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision.

For the purpose of this policy, "defense equipment and technology" refers to "arms and military technologies"; "arms" refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and "military technologies" refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms.

The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes.

**Reference 64 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense personnel**

(As of March 31, 2014)

Personnel of the Ministry of Defense	Special Service	Minister of Defense	
		Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense	
		Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2)	
		Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (Up to 3)	
		Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense	
		Authorized Strength	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense
			Director General, and others 648
			Administrative Officials, and Others 20,752
			SDF Regular Personnel 247,746
		Non-Authorized Strength	Candidates for SDF Personnel
			Reserve Personnel 47,900
			Ready Reserve Personnel 8,467
			Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,600
			National Defense Academy students
			National Defense Medical College students
			GSDF High Technical School students
			Part-Time Officials
	Regular Service	Authorized Strength	Administrative Officials, and Others 29
		Non-Authorized Strength	Part-Time Officials

Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations

2. The law to add partial revision to the National Public Service Act, etc. (Act No. 22 of 2014) was enacted on May 30, 2014, and Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Defense was newly established (for one person if particularly necessary) as a joint position across each Government ministry.

3. Based on the law (Act No. 65 of 2014) enacted on June 13, 2014, which added partial revision to the Act for the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, etc., Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be established in the Ministry of Defense.

**Reference 65 Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel**

(As of March 31, 2014)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff etc.	Total
Authorized	151,063	45,517	47,097	3,495	247,172
Actual	137,850	41,907	42,751	3,204	225,712
Staffing Rate (%)	91.3	92.1	90.8	91.7	91.3

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel					Fixed-Term Personnel	
	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted (upper)	Enlisted (lower)			
Authorized	45,392	4,914	140,740	56,126			
Actual	42,784 (1,974)	4,502 (28)	137,697 (6,905)	20,350 (1,294)	20,379 (2,398)		
Staffing Rate (%)	94.3	91.6	97.8	72.6			

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.

**Reference 66 Status of Recruiting and Employing SDF Regular Personnel (FY2013)**


Classification			Number Recruited	Number Employed	Multiple	
Candidates for general, technical staff		GSDF	4,465 ( 564)	113 ( 10)	39.5 ( 56.4)	
		MSDF	1,881 ( 297)	88 ( 11)	21.4 ( 27.0)	
		ASDF	2,731 ( 425)	60 ( 7)	45.5 ( 60.7)	
		Total	9,077 ( 1,286)	261 ( 28)	34.8 ( 45.9)	
Noncommissioned officer	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	93 ( 38)	13 ( 7)	7.2 ( 5.4)	
	GSDF personnel (Nursing)	GSDF	19 ( 14)	5 ( 4)	3.8 ( 3.5)	
Aviation Students		MSDF	916 ( 89)	74 ( 5)	12.4 ( 17.8)	
		ASDF	3,114 ( 217)	45	69.2	
		Total	4,030 ( 306)	119 ( 5)	33.9 ( 61.2)	
Candidates for Non-commissioned Officers		GSDF	22,415 ( 2,993)	2,091 ( 78)	10.7 ( 38.4)	
		MSDF	5,056 ( 853)	972 ( 39)	5.2 ( 21.9)	
		ASDF	7,063 ( 1,153)	721 ( 85)	9.8 ( 13.6)	
		Total	34,534 ( 4,999)	3,784 ( 202)	9.1 ( 24.7)	
Privates		GSDF	22,580 ( 2,664)	6,407 ( 499)	3.5 ( 5.3)	
		MSDF	5,055 ( 743)	1,241 ( 79)	4.1 ( 9.4)	
		ASDF	5,899 ( 870)	1,540 ( 132)	3.8 ( 6.6)	
		Total	33,534 ( 4,277)	9,188 ( 710)	3.6 ( 6.0)	
National Defense Academy students		Recommended	Social sciences	207 ( 58)	23 ( 5)	9.0 ( 11.6)
			Science and engineering	236 ( 28)	84 ( 5)	2.8 ( 5.6)
			Total	443 ( 86)	107 ( 10)	4.1 ( 8.6)
		Integrated Selection System	Social sciences	157 ( 29)	10 ( 1)	15.7 ( 29.0)
			Science and engineering	169 ( 17)	35 ( 3)	4.8 ( 5.7)
			Total	326 ( 46)	45 ( 4)	7.2 ( 11.5)
		General First Term	Social sciences	5,991 ( 2,210)	81 ( 17)	74.0 ( 130.0)
			Science and engineering	9,735 ( 1,789)	289 ( 16)	33.7 ( 111.8)
			Total	15,726 ( 3,999)	370 ( 33)	42.5 ( 121.2)
		General Second Term	Social sciences	231 ( 57)	14 ( 1)	16.5 ( 57.0)
			Science and engineering	462 ( 66)	34 ( 3)	13.6 ( 22.0)
			Total	693 ( 123)	48 ( 4)	14.4 ( 30.8)
National Defense Medical College students			8,012 ( 2,315)	76 ( 21)	105.4 ( 110.2)	
National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)			3,345 ( 2,620)	74 ( 63)	45.2 ( 41.6)	
Technical High School students	Recommended	312	64	4.9		
	General	4,465	263	17.0		

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate number of females.


2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2013.

## Reference 67 Outline of the SDF Educational System

### 1. SDF Officers and Officer Candidates



### 2. Enlisted SDF Personnel



**Reference 68 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2013**

○ Integrated training

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Relevant external organizations	
SDF Joint Exercise (field training exercise)	Nov. 1–18, 2013	Japanese airspace, bases, surrounding Sea areas, etc.	Each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, JMSDF Sasebo District, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc.		Plan to maintain and enhance the SDF's joint operations capabilities through engaging in armed attack situations.

○ GSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Relevant external organizations	
Army Corps field training exercise	Nov. 1–18, 2013	Western District	JGSDF Western Army Headquarters, 4th Division, 8th Division, 15th Brigade, 2nd Division, 6th Division, Central Readiness Force, etc.		Plan to maintain and enhance Army's capability to respond to armed attacks
Army Corps field training exercise	Nov. 1–Dec. 2, 2013	Northeastern District	JGSDF Northeastern Army Headquarters, 6th Division, 9th Division, etc.		Plan to maintain and enhance Army's capability to respond to armed attacks
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Oct. 22–Nov. 25, 2013	Northern-Western Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)	2nd Division Headquarters Approximately 850 personnel and 350 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Jul. 2–Aug. 4, 2013	Central-Northern Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division Approximately 2,300 personnel and 800 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Oct. 9–21, 2013	Northern-Eastern Districts (Kitafuji Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade Approximately 530 personnel and 180 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility
Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)	Nov. 1–Dec. 2, 2013	Northeastern-Western Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)	One Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division Approximately 2,000 personnel and 850 vehicles		Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility

○ MSDF

Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces		Remarks
			Ministry of Defense/SDF	Relevant external organizations	
MSDF Exercises (map exercises)	Sep. 15–19, 2013	MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating units	Command of respective SDF units, respective regional headquarters, etc. Approximately 550 personnel		Plan to establish outlines for measures to address various situations, and for each class of commanders to practice their assessment of the situations and the operation of units using maps.
MSDF Exercises (field training exercises (joint exercises))	Nov. 16–28, 2013	Sea areas and airspace surrounding Kyushu and Okinawa	Self-Defense Fleet, etc. Approximately 30 vessels, and 60 aircraft		Plan to establish outlines for measures to address various situations, and for each class of commanders to practice their assessment of the situations and the operation of units.

**Reference 69 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2013)**

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Sep. 24–Nov. 26, 2013	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	15 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 530 personnel
	Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fire training	Sep. 28–Nov. 10, 2013	Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.	Each Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, GSDF Artillery School Unit Approximately 250 personnel
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer and others	May. 2–Aug. 1, 2013	Hawaii and surrounding sea areas and airspace, Guam and surrounding sea areas and airspace, and the U.S. East Coast and surrounding sea areas and airspace	2 destroyers 3 aircraft
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers	Dec. 7–24, 2013	the sea areas surrounding Guam	4 destroyers 2 aircraft
	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Sep. 24–Dec. 24, 2013 Jan. 14–Apr. 24, 2014	Hawaii and the sea areas surrounding Guam	1 submarine each
ASDF	Annual practice by anti-aircraft units	Aug. 20–Nov. 15, 2013	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.	12 Air Defense Missiles (6 groups), Air Defense Missile Training Unit Approximately 380 personnel

**Reference 70 Activities in Civic Life**

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 1,560 disposal operations (average of approximately 30 operations per week), weighing approximately 57.1 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 22.9 tons, (accounting for about 40 % of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Removal of Mines <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The MSDF undertakes in minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II.</li> <li>○ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing and disposing of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments.</li> <li>○ Disposal operations in the last fiscal year: a total 333 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.8 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)</li> </ul>
Medical Activities <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (six out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services.</li> <li>○ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs.</li> <li>○ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.</li> <li>○ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.</li> </ul>
Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings <sup>4</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.</li> <li>○ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.</li> </ul>
Exchanges with Local Communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities.</li> <li>○ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.

4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.

**Reference 71 Activities Contributing to Society**

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties <sup>1</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel</li> <li>○ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on chemical disasters response, and aircraft-maneuvering training are provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.</li> </ul>
Transportation Work <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister.</li> <li>○ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)</li> </ul>
Ceremonial Work at National Events <sup>3</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard<sup>4</sup> forming a line for guests<sup>5</sup> and firing a gun salute for them<sup>6</sup></li> <li>○ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.</li> </ul>
Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration <sup>7</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Since the seventh observation in 1965 Japan has lent its cooperation such as through the use of icebreaking ships. Japan has contributed significantly to South Pole observation projects, which mark their 50th anniversary in FY2007, and will continue to provide support for such projects in the future through the launch of the new Shirase in 2009.</li> <li>○ In the 55th South Pole for Antarctic Expedition support provided since November 2013, the SDF has transported expedition members and approximately 1,160 tons of resources to Showa Station, and provided support for the hydrographic survey planned by the expedition team.</li> </ul>
Other Cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions.</li> <li>○ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps.</li> <li>○ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)<sup>8</sup></li> <li>○ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support for flights of private chartered aircraft to Iwoto Island, and the dispatch SDF of music bands.</li> </ul>

Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.


4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect.

5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.

6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.

7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

**Reference 72 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities**


Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area

Areas around bases are classified as follows according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise:

Class 1 Area: Areas where WECPNL is 75 or higher

Class 2 Area: Section of Class 1 Areas where WECPNL is 90 or higher

Class 3 Area: Section of Class 2 Areas where WECPNL is 95 or higher

\* Criteria used for area classifications until 2012 are: WECPNL at 75 or higher, 90 or higher, and 95 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively.

Criteria used for area classifications in 2013 and beyond are: Lden at 62 or higher, 73 or higher, and 76 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively.

(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.

(3) Lden

The equivalent noise level over a day being assessed by weighing noises measured early evening and at night.

Notes: 2. If losses are caused due to acts of the U.S. Forces in Japan, they are compensated according to the Act on Compensation of Special Losses Caused by Act of United States Forces and Other Forces.

**Reference 73** Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities

**Review of the uses of Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defence Institutions**
**◆ Background**

- ◆ Diversification of local needs (demand for allocation to soft business)
- ◆ Evaluation results of the "business classification" by the Government Revitalization Unit ⇒ "To make the uses more free and improve usability"

**Before revision**
**Improvement of public-use facilities**

Public-use facilities:  
Transportation and communications facilities, sports and recreational facilities, environmental health facilities, education and cultural facilities, medical facilities, social welfare facilities, facilities associated with fire-fighting, facilities that contribute to the stimulation of industry


**After revision**
**Improvement of public-use facilities**
**So-called soft business**
**(Newly added)**

Soft businesses such as the following are envisioned:

- Assistance for medical expenses (medical expenses for elementary school pupils and younger, examination costs for pregnant women, etc.)
- Assistance for the cost of running community buses (operational costs for welfare buses, etc.)
- Assistance for the cost to conduct a diagnosis of earthquake resistance for schools and other facilities (cost of diagnosing the earthquake resistance of elementary / junior-high school buildings, etc.)

**Review of the calculation of the ordinary amount issued under the Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defence Institutions**
**(1) Revision of calculation method**

- ① Change in the budget allocation for calculation elements (budget allocation for "operation" will be increased)
- ② Establishment of new training points relating to large-scale or specific training (amount will be increased if joint Japan-US training, large scale exercises, etc., are held)



- (2) Consideration for cities, towns and villages with high population density (population density points will be added)

- (3) Consideration for the particularity of US Forces operations (points will be added to facilities used by stationed forces)

- (4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point and exercising personnel points will be subdivided)

**Defense facilities and cities, towns and villages newly designated as Specified Defense Facilities and Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages, respectively**

Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
Matsushima Air Field	Ishinomaki
Iwo Jima Airport	Ogasawara, Tokyo
Naval Air Facility Atsugi	Fujisawa
Ashiya Air Field	Mizumaki, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture
Torishima Range	Kumejima, Shimajiri District, Okinawa Prefecture
Shimokita Test Center	Higashidōri, Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture

Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
Kasumigaura Air Field	Tsuchiura
Utsunomiya Air Field	Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Prefecture
Utsunomiya Air Field	Utsunomiya
Soumagahara Airfield	Shintō, Kitagunma District, Gunma Prefecture
Kisarazu Air Field	Kisarazu
Camp Zama	Sagamihara
	Zama

Specified Defense Facilities	Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages
Sagami General Depot	Sagamihara
Tokushima Airfield	Matsushige, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture
Metabaru Air Field	Yoshinogari, Kanzaki District, Saga Prefecture
	Kamimine, Miyaki District, Saga Prefecture
Camp Gonsalves	Kunigami, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture
	Higashi, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture


**Reference 74** “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2012)

Outline of the survey Period: January 5–22, 2012


Respondents: 3,000 people aged 20 years or over throughout Japan

Valid responses (rate): 1,893 (63.1%)

Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel





 For details, refer to <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h23/h23-boue/index.html>
**1 Interest in the SDF and defense issues**


Notes: 1. Total of “very interested” and “somewhat interested” until the survey of November 1984.


**2 Impression toward the SDF**


Notes: 1. Total of “good impression” and “not bad impression” until the survey of February 2006.


2. Total of “not good impression” and “bad impression” until the survey of February 2006

**3 Evaluation of the SDF disaster relief activities related to the Great East Japan Earthquake**

**4 Impressions on “Operation Tomodachi” relief activities by the U.S. forces**

**5 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF**

**6 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities**



## 7 Views on Japan-U.S. Security Treaty




## 8 Attitude on defense-exchanges other than with the U.S.



## 9 Defense capabilities of the SDF



## 10 Necessity of education to foster feelings of defending the country



Notes: In the survey for February 1991, the question asked was "In that case, by and large do you feel that the SDF of Japan should be increased further, or that the current strength is enough, or should it be decreased?"

## Reference 75 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2013)

	Ministry of Defense Headquarters	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches	Total
1. Number of disclosure requests	1,336	2,562	3,898
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure	1,471	3,061	4,532
Number of all ASDF decisions Requests accepted	828	2,058	2,886
Requests partially accepted	508	988	1,496
Requests declined	135	15	150
3. Number of administrative protests	377	0	377
4. Number of lawsuits	2	0	2

**Reference 76 Direction of the MOD Reform**

August 30, 2013  
Ministry of Defense

**1. Regarding the Previous MOD Reform (2007–2009)****1. Details**

In response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD and the SDF, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was established in the Prime Minister's Office in December 2007. The Council engaged in repeated discussions, and in July 2008, compiled a report which detailed the analysis of scandals and the direction of reform (hereinafter, the "Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense")

In August of that year, the Ministry of defense decided upon the "Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense" and the "Basic Policy for Organizational Reform of the Ministry of Defense," based on the direction for reform presented by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. In accordance with these, efforts were made to prevent the recurrence of scandals through the execution of reforms in the three areas of ensuring thorough observance of rules and regulations, establishment of professionalism, and establishment of operational management in a form that focused on the execution of duties, with the aim of optimization across the board. At the same time, in an effort to advance drastic realignment of the central organization in two stages, the Defense Council was first to be established in law as of FY2009, the post of the Director of Defense was abolished and the post of the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense newly created.

Furthermore, incorporated into the FY2010 budget request of the end of August 2009 as the second stage of reorganization, was a reorganization proposal detailing plans to unify defense capabilities build-up departments in the MOD central organization, into the Internal Bureau, and to unify the operational departments into the Joint Staff (hereinafter the "2010 Reorganization Proposal"). However, due to the administrative changeover to the Democratic Party in September of that year, the proposal was relinquished after the budget request scheduled in October had been suspended.

**2. Ministry of Defense Central Reorganization Proposal Scheduled for FY2010**

The contents of the 2010 Reorganization Proposal included (1) establishment of permanent posts for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, (2) reorganization of the Bureau of Defense Policy and strengthening of its functions, (3) creation of a new Build-up Plan Bureau (provisional title) in the Internal Bureau, through the fusion of the Internal Bureau and the departments involved in defense capabilities build-up in each of the Staff Offices, in order to achieve optimization across the whole of defense capabilities build-up, which had been optimized individually for each of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, and (4) abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy and the incorporation of its work into the Joint Staff, to eliminate the de facto duplication of duties of operational departments.

Meanwhile, the Proposal thoroughly mixed the civilian officials and uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff, and established their positions appropriated according to expertise. The main point was to facilitate the construction of a system that would allow civilian officials and uniformed personnel to work together. With this in mind, the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense was to undergo a large-scale review, which resulted in many points needing further examination regarding considerations and detailed planning.

Two specific shortcomings in the 2010 Reform Proposal with respect to the unification of defense capabilities build-up, were the fact that the system had not necessarily reflected the viewpoint of joint operation fully, on which defense capabilities build-up is predicated, and that considerations had yet to reach the point of actual reform of departments involved in equipment acquisition, which hold an important role in defense capabilities build-up.

In regard to the unification of operational functions into the Joint Staff, the fact was that the 2010 Reform Proposal required further consideration of the specific scopes of the duties that were to be concentrated into the Joint Staff. For example, no conclusion had

been reached, despite deliberations taking place, about whether it was appropriate to transfer all of the duties of the Bureau of Operational Policy into the Joint Staff after its abolition, even including the duty of planning and drafting laws and regulations pertaining to SDF operation.

Moreover, during the validation of the 2010 Reform Proposal in its recent deliberations, the point was raised that if the jurisdiction of the Joint Staff extended to duties relating to operational policy and dealing with the Diet, then it was possible that the attribute of the Minister as "top-level specialist adviser" in "military matters" would undergo change.

**2. Considerations in the Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform****1. Minister of Defense instructions**

Due to the changeover in administration to a Liberal Democratic Party-New Komeito coalition, in February of this year, the Minister of Defense's instructions to accelerate deliberations regarding the MOD reform were issued. Subsequently, it was determined in the Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform, headed by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (hereinafter, the "Committee"), that (1) from the perspective not only of preventing the recurrence of scandals, but of making the SDF operate more actively and efficiently through the effective use of human resources, and accomplishing the civilian control over the SDF under the severe security environment facing Japan, (2) with regard to the business operation and structure of the central organization, the Committee is giving necessary consideration, taking into account the lessons learned from handling recent incidents such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and the launch of missiles by North Korea, and in tandem with the discussion to strengthen the commanding function of the Prime Minister's Office concerning national security such as the establishment of the Japanese National Security Council, and (3) that a report would be made to the Defense Council, with its target time being the period when the FY2014 budget request is made.

**2. Situation regarding considerations****(1) System of consideration**

The Committee is composed of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, the Vice-Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Minister's Secretariat, the various other director generals and the Chiefs of Staff, with the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense as chairman. Under this is a board of executives composed of the Vice-Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Minister's secretariat and the various Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, as forums for conducting practical, cross-organizational considerations regarding the matters of "defense capabilities build-up," "operations," "policy-planning" and "public relations," project teams, composed of members at the level of deputy director general, Assistant Vice-Minister of the Minister's secretariat, and the directors of the Staff Offices, and work team composed of members at the level of Internal Bureau and Staff Office manager were established.

**(2) Course of considerations**

At the establishment of the Committee in February, seven preliminary discussions were held under the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. Then from February through March, the points for discussion were determined by the Committee, regarding which, since April of this year, earnest discussions and deliberations have been carried out by each of the project teams and work teams. Specifically, a number of discussions and deliberations at a variety of levels were carried out, through the staging of six meetings by the Committee, four by the board of executives, 12 by the project teams and 21 by the work teams.

Moreover, although a certain degree of success was achieved through the solid implementation of the efforts to prevent the recurrence of scandals proposed in the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, incidents still occurred in some cases regarding procurement. It was therefore determined that, measures to prevent recurrence would be considered and the related efforts checked, at forums for deliberations established separately of the Committee (expert committees such as the Committee for Investigation of Incidents and Consideration of Recurrence Prevention in the Selection of Companies to Carry Out a Development Project for the New GSDF

Multi-Use Helicopter (UH-X), and the Committee for Investigation and Consideration of Incidents of Overcharging, etc.).

Based on the above discussions and deliberations, the seventh Committee meeting was held on August 29 of this year, the direction for the MOD reform was compiled, and reported to the Defense Council on the 30th of the month.

### 3. Basic Concept and Direction of Reform

The security environment surrounding Japan has increasingly grown severe; China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan as exemplified by its intrusion into Japan's territorial waters and airspace; North Korea has been such provocative actions as its launch of the missile and its nuclear test. Above all else, so-called gray zone situations relating to territorial land and economic interests are becoming evident and long-term, and the possibility is feared that the situation will get more acute and serious, leading to more serious incidents. Through the handling of recent incidents, exemplified by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the lessons learned in relation to the use of units have been recognized. Furthermore, changes have been occurring in the political environment, such as the move toward establishing the NSC, and taking comprehensive, exceptional measures relating to the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

These various changes in the situation pertaining to the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces served as a basis for the recent considerations regarding MOD reform, during which the points of optimization of defense capabilities build-up across the board, rationalization of duplicated work regarding operations, and strengthening the functions of planning, proposing and transmitting defense policies, as highlighted in the advice of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense were taken into adequate account, in the determination that the ideal format for the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces' duties would be reviewed from the perspective of how to ensure their functions are executed effectively, and the ideal format of the organization would be reviewed, including the viewpoint of making it more efficient and rational.

The direction of the full-fledged reform, including reorganization, is as follows.

#### (1) Remove the barriers to civilian officials and uniformed personnel

It is essential to prompt decision-making to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel in the MOD central organization. For this reason, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in each of the Staff Offices and major commands.

#### (2) From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up)

In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided optimization for each of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, and ensure that the build-up is instead conducted through total optimization, a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up, emphasizing the assessment of the performance of defense capabilities based on joint operations, which has not necessarily been given adequate attention in the past, while further efficiency and optimization in equipment acquisition will be attempted, based on consistent management across the life-cycle of the equipment, and the organization that contributes to total optimization of defense capabilities realigned.

#### (3) Make accurate decisions more swiftly (joint operations)

In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff office as well as efficient coordination body for situation response will be established under the Defense Council.

#### (4) Enhancement of policy-planning and public relations capability

The enhancement of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy has made certain progress since the 2010 Reform Proposal. Going forward, the systems will be enhanced further still, to respond to the drastic increase in international affairs-related work recently in the Ministry of Defense, such as the expansion of the Cabinet-Level Discussion on Foreign Affairs and Defense ("2+2"). At the same time, the enhancement of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy will be

advanced, in response to the enhancement of the strategic functions of the Prime Minister's Office (resulting from the founding of the NSC). Together with this, efforts will be made to enhance the public relations capability of the Ministry of Defense.

In order to ensure that reforms are truly effective, it is vital to change the mentality of each and every member of both the civilian officials and the uniformed personnel. Furthermore, in the present serious security environment, it is necessary to advance reforms smoothly, to avoid disruption and stagnation in response to contingencies. Accordingly, it is important to establish a series of reforms through steady and phased implementation while Internal Bureau and Staff offices equally support the Minister of Defense. Reform is, ultimately, something that is implemented without end. It is natural that it should be constantly examined, while efforts are made for further reform and improvement.

### 4. Specific reform efforts

The matters addressed as a part of the MOD reform are, specifically, as follows (including, in addition to items (1) to (4) of 3. above, matters newly derived in relation to the progress of recent considerations). "Short-term (FY2014)," "Medium-term" and "Long-term" time schedules will be established for these, and implemented steadily and gradually.

#### (1) Mutual assignment of civilian officials and uniformed personnel

- a. By the revision of the relevant articles of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (1954 Law No. 164), permanent posts within the Internal Bureau for uniformed personnel, mainly Lieutenant Colonel and Major will be established while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in the Joint Staff and major SDF commands. (FY2014)
- b. Subsequently, permanent posts for uniformed personnel and civilian officials will be mutually established in high-ranked staffs of the Internal Bureau and the respective Staff Office and major command. (Medium-long term)

#### (2) Total optimization of defense capabilities build-up and strengthening of equipment acquisition functions

- a. Based on the results of implementing optimization method across the board for defense capabilities build-up, in considerations of a review of approaches to defense capabilities which is currently undergoing progress, new procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up. (FY2014)

<Image of new procedure (under consideration)>

Rigorous mutual cooperation is being undertaken between the Internal Bureau and each of the Staff Offices, and in the following step, defense capabilities build-up will be advanced.

- 1) The Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy and the Chief of Joint Staff will implement a unified assessment of the performance of defense capabilities from the perspective not of the Ground, Maritime and Air Defense Forces separately, but the needs of joint operation, based on envisioned contingencies.
- 2) The Chief of Joint Staff will present the matters which are to be emphasized in defense capabilities build-up from the perspective of the needs of joint operation, based on the results of 1).
- 3) The Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy will clarify the priority matters in defense capabilities build-up from a more comprehensive perspective including attitude and policy, in reference to 2).
- b. In addition to a procedure reform for the purpose of the above total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, the following measures will be taken so that equipment acquisition duties can be carried out in a form that is more fair, efficient and optimized.
  - (a) In regard to projects for the improvement of equipment and supplies, the establishment of cross-functional Integrated Project Teams (IPT), headed by a Project Manager (PM) responsible for summarizing the project in question and ensuring its consistent advance, will be increased, and project management strengthened throughout the life-cycle of the equipment, from acquisition including its research and development through to disposal. (FY2014-)
  - (b) In order that project management across the entire life-cycle, as mentioned above, can be implemented organizationally and appropriately, and can even contribute to the maintenance

and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, as well as the total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, departments involved in equipment acquisition in the Internal Bureau, various Staff Offices, Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office shall be integrated in accordance with future discussions, and reorganization that keeps the establishment of the “Defense Equipment Agency” (provisional title) in mind carried out. At that time, the strengthening of surveillance functions will also be considered, in order that procurement is conducted with greater fairness. (Medium-term)

(3) Strengthening of joint operation functions

- a. In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, first for fostering a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau, while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established. (FY2014–) [Reposted]
- b. In order to increase swiftness and efficiency of operations, affairs concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff office. Meanwhile, because functions such as the planning and proposal of laws and regulations pertaining to operations are administrative and institutional works, they will continue to come under the jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau. Due to this, the de facto duplication of duties between the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff, resulting from accountability to the Diet, regarding the duties associated with actual force operations, will be eliminated. With these points in mind, the Bureau of Operational Policy will be reviewed its organization based on new challenges as for response to cyber attacks and externally-related tasks referring in (4). (Medium-term)
- c. When responding to emergency events, since the Defense Council headed by the Minister of Defense and the Emergency Headquarter are functioning effectively, an organization for efficient coordination will be constructed under the Defense Council, to deal with emergencies consisting of relevant top officials among the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff, in order to ensure the further acceleration of decision-making procedures pertaining to emergencies. (Medium-term)
- d. Based on the lessons learned at the time that the Self-Defense Forces were mobilized in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, that duties relating to supporting the Minister of Defense from an expert military perspective in the Joint Staff, and relating to the enforcement of orders from the Minister of Defense became strained, and that the burden on the Joint Staff suddenly increased, cooperation and collaboration will be pursued in areas such as consideration of a review of approaches to defense capabilities, as it relates to ensuring effective command and control in the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (including considerations regarding the establishment of a central command organization in the Ground Self-Defense Force and the ideal format of relations between the relevant organizations and regional units of GSDF), as well as verification of the functions and roles of organizations such as the Joint Staff, thereby raising the effectiveness of joint operations further. (Medium-long term)

(4) Enhancement of policy-planning and public relation capability

- a. In order to enhance strategic discussions and dialog with partner countries, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be newly established to provide general arrangements for the international affairs-related work in the Ministry of Defense. (FY2014)
- b. In order to form a strong connection with the soon-to-be-established NSC, and contribute to the drafting of Japanese security strategies, as well as draft and execute defense policies in their response, the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy to draft strategies will be enhanced based, amongst other things, on the situation regarding the activity of the NSC after its establishment. (FY2014–)
- c. Implementing the following measures to enhance reporting capability
  - (a) A mechanism will be established for the unified coordination of information gathering and public relations in urgent operations,

the SDF's growing international tension and conducting other crisis management by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, when the latter is mobilized, the international situation becomes strained, and other crisis management is required (Reporting Center). (FY2014)

- (b) As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes ever more serious, in order that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces can transmit information strategically and effectively the reporting organization will be reviewed, so that spokespersons of the Minister's Secretariat and the Joint Staff, that have been assigned as specialists to deal with reporting requirements can wield their knowhow to the maximum level and function as a key position in the transmission of information by the Ministry of Defense. (Medium-term)

(5) Enhancement of collaboration with the local community

In order to promote understanding of the local area with camps and bases and to enhance the functions of liaison and coordination with local governments in a state of emergency such as large-scale disasters, efforts will be made to cooperate and collaborate in areas such as consideration of a review of approaches to defense capabilities as it pertains to the format of the relevant regional organizations that can, at all times, collaborate closely with local governments and relevant ministries and agencies (Regional Defense Bureaus, Provincial Cooperation Offices, GSDF Headquarters, MSDF District Headquarters, etc.). (Medium-long term)

(6) Thorough management of information

In order to prevent leaks of, not only confidential information, but information of any kind that is not to be disclosed externally, and thereby maintain the reliability of the MOD as an organization that protects the safety of Japan, and ensure that no obstruction to the execution of its duties arises, efforts are to be made to ensure the thorough management of information at all levels including a review of the specific scope of management, and methods and systems are to be established for investigation when leaks occur. (FY2014–)

(7) Enhancement of the general coordination function of the Minister's Secretariat

A continuous review will be made regarding the business operation, from the perspective of ensuring the accuracy of decision-making by the Ministry, and the Minister's secretariat-centered assistant system for political appointee, will be enhanced so that reports for political appointee are made promptly and appropriately by the relevant bureau at all times. (FY2014)

## 5. Summary

As previously stated, the MOD reform must be implemented soundly, in a manner that brings with it, a reform of the mentality of each and every member. With this in mind, discussions are to be continually pursued in earnest, mainly in the Committee, regarding the specific efforts of the MOD reform described in section 4, so that they may be made concrete. The problem of scandals in procurement is to be eagerly considered in the relevant committees, and the thoroughness of measures to prevent recurrence ensured.