JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

III

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PART 2 MANCHURIA AND MANCHUKUO

CHAPTER I MANCHURIAN ISSUES PRIOR TO THE MUKDEN INCIDENT

In the decade prior to 1931, railways in Manchuria was the thorniest question in Sino-Japanese relations. The protracted negotiations between China and Japan on Manchurian issues, such as the so-called parallel lines, the railway loans, railway rates and the Port of Hulutao[1], attained no solution by the eve of the Mukden Incident of September 1931.

We should take careful note here that the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway was operated as much for political reasons as for economic ones. Following the Russo-Japanese War, the semi-official South Manchurian Railway[2] made it a policy to finance the construction of only such Chinese lines as would act as feeders for the S.M.R. This policy, which was repugnant to China, stimulated the Chinese to embark on their own programme of railway construction quite independent of Japanese capital. As Chinese efforts to overcome the Japanese railway monopoly only served to intensify Sino-Japanese friction and precipitated a conflict on the question of the so-called parallel lines, it emerged that the "parallel lines question" was not, as the Japanese had claimed, a secret protocol, but had, in fact, only been entered in the minutes of the Peking Treaty of 1905. Japan and China disagreed as to exactly what the statement meant, even granting that its existence was valid. Japan claimed that she had the right to preclude the construction of any Chinese line which the S.M.R. regarded as prejudicial to its system, while China contended that she was only precluded from building lines with the deliberate object of unduly impairing the commercial usefulness and value of the South Manchurian Railway. The matter was complicated since there was no mutually acceptable definition as to what actually constituted "parallel lines"[3].

Further Sino-Japanese trouble in Manchuria came about as the result of the Japanese financing certain Chinese Government railways. By 1931, Japanese capital and interest to the value of ¥150,000,000 had been expended in the construction of four major railways and a number of lesser lines[4]. Japan complained that China would not repay the loans nor appoint Japanese railway advisers as stipulated in the agreements. China countered Japan's argument with the contention that the loans were primarily strategic and political; that they had been made by the S.M.R. with the sole idea of monopolizing railway construction; and that the lines were heavily overcapitalized and could not be put on a paying basis. But here again it is clear that the issues at stake were political. The S.M.R. had made the loans in order to build up feeders to its own system, even when it was known that any new lines would remain unprofitable for many years to come. On the other hand, the Chinese Nationalist Government remembered that some of the Manchurian loans were part of the Nishihara Loans of 1918 made to the Anfu Government which at that time controlled Peking and was regarded as having sold out to Japan. Most Chinese therefore felt justified in repudiating the loan contracts.

Complicating the situation further was the "war of railway rates" between Japanese and Chinese lines in Manchuria beginning in 1929. The Japanese asserted that the Chinese rates constituted "unfair competition", to which the Chinese replied that their lines, unlike the S.M.R. were not concerned primarily with making profits but rather with assisting the Chinese rural population to reach markets as cheaply as possible. Each side, with ample grounds, accused each other of rate discrimination, secret rebates, graft, and so on.

Additional and later friction centered on the rivalry between

[1] Bisson. T.A. *Railway Rivalries in Manchuria between China and Japan.* Foreign Policy Reports. April. 1932.

[2] Known by the Japanese as *Mantetsu.* Hereinafter referred to by either its full title or by S.M.R..

[3] On the term "parallel lines," the railway experts attached to the Lytton Commission were of the opinion that the terminology used was "so indefinite that it can be stretched to mean almost anything." It was thus of advantage to Japan not to have a judicial interpretation of the precise meaning of the statement. See: League of Nations, Supplementary Documents to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. (Geneva 1932) p. 49.

[4] The four major Japanese-financed railways were: Kirin-Chang-Chun, Kirin-Tunhua, Ssupingkai-Toanan, and ToananAngangchi.

the Japanese port of Dairen[5] in the Kwangtung Leased Territories, and the Chinese port of Hulutao toward which Chinese railway construction was focussed. The Chinese launched, with the assistance of the Dutch, the building of a railway terminal and deep water dock at the Port of Hulutao, which would have undermined the commercial importance of Dairen. The Chinese plan was to divert traffic from Dairen to Hulutao just as the Japanese had previously diverted traffic from Vladivostok to Dairen. Besides, the Chinese made arrangements for through traffic which enabled the Manchurian farmers to ship their soya beans, the staple exported product of Manchuria, from farm to coast without the use of Japanese lines.

Finally, the Sino-Japanese negotiations of the whole complicated problem of Manchurian railways was protracted to the very eve of September 18, 1931 and resulted in the complete failure of either side to come to a compatible agreement. Japan became uneasy because she believed that time was working in favour of China and, unless she adopted positive and immediate measures, she would loose all.

Immediately prior to Japanese military action in Manchuria there occured two insignificant incidents, the Wanpaoshan Affair and the Nakamura Incident. Both incidents were intrinsically unimportant in themselves, yet both clearly demonstrated the way in which such trifles might be used to inflame Japanese national sentiment at a time when Sino-Japanese relations were already strained to near breaking point by more fundamental issues.

The Wanpaoshan Affair took place in a small village near Changchun where a group of Chinese attacked a Korean irrigation project on July 1, 1931. A detatchment of Japanese consular police arrived on the scene and took the side of the Koreans, drove off the Chinese by gunfire, and stood by while the Koreans finished their work on the irrigation ditch[6].

The incident was blown-up out of all proportion in the Japanese and Korean press[7] and, as a result, anti-Chinese riots broke out in Korea which, according to official accounts, left 142 Chinese killed, 393 injured, and Chinese property valued at ¥4,000,000 destroyed[8]. Japan held that the riots were a spontaneous outburst resulting from China's ill-treatment of Koreans in Manchuria. The Chinese Government on the other hand, claimed that Japan had encouraged their outbreak by permitting inaccurate and inflammatory reports in the press relating to the incident. Also they accused the Japanese of taking no adequate steps to suppress the riots until much life and property had been destroyed[9]. Japan expressed regrets for the riots but no settlement had been reached by September of 1931. But this was not the end of the affair, the events in Korea precipitated a boycott of Japanese goods in China which, with the possible exception of the 1919-21 boycott, was the most intense, the most effective, and the most prolonged of China's efforts to employ this weapon.

In the middle of August of the same year the Wanpaoshan affair was eclipsed by a more serious incident — the execution of Captain Nakamura and three companions by Chinese soldiers in the interior of Manchuria. This event, which is believed to have actually taken place some time late in June, was not immediately discovered, and news of it was, for a time, actually suppressed by the Japanese Foreign Office. What actually happened will probably never be known and all references to the incident are so confusing and contradictory that it is difficult to obtain a clear picture. However, by analysing the various reports we can arrive at the conclusion that on June 27, 1931, Captain Nakamura Shintaro, a Japanese military officer on active duty, while on a secret mission for the Japanese army in Manchuria, represented himself as an agricultural expert and was killed by Chinese soldiers near Toanan in northeast Manchuria. Indeed, Captain Nakamura was an intelligence officer whose primary assignment was to estimate the strength of Mongol nationalism and Mongol opposition to Chinese colonization of Mongol lands in northwest Manchuria[10]. The details of the case were made public by the Japanese military authorities over strenuous protest from the Foreign Office. The Chinese claimed that Captain Nakamura was put to death as a spy. He had carried on his person patent medicine, which included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes. The Japanese demanded an apology, indemnity and punishment of the murderers; the military authorities, however, contemplated more drastic action. The military utilized the incident to inflame public opinion and to dictate the government's policy under threat of independent action in Manchuria.

During the second week of September, which witnessed the military authorities of Japan carrying out negotiations in Manchuria side by side with the civil authorities, matters rapidly came to a head. On September 10, Colonel Kenji Doihara, a particularly nauseating individual, chief of the Kwangtung garrisons's Special Service Organ[11], reported to General Kanaya, Chief of Staff, regarding a "concrete plan for a measure to be taken against China which is being upheld by the leading men of the Kwangtung troops". The action to be taken had been carefully worked out by the General Staff and the War Department, and instructions were cabled to General Honjo, Commander of the Kwangtung garrison. On September 14, Colonel Doihara left Tokyo for Mukden with additional instructions for the military authorities. General Honjo himself arrived in Mukden on September 15 and immediately issued mobilization orders to all Japanese troops in the area.

On September 16, the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden

[5] Talien.

[6] The basic right of Japanese subjects to lease land in South Manchuria was granted in the 1915 treaty, signed as a sequel to the Twenty-One Demands. This right was usually voided by Chinese officials. The same right was also claimed for Japan's Korean subjects.

[7] The Korean press was, in any case, completely under Japanese control.

[8] V.K. Wellington Koo. Memorandum presented to the Lytton Commission. P. 262.

[9] Ibid. p. 263.

[10] League of Nations: Report of the Commission of Enquiry. p.66-67.

[11] The Special Service Organs were branches of the Army and Navy Intelligence specializing in poltical intrigue. They worked closely with all agencies of Japanese subversion including the Opium Board, Military Intelligence, and the supragovernmental Civilian Spy Service.

was informed that Lt. Colonel Kwan Yu-heng commander of the Third Corps of the Chinese Militia, alleged to have been responsible for the Nakamura executions, was under detention at the headquarters of the Mukden gendarmerie, and his court martial had been decided upon. News of this event, laying the basis for a settlement satisfactory to Japan, was published in Japanese newspapers on September 17; but to no avail. The following day Japanese military operations were begun at Mukden.

CHAPTER 2 THE MUKDEN INCIDENT AND THE CREATION OF MANCHUKUO

The year 1931 was a particularly critical one for most countries of the world. In China, nationalism was on the increase, but the government was confronted with communist-suppression campaigns, with floods and famines. The world-wide depression showed no sign of abating and was being sorely felt by every major power with particularly disastrous results in Japan. Everywhere the prospects for the proposed disarmament conference seemed dim. In Europe there was economic chaos, England had gone off the gold standard; Germany was suffering terrible inflation and unemployment and, in America, the economic distress was such that the government was unable to deal with it. Soviet Russia had risen from the devastation of a civil war and was showing a renewed interest in the Far East, particularly Manchuria.

In September of 1931, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, son on Chang Tso-lin[12], was residing at his headquarters in Peiping[13] with the majority of his troops stationed south of the Great Wall. If Japan favoured a policy of force to settle issues in Manchuria, September of 1931 was the most opportune moment. And, if such force were applied, it was highly unlikely that Europe or America would or could interfere effectively to stop it.

That time was in favour of Japanese action was well evidenced by General Honjo's plan. On the eve of the Mukden Incident, General I. S. Honjo, Commander of the Japanese Kwangtung Army in Manchuria, submitted to the Minister of War a plan for the occupation of Manchuria and subsequent domination of East Asia. The plan said in part:

> ..... unless we actually occupy Manchuria and Mongolia during this opportune moment, when the world is facing an economic depression, when the five-year plan of Soviet Russia is not yet completed, and when the unification of China is not yet accomplished, we cannot expect to effect the consolidation of our Empire in the present-day conditions of the world.....[14].

What is more important than this is, that Japan, disregarding the treaty provisions, had continuously stationed troops in the vicinity of Mukden and elsewhere in the South Manchuria Railway "Zones" since the Russo-Japanese War. The presence of Japanese troops in South Manchuria would unquestionably facilitate the rapid extention of Japanese occupation and make possible the argument that direct aggression did not take place. When hostilities were initiated it was unnecessary for the Japanese to cross a political frontier, for their troops were already on the spot in sufficient numbers to precipitate the conflict providing the Chinese should resist, and to follow up their advantage should the Chinese not resist.

At approximately thirty minutes past ten on the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwangtung Army under the command of General Honjo suddenly and without warning bombarded the Chinese Northern Barracks situated on the outskirts of Mukden in the vicinity of the S.M.R. The following morning the population of Mukden awoke to find their city under the occupation of the Japanese who had siezed Mukden without encountering hardly any Chinese resistance. Military action was precipitated, according to the Japanese version, by a Chinese explosion on the S.M.R. tracks. The Japanese claimed that a detachment of Chinese soldiers from the neighbouring Northern Barracks dynamited a section of the South Manchurian Railway on the outskirts north of Mukden and were caught in the act by a patrol of Japanese railway guards who just happened to be on night maneuvers in the area. The Chinese version was that the Japanese faked the explosion. As evidence the Chinese offered metal splinters which were of a different composition from the actual rails; and they pointed out that the south-bound express from Changchun passed right over the alleged damaged section without any delay in its scheduled arrival time in Mukden immediately after the occurrence of the "explosion". However, the Lytton Commission appointed by the League of Nations to investigate conditions in the Far East, particularly Manchuria, found that:

> ..... the Japanese had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th — 19th, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives and property of Japanese nationals at this particular time and place. They made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. The military operations of the Japanese troops during the night

[12] Former war lord of all Manchuria. Supposidly murdered by the Japanese on June 4, 1927. Chang was disposed of as he attempted to extend his authority outside of Manchuria and spread the flames of Chinese Nationalism into Manchuria.

[13] "Peking" and "Peiping" are used throughout this paper. "Peking" is used when the legal government of China Resides in that city. When it resides elsewhere (such as in 1937 when it was in Nanking and later Chungking), Peking is known as "Peiping."

[14] For the full text of General Honjo's plan, see Appendix "C"

cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defense[15].

In a pamphlet handed to Japanese soldiers immediately after the "incident", the military sought to justify its actions in the following manner:

> On the evening of September 18, 1931, in the vicinity of Mukden, some Chinese soldiers commanded by the bandit Chang Hsueh-liang, son of the bandit General Chang Tso-Lin, who for many years had terrorized Manchuria and held it in slavery, set off a mine at a spot on the Japanese railway near Mukden so as to cause the derailment of the Japanese train which was a few minutes later to pass from Changchun to Mukden. Fortunately in the neighbourhood of that spot there happened to be, together with six soldiers, Lieutenant Kawamoto, a direct descendent of an uninterrupted line of Samurai ancestors of 48 generations. Realizing that the train was approaching and that no human power could avoid a catastrophe, since several yards of the railway line had been destroyed, he turned toward the divine power. Turning towards Japan and bending low in all humility, he invoked the intervention of Amaterasu-O-Mi-Kami. His humble and fervent prayer was heard. The train reached the spot where the lines had been destroyed, raised itself in the air, and having passed the dangerous point, gently came down again on the other side of the railway line and continued on its way. The testimony of the driver and the fireman of the train as well as Lieutenant Kawamoto and his six soldiers, who saw the event with their own eyes, is sufficient to prove the truth of this supernatural fact — a fact which has once again demonstrated for the whole world the divine origin of the Japanese people[16].

To expect the officers and men of the Kwangtung Army to swallow this fairy story must have been an insult to their intelligence or, the Japanese Army was so indoctrinated that they believed it. Suffice to say, the version the Japanese gave to the League Commission was quite different.

Following the explosion, the Japanese, in the name of self-defense, put into operation a carefully prepared plan of proceedure. Within two days after the seizure of Mukden, a Japanese mayor, Colonel Doihara[17] was installed in that city. The Kwangtung Army seized Changchun on September 19, and Kirin on the 21st. In order to prevent aggravating the situation and in the hope of a possible withdrawal of Japanese troops, Chinese troops in Manchuria were advised by their government to withdraw and offer no resistance in the face of the advancing Japanese. At the same time the Manchurian local government withdrew to Chinchow near the Great Wall. Thus the Kwangtung Army swiftly and surely occupied city after city from north to south in Manchuria. These cities were occupied on the pretext of protecting Japanese lives and property, while Japanese officials at home and diplomats abroad gave assurances that their troops would return to the railway "zones" as soon as the safety of their nationals and property permitted.

Actually the opposite was true, the commander of the Japanese forces in Korea sent reinforcements into Manchuria and told Prince Saionji that it might be necessary to send troops to the Yangtse.

The total number of men under arms in China at this time was estimated to be around 2,500,000. However, this huge figure gives no indication of the number of men that could have actually been concentrated against Japan. Because of rivalries, jealosies and local commitments, it was extremely unlikely that a force of no more than 300,000 men could have been assembled anywhere in China. Upon the outbreak of fighting at Mukden, the Japanese, as mentioned, put into effect a definite military plan covering the whole zone of the South Manchurian Railway. During the morning of September 19, three companies of Japanese troops, say, 500 men, stormed the main Chinese barracks at Mukden and thrust the Chinese garrison, several thousand strong, away from the city. Almost simultaneously the 8,000 Chinese troops at Changchun, 180 miles away, were attacked and expelled from that city. The Japanese immediately instigated a rigid patrol of the whole South Manchurian Railway and began to push troops along certain of its feeders. Also on September 19, they established a post at Hsinmintun, 35 miles from Mukden, on the Peiping-Mukden line, Two days later they occupied Kirin, 79 miles from Changchun, and, on September 22, they reached Tunhua, 112 miles east of Kirin. Troops from Ssupingkai reached Chengchiatun, 50 miles west on the same day and promptly sent advance forces to Toanan. To replace the units thus dispersed, an infantry brigade reinforced with artillery was shipped in from Korea, so that the number of Japanese troops in Manchuria was brought to an approximate total of 15,000. Serious fighting had been confined to Mukden and Changchun; Japanese casualties were infinitesimal while those of the Chinese were also relatively small[18]. It was estimated, however, that no less than 10,000 Chinese soldiers melted away from their units during the fighting and retreating.

Twelve days after the seizure of Mukden, a Japanese official called at the residence of Henry Pu-yi[19], the disposed Emperor of China, at Tientsin. Following his disposal as Emperor, Henry had been supported financially and politically by the Japanese until some opportune moment when he would be of use to his benefactors. That moment had now arrived. The Japanese officially proposed that he come to Manchuria where he would be restored as Emperor; naturally under Japanese tutelage. Henry said that he would consider the matter. Not satisfied with this reply, the Japanese decided to send one of their most trusted

[15] League of Nations: Report of the Commission of Enquiry. (Geneva) 1932. p. 71.

[16] Vespa. A. Secret Agent of Japan. London. Victor Gollanca Ltd. 1938. pp.21-22.

[17] The same Doihara of the Special Service Organ. Later to be sentenced to death by the Tokyo Military Tribunal as a Class A war criminal and executed on December 23, 1948.

[18] According to Bergamini; Japan's Imperial Conspiracy. Granada Publishing Co., Ltd. London. 1971. The number of troops killed in South Manchuria during the seizure of Mukden were, Chinese: 400, Japanese: 2.

[19] Known in China as Emperor Hsuan-Tung.

agents to "persuade" Henry to make the journey to Mukden. The trusted agent turned out to be none other than Colonel Doihara Kenji. On his arrival in Tientsin, Doihara proceeded to cajole and threaten Henry to return to the throne of his ancestors. Henry refused to commit himself while his opium-smoking wife Elizabeth was absolutely against the proposed move to Mukden. Doihara used his agents in Tientsin to harass Henry by sending threatening letter and bombs and, as a last resort, engineered a series of nightly riots in the Chinese quarter of Tientsin. Using the disturbances as a pretext, the Japanese garrison commander declared martial law in the Japanese Concession and isolated the palace where Henry was staying. Frightened at last, Henry finally made up his mind that life might be more pleasant in Mukden. Hidden in the bilges of a launch, Henry was taken down river where a Japanese merchant ship, the Awaji Maru was waiting. The following morning Henry arrived safe and sound at the Yingkow docks of the South Manchurian Railway in Dairen where a delegation headed by a certain Amakasu Masahiko[20] was waiting to greet him. From here Henry was spirited away to the Hotel Yamato[21] in Mukden where he stayed until March of 1932 when he was proclaimed chief executive — not Emperor — of the new "state" of Manchukuo.

In a protocol signed on September 15, 1932 with the Government of the new "state", Japan recognized Manchukuo as an independent state: just how independent it was we shall see in the following pages[22].

As history has shown, the Japanese were the real rulers of Manchukuo while the Manchukuo Cabinet merely played the role of serving as scenery at public ceremonies. The real seat of power was not at Hsinking (formally Changchun), capital of Manchukuo, but in Tokyo. The administrative system was dominated throughout by Japanese officials, with ultimate authority vested in the General Staff of the Japanese Army. The Commander of the Kwangtung Army, or Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in Manchukuo, who was concurrently Governor of the Kwangtung Leased Territories and the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo, was the chief authority of the Japanese administration in that country and was, in fact, a viceroy of the Emperor of Japan. On this point Mr. H. J. Timperley writes:

> Manchukuo's vaunted independence exists only in the imagination of the Japanese propagandists. As at present constituted, the Manchukuo 'government' amounts to little more than a polite fiction intended to obscure the fact that Japan has gone in for imperialism in a big way. Japanese officials occupy the key positions in the Manchukuo administration and work under the direction of the Kwangtung Army, which in turn is subordinate, ostensibly at least, to the Japanese Imperial General Staff. Mr. Pu-yi and his team of Manchu and Chinese ministers, commonly spoken of in Manchuria as the 'phantom cabinet', are entirely overshadowed by their so-called Japanese 'advisors' who in fact constitute the country's real authority[23].

Even the Japanese themselves admitted the fact. To quote from the "Manchuria Fortnightly", a supplement of the "Manchuria Daily News":

> ..... Manchuria is at present patrolled by Japanese troops conjointly with the Manchukuo army and police by virtue of the Manchukuo — Japan Protocol. Besides, a number of high government posts, administrative and judicial, in Manchuria are held by Japanese.

In Japan itself, the events in Manchuria were dramatized to extremes in order to foster public sentiment. War maps and vivid pictures attracted crowds to the shop windows where they were displayed. At night, neon signs at the large newspaper offices told of the day's happenings in Manchuria. High school students wearing armbands harassed the crowds for funds to help the "heroes" in the Northern Territories. Newspapers told of the Chinese population in Manchuria welcoming their Japanese liberators with tears and shouts of joy. However, in Manchuria itself, foreign observers viewed the progress of the Japanese army like the slow development of a virulent disease, the malignancy spreading dangerously, all outside help apparently helpless to check it. And watching this unchecked development they are reminded more forcibly of the disease simile by the realization that it is "communicable" — in other words, its ravages are certain to spread far beyond the present geographical limits unless means are quickly found to bring the fever under control.

But there seemed to be no way of halting and containing the disease. By March of 1933 the borders of Manchukuo were extended by the Japanese to Jehol Province (Eastern Inner Mongolia). This rich poppy-growing region would, as we will discover, further aid the Japanese in their full and utter conquest of Manchuria.

Japan first extended diplomatic recognition of Manchukuo on September 15, 1932 followed by the Vatican in April, 1934[24] and El Salvador on May 19, 1934. Italy, Japan's axis ally, formally recognized the puppet state on November 29, 1936 simultaneously with Japan's recognition of the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy. Germany, another of Japan's axis allies, gave official recognition on February 20, 1938. However, a German Consul had arrived in Mukden on November 7, 1936. Then came recognition by Poland on October 19, 1938, and by Hungary on January 14, 1939. On February 24, 1939, Manchukuo became a signatory of the Anti-Comintern Pact

[20] Amakasa Masahiko was the murderer of the well-known Socialist Osugi Sakae. In 1923 just after the Great Kanto Earthquake, Osugi and his family were arrested. Osugi, his wife and his seven year-old son were strangled by Amakasa at police headquarters.

[21] One of a chain of hotels of the same name operated by the South Manchurian Railway Company throughout Manchuria.

[22] For the text of the Manchukuo-Japan Protocal, see Appendix D.

[23] H. J. Timperly. Japan and Manchukuo. Foreign Affairs, January 1934. p. 295.

[24] Enquiries as to whether the Vatican did, in fact, grant official recognition to Manchukuo were met with evasive answers. it is possible however, that such recognition, if it was granted, was not *de jure* but merely the sending of a Papal Representative.

concluded between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936. And, as Soviet Russia had sold her interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo in 1935, she presumably extended de facto recognition to the new "state". In further support of this claim, Manchukuo did, in fact, maintain consular agents in Siberia with Moscow's consent[25].

On March 1, 1934, Henry Pu-yi, as we have mentioned, was enthroned as "chief executive" of Manchukuo with the title "Emperor Kang Teh". Regardless of this title, he took orders from Tokyo through the Kwangtung Army. Later in 1946 Henry testified before the I.M.T.F.E. (International Military Tribunal for the Far East) that Manchukuo was not a soveregin state at all:

> ..... the Manchurian people, officials and myself lost freedom completely. When Lord Lytton came to Manchuria we were all under the supervision of Japanese military officers; and wherever Lord Lytton went, he was under the supervision of Japanese gendarmes. When I interviewed Lord Lytton, many Kwangtung Military Officers were beside me supervising. If I had told the truth, I would have been murdered right after the mission left Manchuria.

The creation of Manchukuo by the Japanese was but a step toward her later expansion into China proper. This expansion was responsible for the Sino-Japanese War lasting from 1937 until 1945 and consequently led to the Pacific War, Thus, the Mukden Incident was but the first step on the road to Japan's absolute subjugation of South East Asia and ultimately led to her complete ruination which culminated on the USS "Missouri" and her signing of the unconditional surrender. On August 10, 1945, when Japan sued for peace, the "state" of Manchukuo immediately vanished. Henry Pu-yi was captured by the Soviets who had declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria a few days after the American bombing of Hiroshima. Henry was later handed over to the Chinese Communists who held him on the mainland until his death in 1968.

[25] It is rather difficult to discover exactly which countries recognized Manchukuo as most sources are not in agreement with each other. The countries mentioned previously are quoted from P.H. Clyde's "The Far East," 1958. "The Manchuria Yearbook" (Manshu Seifu Nenkan). 1934. The "Manchukuo Official Gazette" (Manshukuoko Seifu KoKo), 1934, etc.

CHAPTER 3 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS JURISDICTION AND THE SHANGHAI INCIDENT

Immediately following the Incident at Mukden, China made a strong protest to Tokyo and, following this, on September 21, appealed to the League of Nations under Article XI of the Covenant. China further requested the United States, as a signatory of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, to aid in preserving peace in the Far East and bring about a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese problem. The Japanese representative at Geneva was advised by his government to block any League action and to maintain that the incident was unimportant and could be settled by direct Sino-Japanese negotiations.

No sooner had China made the appeal, the Council of the League, which had been in session when the Mukden Incident occured, recommended that the United States, while not a member of the League, be fully informed of what was happening in Geneva in relation to the Sino-Japanese Manchurian controversy. The reason for this was that the Mukden Incident raised questions which involved not only those in the Covenant of the League, but also the understandings of the Paris Peace Pact and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, to which the latter two the United States was a party. Later, the League went even further and invited the United States to delegate a representative to deal with matters involving the Paris Peace Pact. This led to immediately consultation between the Secretary general of the League and the American State Department. The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimpson, gave assurances of American "cooperation and frankness" and expressed the opinion that the Japanese military had ignored the Japanese Foreign Office[26]. It was thus the opinion of the American Government that preparation should be made to uphold treaty obligations but it would be wise for the Western Powers to "avoid action which might excite nationalistic feelings in Japan in support of the military and against Shidehara" (the Japanese Foreign Minister). From this point on, the United States and the major League powers were in virtually constant but hardly effective consultation on the Sino-Japanese dispute.

Further, on September 22, the President of the League Council sent the Chinese and Japanese government's a telegram containing an "urgent appeal" that those two governments should refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem, and informing them that he was about to begin consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives with a view to finding adequate means to enable the two countries to withdraw their troops forthwith without endangering the safety of the life and property of their nationals. In reply, the Chinese government further pointed out that the situation was hourly growing in gravity, so that an effective application of the Council's powers brooked no delay. The Japanese government, in its reply, declared that it had "firmly persued the object of preventing an extension of the situation," and again it stated its opinion that the controversy should be settled by direct negotiations between itself and China and added that it had a "firm intention not to

[26] It appears that the Japanese military and the government were both in favour of expansion in Manchuria and China, it was merely the method taken to effect such expansion that caused disagreement.

depart from this line of conduct." Despite the "firm intentions" of the Japanese, they broke yet another promise and continued military operations in Manchuria.

Coupled with the action of the League Council, the American Secretary of State had, on September 22, handed the Japanese Ambassador in Washington a memorandum in which surprise and concern were expressed with regard to Japanese military operations in Manchuria. "The actual situation," the memorandum said, "is that an army of the Japanese Government is in complete control of South Manchuria," and the situation "brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements such as the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the Briand-Kellogg Pact." The memorandum went on to say that "the liquidation of this situation rests largely with Japan for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are now exercising de facto control in South Manchuria."

On September 28, China suggested that the League Council despatch a neutral commission to the Far East to determine the true facts. But this suggestion, as China explained, did not necessarily mean that a commission should be sent from Geneva, as there were neutrals on the spot who could be selected. This suggestion of China's was viewed as an interesting one by the Council, but was strongly rejected by Japan for obvious reasons. Also, the United States did not favour the immediate sending or appointment of enquiry commissions at this time for the simple reason that any action would serve to strengthen the war-like spirit among the Japanese militarists and deprive the Japanese civil authorities of the chance to regain control of the situation. This view of the United States went a long way in influencing Geneva to adopt a "wait and see" attitude; at least for the time being.

Events in Manchuria showed that, far from withdrawing, Japanese troops were determined to broaden the scope of operations. On October 8, Japanese warplanes began bombing the city of Chinchow where the Chinese authorities had established a provisional government. This new development in the Manchurian situation had been conductive to the adoption of a resolution on October 24, by the League Council directing Japan to withdraw her troops into the railway "zones" by a definite date, namely, November 16. The Resolution also called upon the Chinese Government to "make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated (by Japanese troops) as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there," and further requested the Chinese Government to "associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements." Finally, the Resolution recommended that China and Japan, "as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them.[27]"

However, Japan from the very outset maintained that her military operations in Manchuria had no relation to anything but self-defense, and refused to recognize the juridical force of the Resolution. Thus instead of taking any steps to effect the withdrawal of her troops, Japan proceeded to extend her conquests into North Manchuria to the city of Tsitsihar and also to move southward towards Chinchow, provisional capital of Manchuria. The plan of the Japanese was to seize Tsitsihar as,of all cities in Manchuria it was the farthest from Mukden and therefore the most difficult and spectacular to capture. In addition to this, the largest of Chang Hsueh-liang's armies was regrouping in the Tsitsihar region and, if smashed now, would make the task of capturing the remainder of Manchuria much easier. Thus the provision for the fixed date for the completion of withdrawal of Japanese troops set by the Resolution remained without any effect upon the situation and, as we will see later, the provision itself was abandoned by the Council on December 10. With the refusal of the Japanese to evacuate their troops, the Resolution became inoperative.

With regard to direct negotiations, Japan made her intentions very clear—she insisted upon direct negotiations for the settlement of overall outstanding issues between herself and China as a condition precedent to the evacuation of her troops on reasons of "self defense" to ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals; while China held that the withdrawal of Japanese troops should be completed before any direct negotiations could be carried out. It was China's view that:

> ..... so long as Japanese troops are in illegal occupation of Chinese soil, contrary to the Council's request and in violation of Article X of the Covenant, of Article 11 of the Pact of Paris, and Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, neither good relations or negotiations between the two countries are possible.[28].

The insistence of Japan on direct negotiations was a condition precedent of the evacuation of her troops,in that she deemed it necessary to occupy Chinese territory as a means of assuring a "suitable adjustment" with the Chinese government in the future.

On November 5, the American Government delivered a note to the Japanese Government which, after noting Japan's statements regarding direct negotiations, went on to say that "the solution of the present situation in Manchuria and the settlement of the broader issues involved in the treaty rights were two distinct things and should therefore be separated."[29]. The memorandum further pointed out that direct negotiations for the settlement of the broader issues ought not to be made a condition precedent to the evacuation of the occupied positions, otherwise it would give the world the impression that Japan intends to use military force to bring about a settlement of these broader issues.

With her military conquests safely achieved in Manchuria, Japan, on November 21, 1931, agreed that the League send the oft-discussed Commission of Investigation; first suggested by

[27] W.W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations. Baltimore. The John Hopkins Press. 1935. p. 56.
[28] W.W. Willoughby. op. cit. p. 138.
[29] Lowell. A.L. Manchuria, the League, and the United States. Foreign Affairs, June, 1932.

China but rejected by Japan. On December 10, a resolution for the Japanese proposal was adopted by the Council, and thus, the well-known Lytton Commission was finally constituted in the middle of January 1932, reaching the Far East on the last day of February. The members of the Commission were: Count Aldrovandi (Italian), General de Division Henry Claudel (French), the Earl of Lytton (British), Major-General Frank Ross McCoy[30] (American), and Dr. Heinrich Schnee (German), with Lord Lytton as its Chairman. As "Assessors" to assist the Commission as provided in the Council's Resolution, Japan appointed Mr. Isaburo Yoshida, Japanese Ambassador to Turkey, while China appointed Dr. Wellington Koo. The secretary General of the League designated M. Robert Haas, a Director in the Secretariat of the League, to serve as Secretary General of the Commission.

Besides the provision for sending a Commission of Enquiry to the Far East, the Council, in its Resolution of December 10, neither called upon nor recommended to the contending parties to do anything beyond what had been contained in its Resolution of September 30. Instead of taking any new action, it withdrew the requirement provided in the Resolution of October 24, that Japanese troops would be evacuated by a definite date. The date then fixed had long passed when the Resolution of December 10 was adopted, and no mention was made of a new specific date for the evacuation of troops, although the Resolution stated that "events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council's meeting of October 24." The retrograde step taken by the Council and the unwillingness upon the part of the Powers represented in the Council to take any action antagonistic to Japan eventually gave Japan a free hand in the preparation for an immediate attack upon Shanghai on January 28, the following year[31].

Obviously the Japanese had good reason to change their attitude toward a Commission of Enquiry, some possibilities for this change of mind might be: (1)The Japanese Government was, up to this time, aware of the fact that, as regards its action in Manchuria there would be no real danger of active intervention on the part of the Powers, individually or collectively, through the League, as the Powers had their own problems to deal with: or, (2) with such a Commission authorized and constituted, the League or non-member Powers would not be likely to recommend any further action in opposition to Japan's Manchurian policy until the Report of the Commission was received. This would give Japan time and opportunity to extend and consolidate her occupation of Manchuria. As we have already mentioned, Japan refused to recognize the judicial force of the Resolution and proceeded to extend her conquests into North Manchuria, specifically, the city of Tsitsihar. Later, as we will discover, the Japanese would cross the Great Wall for an attack upon Shanghai. The method behind this madness was the saving of the League's face. Its was fairly obvious to the Japanese that the League members or non-members would not interfere actively in Manchuria. Thus, if the Japanese returned Tsitsihar and Shanghai to the status quo ante, the League would settle for the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria as a better-than-nothing solution. This calculated gamble of the Japanese would pay off exactly as it was planned.

Only a few week after the adoption by the League of the Japanese proposal for a Commission of Enquiry to be sent to the Far East, Japanese forces dispersed the last southern remnants of the Chinese armies and captured the city of Chinchow on January 2, 1932 despite a neutral zone around the city suggested by the Chinese. The efforts to solve the Manchurian conflict by peaceful means had failed. As 1932 advanced, Japan completed her military conquest of Manchuria. Later, while the Lytton Commission spent its time in investigation, Japan undertook the creation of the new "state" of Manchukuo.

From the very beginning of Japan's military action in Manchuria, the League Powers as well as the United States were well aware of the dangers involved. Yet as 1931 drew to a close and Japan's military action progressed, neither the League nor the United States did anything, either economically or militarily to check the Japanese advance. It was the hope of the American Government that peaceful elements in the Japanese Government would be encouraged to assert their influence over the Army, but as the months rolled away, any and all opposition to the military was checked and silenced either by assassination or intimidation until Japan was left with a government that opposed the Army not on principle but on method. However, as the year progressed, the American Government gradually moved from a position of reconciliation to one of diplomatic coercion—that is, it adopted a policy of non-recognition, previously used to interfere with the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915[32]. Secretary of State, Stimpson, in identical notes to China and Japan stated that the United States:

> ..... cannot admit the legality of any de facto situation, nor does it intend to recognize any treaty entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open-Door Policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which China and Japan,as well as the United States, are parties[33].

With this statement, the so-called Stimpson Doctrine was formulated. The United States had invited the cooperation of the British and French Governments in the promulgation of this doctrine, however, the invitation was declined until the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident when the League began to align itself

[30] The original "real" McCoy.
[31] MacNair. H.F. The Real Conflict between China and Japan. The University Press. Chicago. 1938. p. 144-145.
[32] MacMurray. J.V. A. Treaties and agreements with and Concerning China 1894-1919. 2 volumes. Oxford University Press. New York. 1921. p. 547.
[33] Lowell A.L. op. cit. Foreign Affairs. April. 1932.

with the doctrine. The British were reluctant to cooperate unless there was a determination on the part of the United States to back up its words by force. However, there was no indication that the United States intended to go this far; in fact, she was opposed to the application of even economic sanctions.

Although disavowing in her reply to Stimpson's note, any intention of violating the territorial integrity of China, Japan, with obvious political motives in mind, extended the area of occupation. Further, on January 28, 1932, the Japanese, in order to force the Chinese to buy their goods (amongst other reasons), moved her navel forces into position for a premeditated attack on Shanghai. It was here, in Shanghai, that a most effective boycott of Japanese goods was under way. Again China appealed to the League for sanctions; but again in vain. In Manchuria, even while the Lytton Commission was engaged in investigations, Japan created the new "state" of Manchukuo and declared its independence on February 18, 1932.

At last, on March 11, 1932, the League Assembly gave in somewhat by adopting the American Non-Recognition Doctrine through a declaration which read:

> ..... that it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris[34].

On September 15, just seventeen days before the Lytton Report was made public, Japan showed her utter contempt for the League by officially extending diplomatic recognition of her puppet "state" of Manchukuo. This was an obvious move to confront the League with a fait accompli. In this respect it is interesting to compare Japan's moves in the Far East with Germany's in Europe: both sought *Lebensraum*, both considered themselves to be of a superior race, and both were intent on seeing just how far the Western Powers would compromise; how far they could be pushed before they would react. In both countries tremendous gains were made before the Powers woke up to the fact that there was no end to their demands; no bounds to their greed.

Meanwhile, in Shanghai, things had gone from bad to worse. There had been a number of street brawls between Chinese and Japanese and, in one of them, a Japanese monk was seriously injured and later died. This incident further served as an excuse for the Japanese attack on Shanghai of January 28, 1932. The Americans, followed by the British, protested the Japanese bombing of the civilian population of Shanghai and concurrently sent reinforcements to the International Settlement in that city.

Following the bombings, Japanese marines landed on the beach-heads near Shanghai and proceeded to make their way towards the city. Fighting continued until January 30, when the Japanese commander tacitly admitted failure by halting the offensive. This was followed by a period of desultory sniping with the Chinese population waiting fearfully for a renewed attack which they knew was imminent. The interim was utilized by Shanghai consular officials to effect a truce, but all attempts at this stage met with failure.

On February 2, the United States and Britain submitted a comprehensive peace proposal to Japan and China. The principal points of this proposal were: cessation of all acts of violence; no further mobilization or preparation for hostilities; withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in Shanghai: protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of a neutral zone to be policed by neutrals under consular authority; and prompt advances toward negotiation to settle outstanding Sino-Japanese controversies, with the aid of neutral observers or participants, in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the League Resolution of December 9[35].

On February 29, China invoked Article X and XV of the Covenant under which the League would be required to assess responsibility and eventually perhaps apply sanctions. This led, on March 4, to the appointment of local consular representatives of the League States to report directly on conditions in and around Shanghai. The Japanese in turn requested the good offices of the neutral powers to reestablish peace in Shanghai. By this move, the American and British efforts to bring about peace were seen to have been worthwhile, however, since the terms proposed by the neutral powers were not acceptable to Japan, the effort failed.

While the eyes of the world were upon Shanghai, Japan moved rapidly to further consolidate her position in Manchuria. The Japanese had created local "self-governing" administrations throughout the country which were to be gradually combined into the new "state."

On March 11, 1932, the League Assembly aligned itself with the non-recognition doctrine initiated by the United States through a resolution proposed by Britain. On April 30, it adopted a resolution which provided for the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Shanghai and the establishment of a Joint Commission, including neutral members, to certify the withdrawal and to collaborate in arranging transfers. Finally, on May 5, China and Japan made peace at Shanghai on terms worked out by the consular committee of the League.

The subsequent withdrawal of Japanese forces from Shanghai did not, in any way whatsoever, indicate any change in Japanese policy. The withdrawal, far from bowing to the wishes of the League, was made to save the face of the Japanese for their failure to put an end to the stubborn resistance of the Chinese 19th Route Army. Also, it was expedient at this time for the Japanese to placate the Western Powers at Shanghai in view of the fact that the situation in Manchuria was not perfectly stable. But, more than anything else, it was the fact that the League Commission of Enquiry headed by Lord Lytton had been prowling around the Far East for the last few months and was now in the process of writing a report on its findings; a report

[34] Willoughby. W.W. op. cit. pp. 299-301.
[35] Bison. T.A. Japan and Manchukuo. Foreign Policy Bulletin. February. 1932.

that would be of vital importance to Japan. It would decide the course of Japanese history for the next decade.

CHAPTER 4 THE LEAGUE COMMISSION AND REPORT OF ENQUIRY

In this chapter, I intend to deal only with the activities of the League Commission in Manchuria and the subsequent Report of Enquiry. The arduous labours of the Commission consisted of a preliminary study of the events and issues involved in the Far East, travels to the capitals of Japan and China and consultations with government officials there, and a personal investigation of Manchuria itself, including the hearing of evidence from a wide variety of sources. In this last and most important phase of the Commission's work, that of investigating conditions in Manchuria, it was faced with overwhelming opposition in the form of Japanese attempts to prevent them from obtaining facts. In spite of this, the situation clarified itself through the unanimous conviction of five honest men of the most diverse backgrounds and political opinion. What the Commission had to face in Manchuria has been summed up quite adequately by the New York Times correspondent Hallet Abent, who wrote:

> Despite the feverish preparations for an attempts to impress the League of Nation's investigators, the "independent" Manchukuo government presents an unconvincing and sometimes astonishing and amusing spectacle. The Changchun regime, headed by former Emperor Pu-yi (with 600 Japanese advisers) is obviously a mere makeshift, shining with a sticky, undried coating of Japanese lacquer. ..... It is noteworthy that foreign contacts with the Chinese heads of Manchukuo are impossible when high Japanese officials are not present.

Exactly what did Mr. Arbent mean when he mentions "feverish Japanese preparations to impress the League of Nations's investigators?" In the following pages we will see exactly to what lengths the Japanese went to impress; "deceive" is a more appropriate word, the League investigators.

One danger that the League investigators were constantly reminded of by the Japanese was the fear, real or imagined, of assassination by bandits, communists and Koreans. One wonders what kind of security forces the Japanese commanded in Harbin to protect the Commission members from the ravages of such assassins? They were:

1. The Japanese Intelligence Service, the chief of which is appointed by Tokyo and answers only to Tokyo.
2. The Japanese Genermerie, which is subordinate to the Japanese Military Authorities.
3. The Manchukuo Gendermerie, subordinate to the Manchukuo Military Authorities.
4. The Manchukuo State Police, under the direction of the Manchukuo Minister of the Interior.
5. The City Police, controlled by the City Municipality.
6. The Japanese Consular Police, responsible to the Japanese Consulate.
7. The Criminal Police, subject to the Municipal Authorities, but independent of the City Police.
8. The State Intelligence Service, under the Manchukuo War Office.
9. The Railroad Police, under Railroad administration.

Quite sufficient, it seems, to protect the League investigators from harm.

The leading members of the League Commission were housed at the Hotel Modern in Harbin[36]. The hotel itself was placed in a state of siege; most of the rooms were occupied by Japanese or White Russian agents of the State Political Police and the hotel staff, from manager to bellboy, was replaced by police agents, even the hotel guests were in the employ of the police. At other hotels were members of the Commission were staying (Grand and Novi Mir), the situation was the same. The schedule of the Commission members was arranged well in advance and the Japanese made quite sure that any place they might visit was staffed by police agents or pro-Japanese personnel. All anti-Japanese elements were removed from sight; in hospitals, cinemas, restaurants, and theatres, in fact any conceivable place the investigators might visit. Following this, the Japanese attempted to impress the Commission with public enthusiasm for Manchukuo; they went out of their way to impress on the Commission members that the creation of Manchukuo was the spontaneous wish of the people. Thousands of small Manchukuo flags and pictures of Henry Pu-yi were printed at nominal cost to the Japanese and sold under threat of arrest to everyone in Harbin and all those, whether Chinese, Russian or Korean, living along the railway line. Naturally, besides being of value to the Japanese as propaganda, it reaped an enormous profit for the Kwangtung authorities.

Each member of the Commission was assigned four agents who took turns in watching his every move and recording his movements. Such measures, it was held, protected the members from bandits and communists who intended to attack the League investigators as well as the Chinese representatives. Despite all the feverish precautions of the Japanese, a great many Manchukuo, Russian, Chinese and Korean agents in the pay of the Japanese were opposed to the Manchukuo scheme and aided the Commission in various ways. They arranged private interviews between businessmen, professors and politicians while facilitating the delivery of hundreds of written communications.

The extent of Japanese failure to deceive the Commission was eloquently expressed by Lord Lytton in the chapter entitled:

[36] Owned by a certain Joseph Kaspe whose son was kidnapped and held for ranson by the Japanese in 1932 and was later killed on Kaspe's refusal to pay the sum demanded. For further details, see: Vespa. op. cit. pp. 195-206.

"Opinions of the Inhabitants of Manchuria" of his "Report to the League of Nations."

"It was one of the objects of the Commission to ascertain the attitude of the inhabitants of Manchuria towards the new "state" ..... however, the obtaining of evidence presented some difficulty. The danger, real or supposed, to the Commission from bandits, Koreans, Communists, or supporters of the new government who might be angered by the presence of the Chinese Assessor on account of his criticism of the regime, provided a reason for exceptional measures of protection. There were, no doubt, occasional dangers in the unsettled conditions of the country ..... but the effect of police measures adopted was to keep away witnesses, and many Chinese were frankly afraid of even meeting members of our staff. We were informed at one place that ..... no one would be allowed to see the Commission without official permission. Interviews were therefore usually arranged with considerable difficulty and in secret, and many informed us that it was too dangerous for them to meet us even in this way.

"In spite of these difficulties, we were able to arrange private interviews with numerous people, in addition to our public interviews with 'Manchukuo' officials, Japanese Consuls and military officers. We also received over 1,500 written communications; some delivered by hand, the majority sent by post to different addresses .....

"Many delegations representing public bodies and associations were received, and usually presented to us written statements. Most of the delegations were introduced by the Japanese or by 'Manchukuo authorities, and we had strong grounds for believing that the statements left with us had previously obtained Japanese approval. In fact, in some cases, persons who had presented them informed us afterwards that they had been written or substantially revised by the Japanese and were not to be taken as an expression of their real feelings. These documents were remarkable for their studied neglect to comment either favourably or otherwise, upon Japanese participation in the establishment or maintenance of the 'Manchukuo' administration. In the main, these statements were concerned with the relieving of grievences against the former Chinese administration and contained expressions of hope and confidence in the future of the new 'State.'

"The letters we received from farmers, small tradesmen, town workers and students, related the feelings and experiences of the writers. After the return of the Commission to Peiping in June (1932), this mass of correspondence was translated, analysed and arranged by an expert staff specially selected for the purpose. All of these 1,500 letter *except two*, were bitterly hostile to the new 'Manchukuo Government' and to the Japanese. They appeared to be the sincere and spontaneous expression of opinion.

"The higher Chinese officials of the 'Manchukuo Government' are in office for various reasons. Many of them were previously in the service of the former regime and have been retained either by inducement or by intimidation of one kind or another. Some of them conveyed messages to the Commission to the effect that they had been forced to remain in office under duress, and that all power was in Japanese hands, that they were loyal to China and what they had said at their interview with the Commission in the presence of the Japanese was not necessarily to be believed.

"The Chinese businesssmen and the bankers who were interviewed by us were hostile to 'Manchukuo.' They disliked the Japanese. They feared for their lives and property, and frequently remarked; 'We don't want to become like the Koreans.' The professional classes, teachers and doctors are hostile to 'Manchukuo.' They alledge that they are spied on and intimidated. The interference with education, the closing of universities and some of the schools, and the alterations in the school textbooks[37]. have added to their hostility, already great on patriotic grounds. The censorship of the Press, Post and opinion is resented, as is the prohibiton of entry into 'Manchukuo' of newspapers published in China ..... Many letters were received from students and young people, directed against 'Manchukuo.'

"The heads of the 'Manchukuo Government' and of the local administration are purely Chinese. The Japanese hold positions as 'Advisers. The organization is such as to give to these officials and 'advisers' opportunities not only for giving technical advice, but also of actually controlling and directing the administration.

"After careful study of evidence presented to us in private and public interviews, in letters and written statements, we have come to the conclusion that there is no Chinese support for 'Manuchukuo' which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese."[38].

By August 30, 1932 the 400 page Lytton Report was ready for printing. The following week the completed report was on its way to Geneva for presentation before the League. Meanwhile, in Japan, there was much speculation regarding the content of the report. Even while the Commission was in Manchuria, the Japanese Government, as mentioned previously, had announced their intention of officially recognizing the "State of Manchukuo." Such action, it was reported, seemed to members of the Commission as premature and likely to further complicate and alter the situation if taken before the League could receive the Report.

Japanese Foreign Minister, Uchida, bluntly told the League Commission member that, "if Japan wants to recognize the new Manchurian government, that is her privilege-and that her policy would remain unchanged despite League advice." War Minister Araki stated publicly that, "regardless of the form of the Manchurian government, Japan will not recognize China sovereignty as extending over Manchuria." Simultaneously with this statement a draft providing for the establishment of a new administrative organ in Manchuria, supplanting the Governor-General of the Kwangtung Leased Territory and unifying the heretofore scattered military and civil control under a so-called

[37] Even today, 60 years after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese penchant for altering school textbooks has changed little. Generations of Japanese live in a historical void in order to cover up her actions during the 30's and 40's.

[38] League of Nations: Report of the Commission of Enquiry. C. 663 M. 320. 1932. VI. pp. 110-111. (Hereinafter cited as the "Lytton Report.")

quadruple-rule, was completed in Tokyo. These new arrangements affected the Kwangtung Leased Territory, the South Manchurian Railway Zone, and the newly "pacified" areas of Manchuria proper.

The main points of the new plan were as follows:

1. In effect the Commander-in Chief of the Kwangtung Garrison, the Governor-General of Kwangtung and the temporary resident minister plenipotentiary to Manchuria shall be the same person.
2. No changes, especially in the official organization of the government-general of Kwangtung shall be made, the official organization of the Kwangtung government-general remaining as at present.
3. The resident minister plenipotentiary shall be under control of the Japanese Foreign Minister, (and) shall be in charge of diplomatic matters and shall have control over the Japanese Consular services of Manchuria.
4. The resident minister plenipotentiary shall have assistants. A government official in service ordered by the resident minister plenipotentiary to serve as his assistant shall be eligible to become a non-member of the regular staff of the government service from which he is enlisted as assistant to the resident minister plenipotentiary and his assistants shall be regulated separately by Imperial ordinance.
5. The special service department of the Kwangtung garrison shall be maintained as heretofore. Members of the Kwangtung special service department shall be eligible to become assistants to the resident minister plenipotentiary.
6. Matters regarding education, public works and health now vested in the South Manchuria Railway Company shall be maintained for the time being as heretofore by the South Manchuria Railway Company administraton[39]

When the English in the above draft has been deciphered, one is left with the fact that the carrying out of the proposed new administrative order would leave Manchuria surely and solidly in the hands of the Japanese despite the recommendations of the Lytton Commission. Even before the Lytton Report became public, the Japanese had made up their minds that; if the League recognizes Manchukuo, all well and good, if the League refuses to recognize Manchukuo, then Japan will not recognize the League.

On February 17, 1933, the League of Nations's Committee of Nineteen met in Geneva and recomended the adoption of the Lytton Report to the full League Assembly and issued its own 15,000 word summary of the case against Japan. On February 24, the full League Assembly met to consider endorsement of the Committee of Nineteen's acceptance of Lord Lytton's judgement. Both the Chinese and Japanese delegates gave their views and presented their arguments in favour of or against the formation of Manchukuo. Finally, the issue was put to the vote. Of the forty-five delegates present, all except Siam voted against Japan. Since abstainers and disputants were not counted (Siam abstained), Japan had been condemned forty-five to nothing. Matsuoka, the leader of the Japanese delegation, walked to the rostrum and made a short speech; "with profound regret," he said, "the Japanese government are obliged to feel they have now reached the limit of their endeavours to cooperate with the League regarding Sino-Japanese differences." "I want to thank the members of the League." With that he walked down the aisle and signalled his fellow Japanese delegates to follow him; left the assembly hall never to return. Later that day the remaining members of the League voted to refrain from recognizing Manchukuo "de jure or de facto." Even as the League members were voting, The Japanese Army was engaged in the invasion of Jehol Province, north of the Great Wall-Jehol Province, probably one of the greatest poppy-growing areas in the world; poppies that would later be processed by the Japanese into morphine, cocaine and heroin, the proceeds of which would help to swell the coffers of the Kwangtung Army as part of their attempt to make Manchukuo "pay."

But what of the Lytton Report ? A brief summary of its contents would, I believe, serve to give some idea of the tremendous amount of work carried out by Lord Lytton and his team of investigators.

The Report consists of ten chapters, under the following headings: I—Outline of recent developments in China; II—Manchuria; III Manchurian issues between China and Japan; IV—Narrative of events in Manchuria on and subsequent to September 18, 1931; V—Shanghai; VI—"Manchukuo"; VII—Japan's economic interests and the Chinese boycott; VII—Economic interests in Manchuria; IX—Principles and conditions of settlement; X—Considerations and suggestions to the Council. ..... To summarize each heading briefly:

Chapter I takes account of China as a "nation in evolution" with its two decades of recent history punctured by banditry and the activities of independent war lords, and with the growing menace of communism the most dominant factor preventing the establishment of a national government. These conditions have "adversely affected all the nations with which China has been brought into contact and, until remedied, will continue a menace to world peace and a contributary cause of world economic depression."[40]. The Commission did take into account the fact that the National Government of China has made considerable progress. Moreover, it challenges the view expressed by the Japanese Government in its statement of February 23, 1932, that present conditions in China must "profoundly" modify the application to China of the Covenant.[41].

Chapter II is a description of Manchuria with an analysis of its population. Politically a part of China, with an overwhelmingly predominant Chinese population, the vested interests of others in the territory and the obligations of the Chinese administration towards these interests should not be overlooked. The Commission found that Chinese sovereignty under Chang Hseuh-liang's military regime had brought about conditions

[39] South Manchuria Railway Company: Third Report on Progress in Manchuria. Dairen, 1933.
[40] Lytton Report. op. cit. p. 13.
[41] League of Nations, Official Journal, March, 1932. p. 38.

prejudicial to foreign interests, particularly the Japanese. Sino-Soviet relations in Manchuria had also been such as to cause alarm, and the Japanese government's fears of an extention of communistic influence from Outer Mongolia into Manchuria was a recognizable factor in the decision to persue a strong military policy in Manchuria.

Chapter III reviews the existing Sino-Japanese treaties with regard to Manchuria, and Japan's rights and privileges therein. The political, economic and legal factors involved create a situation without an exact parallel in the world. The chapter goes on to review Japan's vested interests, the effect of the Nine-Power Treaty on those interests, Japanese railway policies, and the aggravating problem of Korean settlement in Manchuria with all the 1931 incidents connected therewith. The statement is made that the open hostilities of 1931 can be traced to the "Nakamura Incident" which greatly aggravated Japanese resentment toward China, but Japan's claim that there were 300 unsettled grievences which had provoked her to the action of September 18, after all peaceful means toward their settlement had been exhausted "cannot be substantiated."

The Commission conceded that Manchuria is of great importance to both China and Japan. Patriotic sentiment accentuated by Japan's sacrifices in its war with Russia in 1904-1905, the paramount need of military defense, and the exceptional treaty rights acquired by Japan "all combine to create the claim to a 'special position' in Manchuria." China, however, regards Manchuria as part of its territory, a first line of defense, a population outlet and a granary. The Commission gave evidence that historically, culturally and leagally Manchuria has been a part of China for centuries. The Commission went on to say that it cannot "accept the contention of Japan that it has 'special interests' in Manchuria, in the sense in which the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917 used the term." And further;

> "The Japanese government, since the Russo-Japanese War, has at various times sought to obtain from Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America recognition of their country's 'special position,' 'special interests,' 'special influence,' or 'paramount interest,' in Manchuria. These efforts have only met with partial success, and where recognition of such claims has been accorded, in more or less definate terms, the international agreements or understandings containing them have largely disappeared with the passage of time, either by formal abrogation or otherwise. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, challenged to a large extent the claims of any signatory State to a 'special position' or to 'special rights and interests' in any part of China, including Manchuria. The Japanese claim to such a position in Manchuria conflicts with the sovereign rights of China.....[42]."

The Commission intimated, moreover, that the importance of Manchuria to Japan may be exaggerated. Manchuria does not seem to be suitable for Japanese immigration on a large scale. It may become an important source of food supply in the future, "but in that case a large amount of capital would have to spent in the development of a sufficient irrigation system." Even greater amounts of capital would be necessary to create Japanese heavy industry and develop the coal, oil, and iron resources of Manchuria. There is no reason to believe that Japan and Manchuria could succeed in forming a self-sufficient economic bloc. "Japan depends for the bulk of her commerce far less on Manchuria that she does on the United States, China proper and British India." Japan looks to further industrialization as a means of solving its agrarian crisis.

Chapter IV deals in detail with the events of September 18, 1931, and with successive aggressive occurrances leading up to the capture of Chingchow. It makes the significant statement that the military action of September 18, had been preceeded by a week of night manoeuvers on the part of the Japanese forces accompanied by intensive machinegun fire so that the inhabitants of Mukden were largely unaware of the meaning of the activity of that particular night until morning discovered the city in the hands of its Japanese occupants. The Commission could find no evidence of Chinese military plans in relation to this incident, though the existance of a "carefully prepared" Japanese plan "to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese" was evident and not denied. The Report further states:

> "Tense feeling undoubedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as we explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan and on the night of September 18, this plan was put into action with swiftness and prccision. The Chinese, in accordance with the instruction referred to, ... had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives and property of Japanese national at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces and were suprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion unboubtedly occured on or near the railway between 10 and 10:30 p.m. on September 18, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as legitimate measures of self-defense. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defense.[43],

Chapter V is an account of the events in Shanghai leading up to and carrying through the period of the Japanese bombing and subsequent invasion of that city in January and February of 1931.

Chapter VI is an outline of the political situation in Manchuria preceeding the creation of the new "state" of Manchukuo. The motivation from the Japanese in this connection is described as

[42] Ibid. pp. 39-40.
[43] Ibid. p. 71.

mainly due to Japanese domestic politics. The Report then describes in detail the steps taken to establish the new government and declares:

> "It is clear that the Independence Movement, which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September 1931, was only made possible by the presence of Japanese troops. ..... The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that, while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of 'Manchukuo,' the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgement, the new state could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military[44]."

This section of the Report ends with the statement: "After careful study of the evidence presented to us in public and private interviews, in letters and written statements, we have come to the conclusion that there is no general Chinese support for the Manchukuo government, which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese."[45].

Chapter VII deals largely with the problem of the Chinese boycott. The Commission found that by 1925 the boycott, as organized by the Kuomingtang, had become virtually a national weapon. Japan, in view of her dependence on the China trade, was found to be particularly vulnerable to this weapon. The use of the boycott served to enhance the already strained relations between the two countries. However, the commission did not pass judgement on whether the boycott activities had or had not been a definate government act. Voluntary or privately organized boycotts are recognized as legitimate, but the Report states: "Whether, however, the organized application of the boycott to the trade of one particular country is consistant with the friendly relations or in conformity with treaty obligations is rather a problem of international law than a subject of our enquiry. We would express the hope, however, that in the interest of all States this problem should be considered at an early date and registered by international agreement."[46].

Chapter VIII goes into statistics and economic investment in Manchuria and deals with the problem of administration and the recognition of trade interests. The essential need for a regime of law and order is brought out, but the imposition of a foreign administered regime, even were its immediate object of law and order achieved and justified, could never be acceptable or successful.

Chapter IX reviews the preceding eight chapters. The Report stresses the fact that the territory in dispute concerns a piece of land the size of France and Germany combined, a territory legally belonging to China, but sufficiently autonomous to treat with Japan directly on local matters, particularly on questions of Japanese treaty rights and investments which must be taken into account in any final settlement. The Report continues: "It is a fact that without a declaration of war, a large area of what was indisputable Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan, and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China."[47].

The Commission pointed out that Manchuria does not represent, as the League hoped, a local problem to be settled by the disputing parties, it is an international problem, and any solution ignoring the interests of other nationals therein would be impermanent. The Commission then goes on to point out ten conditions which in their opinion are indespensable to any satisfactory settlement of the situation. The ten conditions are:

1. Compatibility with the interests of both China and Japan.
2. Consideration of the interests of the U.S.S.R.
3. Conformity with existing multilateral treaties.
4. Recognition of Japan's interests in Manchuria.
5. The establishment of new treaty relations between China and Japan.
6. Effective provision for the settlement of future disputes.
7. Manchurian autonomy.
8. Internal order and security against external aggression.
9. Encouragement of an economic rappochement between China and Japan.
10. International cooperation in Chinese reconstruction.

Chapter X states that "to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries." a series of suggestions is offered to the League Council as an aid in drawing up a definite proposal to be submitted by the League to the two disputants.

The suggested steps for procedure toward a settlement are:

A: An invitation from the Council of the League to the Governments of China and Japan to discuss a solution of their dispute on the lines indicated by the "conditions of settlement" summarized above.

B: The summoning of an Advisory Conference to "recommend detailed proposals for the constitution of a special regime for the administration of the Three Eastern Provinces," the Chinese and Japanese Governments and the diverse local population of Manchuria to be represented according to equitable provisions, with (possibly) neutral observers present and with the League Council ready at all points to lend its offices toward agreement on disputed points of discussion.

C: The embodiment of the conference results in four suggested instruments, to be negotiated directly between China and Japan, these to be as follows:

(1) A declaration by the Government of China constituting a special administration for the Three Eastern Provinces, in terms recommended by the Advisory Conference.

(2) A Sino-Japanese Treaty dealing with Japanese interests.

(3) A Sino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance.

(4) A Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty[48].

[44] Ibid. p. 73.
[45] Ibid. p. 87.
[46] Ibid. p. 101.
[47] Ibid. p. 134.
[48] Ibid. p. 137.

A draft report adopted by the League Assembly exonerated China from blame for the course of events and denied that Japanese military operations as a whole could be regarded as measures of self-defense. The draft also asserted that the sovereignty of Manchuria belonged to China and that the "Government of Manchukuo" was only made possible by the presence of Japanese troops. Japan's response to the Draft Report was the walkout of the Japanese delegation from the Assembly on the very day that the Draft Report was adopted, and finally Japan's announcement of her resignation from the League as mentioned previously.

Prior to September 30, 1932 when the Lytton Report was officially communicated to the Japanese Government, it was comparatively easy to predict the way in which the report would be received in Japan. This was not because its contents were known or conjectured—though it seems that there was some leakage[49] — but because the Japanese Government had already taken steps to discount the findings of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry, first by recognizing Manchukuo, and second by mobilizing public opinion in advance against the Report. The assumption was that, unless the Report was favourable to Japan, it was a bad report and should be treated as of no importance.

On October 1, the Japanese War Ministery issued a statement to the effect that it would study the historical sections of the Report with care, and point out vigourously any mistakes it found[50]. As for the Commissions's views on the settlement of the Manchurian Problem, these need not to be regarded as of any significance. General Araki, the War Minister, had already public announced that, if the League of Nations found itself unable to take the Japanese points of view, Japan was quite ready to leave the League.

It was not surprising, therefore, that when the Report was published, it should meet with a chorus of disproval. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported to have described the document as "prejudiced" and "improper." Admiral Okada, the minister of Marine, said it was "worthless." General Araki, true to form, denounced it as a "mere book of travels" which anyone could have written "after a week's journey in Manchuria." If the League thought that the adoption of the Report could lead to an amicable settlement, the League was grossly mistaken. The League, the Japanese reasoned, had shown itself incapable of solving European problems; how then could it be expected to settle those of the Far East?

With such a lead, it was to be expected that denunciation of the Report in Japan would be both widespread and intense. And so it was. Distinguished generals expressed deep indignation. The Ex-Soldiers Associations commenced activities which were "to stir up public opinion at this momemtous juncture." They held protest meetings throughout the country as did other bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce, groups of university professors, and numerous patriotic societies, some of which were newly formed for the purpose. The newspapers gave prominence to the Report, to its faults, to the incompetence of the League, for several days, and nationalistic feeling seemed for a time to run very high. There was, by coincidence, perhaps, an outbreak of spy mania. The most innocent movement of foreigners was in several places watched and hampered by the police or by self-appointed detectives, thus giving rise to "incidents" which were too comic to be regrettable.[51]

A person unfamiliar with Japan might have concluded that the whole country was aflame with indignation and seething with xenophobia; yet this was not true, as Manchuria and the League seemed to enter very little into ordinary conversation, but certainly support for the official policy was universal.

It is interesting to examine the reasons for this unanimity, not only because it was an historical phenomenon almost without parallel in modern times, but because it might throw some light on movements of opinion in Japan.

In the first place, the Japanese have a strong tradition of obedience to authority, a truly remarkable solidarity. Their history has not been such as to discourage disagreement with their rulers, and with them non-conformity is not, as in Western civilizations, accounted virtuous. In the second place, the Japanese are extremely sensitive to criticism. Feelings are supposidly delicate and must not be wounded. It was to be expected therefore, that open censure of Japan's conduct would provoke angry reaction.

There is a third reasons why the Japanese public were genuinely taken back when they found that the Report was not entirely favourable to them, and contained some admonitory passages. They have, as a people, a curious habit of assuming that ordinary rules do not apply to them. They presume that they occupy a "special position" in the world which nobody but a Japanese understands. This "special position" did not only apply to Manchuria, but takes in the whole universe. This attitude can be easily detected in the reaction of the Japanese to the Lytton Report. It seemed wrong that the Commission should judge Japanese actions by Western standards. In Europe and America, maybe, unpleasant results followed from hazardous policies, but that was not necessarily true in the Far East and especially with regard to the Japanese who regard themselves as the key nation in Asia and the champion of peace and harmony.

However, throughout modern history, Japan has never championed a cause unidentifiable with its own; it has protected no country, nor has it fought any war unless the ultimate result has been or has been thought to be the strengtening and enhancement of Japan and Japan alone.

This peculiarity of mind seems to have been detected by the writers of the Report who, in one passage, remark that, "Even in

[49] The Report was completed on August 30, 1932 and was scheduled to be distributed three weeks later to each of the representatives in the League. However, on August 31, Japanese spokesmen in the Foreign Office and War Ministry began to attack the Report citing exact references by chapter. It seems that Japanese military Intelligence had succeeded in buying a true carbon copy from one of the Commission's secretaries. Bergamini. op. cit.

[50] Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. The League of Nations Association of Japan. November 21, 1932.

[51] It was to be only a few years later that any Japanese employed by a foreigner was required to belong to one of the many police departments.

Japan appropriate means must be found for the attainment of every end."

Given the characteristics just outlined, and a spontaneous patriotism like that of the Japanese, which, even without assiduous cultivation, closes ranks, and forms a united front against what is deemed interference from without, one can scarcely be surprised that Japanese action at this time seemed as firm as it was unanimous. The Lytton Report, for all the abuse that was heaped on it, was carefully read in Japan; not only by those whose business it was to refute it, but also by the general public. After its appearance other books on the Manchurian question went out of favour and translations of the Report were in great demand.[52]. When the first violence of the press attack died down, careful criticism began to appear, and many readers became more willing to admit that, though not without faults, it was a unique document, a serious attempt to present an honest judgement on a complex political issue.

The Japanese militarists and their supporters in the government tried, by fair means or foul, to defend their actions in Manchuria with arguments of such doubtful validity and ambiguity that they succeeded in giving the impression that they had absolutely no case at all. It might be worthwhile at this stage to examine briefly the contentions of the Japanese in Manchuria.

Taking first their objections to the Report as a diplomatic document, objections which for the most part can be summarily dismissed, we find that the points that give most offence were the assertions that the military measures taken in September of 1931 exceeded the legitimate needs for self-defense and the assertion that Manchukuo was, in fact, a puppet state, formed by the Japanese themselves and not by the people of Manchuria. These assertions whatever dialectic may be used in their rebuttal, contain truth enough to have made them highly unpalatable to the Japanese, who, having chosen to base their cause upon a fiction,were indignant in inverse proportion to their innocence. But they had other and more legitimate criticisms to level at the Report. They contended that it dislayed throughout a bias in favour of China. It is difficult to prove this contention by citing from the text. Indeed, the Report shows traces of an effort, almost a strain, on the part of the writers, to be fair and sympathetic to both sides. But even an unprejudiced non-Japanese reader feels an underlying note of disproval for Japan and a preference for China. Perhaps this discrimination is due to some fundamental harmony of temperment between Chinese and Europeans; perhaps it arose from irritation cause by inane spying and restraints from which the Commission suffered at the hands of the Japanese in Manchuria; or, again, it may be that the Chinese made a better impression because even in their mendacity they are more frank and open than the Japanese. Whatever the reason, the difference is there. Another objection to the Report was its economic sections, and in particular its study of the boycott. This section is quite inadequate and criticism by the Japanese seems to be justified. The parts in question do not come up to the standard of the remainder, and they contain some judgements which it would be difficult to support.

However, the true reasons for the hostility to the Report lay deeper than what is written on its pages. The differences are to be found in the sentiment of Japan in the 1930's and the principles for which the League of Nations stood for.

An explanation of Japan's policy in the 1930's might read like the following: The League was formed after the European war by fatigued nations wishing for peace. Having parcelled out so much of the world as was at their disposal, they desired to preserve their strength and their property. Their ideal was the maintenance of the status quo, the strong powers to remain strong, the weak to remain weak. Fear and exhaustion dictated this policy as much as the genuine desire for peace. But Japan could not accept the doctrine that a young and vigourous nation must remain content with what is possesses, in a state of arrested growth. The League professed that if we being our troubles to it, they will be solved. However, during the years following the Great War, Japan saw nothing to encourage them to put their trust in the League, a body which had failed to solve any of the major problems of Europe, be they political or economical, and yet, the League attempted to teach the Japanese how to conduct their affairs in the Orient. The Japanese resented the assumption of superior knowledge and moral arrogance of the League Commission, and especially they disliked the credulity with which the League listened to the professions of the Chinese. How could Japan believe the repeated promises of the League Powers in Europe to disarm when their actions only indicated the contrary. The Japanese were further exasperated by the fact that having attained major power status she was excluded from equal status. At the Versailles Conference it was Japan who had insisted on the insertion of a declaration of racial equality into the Charter of the League of Nations, this was denied her (particularly at the insistance of Australia) and since then her goods and people had been excluded. Such then was the general feeling in Japan at the time of the Lytton Report.

However, having examined the Japanese point of view, one wonders how they would defend their own government who did, to say the least, give an extremely convenient interpretation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The League of Nations did, it is true, demonstrate with convincing clearness the danger of war involved in the Manchurian dispute, but it did little to promote peaceful feelings between the parties involved. But, no matter how difficult was the League's task, no matter how much its methods stood open to criticism, what remains true is that the League stood or peace, for reconciliation and for collective responsibility. However, these were ideals to which the Japanese Government nor the people had travelled far along the road of internationalism, nor had they a strong a distaste for war as they have now. All the arguments of the League fell on deaf ears in Japan for she had not the bitter experience which the European Powers had gained from the Great War, and warefare seemed more like an

[52] It did, in fact, become a best seller in Japan.

adventure rather than a tragedy[53]. Perhaps another reason for Japan's attitude at this time was the fact that there was no influential body of liberal, critical opinion. There was liberal thought, there were even many shades of subversive thought, but it was inert, it rarely got translated into open speech, much less into action.

But it is a curious aspect of the Japanese psychology that even after the Mukden Incident when her foreign policy was reaping the condemnation of the world, her only answer was to tell herself that she was right and her judges wrong. To strengthen this conviction, she built up the fiction that her acts had resulted from the purest of motives which the nations of the world willfully misunderstood. And the more they disapproved, the more adamant grew Japans conviction that she was right. This feeling of righteousness, and its corollary of being misunderstood, found daily expression in the speech and press of the country. Besides being misunderstood, Japan accused other nations of not showing sincerity. She accused the Lytton Commission of insincerity when that body went so far "as to charge Japan with occupying Chinese territory,"[54]. with its implied horror at the very accusation of ever having occupied Chinese territory, as if it were an act of which Japan had never dreamed. One asks oneself to what purpose the Japanese believed could be served by such an obvious pretense. The answer is that to the Japanese it was not a pretense. So completely divorced is the Japanese mental process from the Occidental, so devoid of what Westerners know as logic, that the Japanese are able to make statements knowing full well they present a false picture but sincerely believing them. How this mental process is accomplished is impossible to understand, much less explain; but a clue to this paradox might be found in the Western idea of "keeping appearances." Thus, for a Japanese, appearances mean more than reality. As fact mean little, should one be forced to face certain unacceptable facts, he will ignore them and pretend that they do not exist.

It is this ability to disregard fact without feeling any sense of inconsistency which allowed the Japanese to make statements like the following on making the decision to leave the League of Nations: "Japan has been a constant supporter of the League and her membership in it has been a powerful factor in maintaining peace in the Far East and on the Pacific."[55]. This is not hyprocricy, it is merely the inability to put oneself in the position of ones opponant. It is, in fact, tantamout to saying; "I am right and you are wrong and whatever you say won't change my opinion."

Because their mental processes are not alike, Japan and the West find diplomatic intercourse a difficult matter; and what augments this difficulty is the fact that, from the foreign point of view, the Japanese have no understanding of the word "negotiate." Negotiation between two Western states is the mutual attempt to approach common ground; its essence is compromise. But the concept of compromise was quite foreign to the Japanese. To them, diplomatic negotiation meant the effort of each national representative to put over his own plan intact, the end in view being that one shall win and the other lose The London Naval Conference of 1936 was an illustration of Japanese determination to obtain parity or nothing; the Japanese were not prepared to yield a single ton, regardless of what was proposed. They were so inflexible that they finally withdrew, having contributed nothing to the Conference and having gained nothing for themselves.

The indignation at which the Lytton Report dared accuse Japan goes back to the Meiji Period (1868) when the Japanese made up their minds that the only way to end an unequal association with the West would be to adopt themselves to the civilization of the West as they had done with China centuries ago. They suceeded, but at a cost of part of their own integrity, for now the Japanese live under a system that is not their own, it is an imitation of American and European culture which is incompatible with the Japanese psychology and temperament.

Despite the enormous amount of work carried out by the League Commission, Japan's departure from the League of Nations negated all its efforts and glaringly showed that the principle of collective security just didn't work. Neither Britain, nor France, the two powers which dominated the League, were prepared to apply sanctions, either economic or military, against Japan without the active support of the United States. In this respect, there was no indication that the United States was prepared to offer support of any sanction; in fact, she was oposed to the application of even economic santions which she regarded as a "step to war."[56]. The United States was hostile to any measures against Japan which directly involved her, other than those relating to adverse public opinion and the official non-recognition of conquests or settlements achieved by other than peaceful means. Nevertheless, the hopes of the United States of strengthening the Japanese moderates by adopting a passive policy was soon shown to be unsound as a solution to the crisis by the following sequence of events. Paradoxically, its principal effect was to encourage the Japanese militarists. Needless to say, in the eyes of the United States, Japanese machinations in Manchuria were a flagrant violation of treaties and, more than anything else, represented a real threat to the whole structure of peace. However, at this time, the United States, or for that matter, all of the Western nations, did not consider war against Japan as the proper solution. With the memories of the Great War still fresh, neither the League nor the United States, or even the two together, were prepared to take steps to bring a halt to Japanese expansion and, as on a previous occasion in 1915, the integrity of China was not preserved by reassertion of the non-recognition doctrine.

It is a moot point that a punitive war conducted jointly by the great powers of the West might have eventually succeeded in crushing Japan, compelled her to observe her treaty obligations,

[53] For Japan's pittance of assistance during W.W.I., (about 1,000 casulties) she gained a leasehold on Tsingtao and the German mandated Marshall Islands.

[54] Gaigo Jiho (Revue Diplomatique) Tokyo Journal. Aug. 1935.

[55] Jiji (Current Affairs) a noe defunct Tokyo Journal. 1935.

[56] U.S. State Department. "The Far East" Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931. Vol. III. pp. 494-496.

and forced her to withdraw from Manchuria. However, such a war would have been extremely costly to the West both in terms of manpower and gold and would have entitled sacrifices far greater than the Western Powers were prepared to make at that time for the reasons mentioned previously. The West's refusal to use military force against Japan, was, besides the fear of repeating the slaughter of the First World War, brought about by the fact that the whole world during the period 1931-32 was in the depths of an economic depression of the first magnitude; thus, none of the Powers was prepared to embark on a policy which would only further aggravate the economic distress in their own country. Further, even had the great powers within League been willing to impose sanctions upon Japan, they would have probably deterred from carrying out such a policy by the knowledge that the United States was not a member of the League and would not participate in such sanctions. Finally, it is most probable that in the years 1931-33, no Western nation was sufficiently interested in Manchuria to resent Japan's conquests, much less wage war to prevent them. Japan, on the other hand, had chosen her time well. She was convinced that, though the world might use fair or vigourous words against her, it would oppose her with neither economic nor military sanctions. In the light of subsequent events, Japan's judgement proved to be sound. Collective security as an effective weapon shown in the light of the Manchurian Crisis proved to be wanting.

The failure to enforce collective security on behalf of China was, as history has shown a fateful blunder and no doubt started the train of events that led to the Pacific War. It is obvious now that the appeasement of Japan, just as the appeasement of Germany, did not deter the two from further acts of aggression. If only the great powers, including the United States, had resorted to an economic and financial boycott, supported, if necessary, by the might of their combined navies, Japan would have eventually suffered economic collapse, her military leaders would have been discredited, and she would have been forced to withdraw from Manchuria. Had these measures been carried out, it would have secured a great triumph for collective security and would have further served as a warning to other would-be aggressors that their plans for conquest would be met by the combined forces of the League of Nations. However, by the inaction of the League in the face of Japan's aggression, the world's faith in collective security weakened, spelt the end of the League and encouraged other aggressors to embark on their plans for world domination. In the light of the events of September 18, 1931, one can trace the pattern of events which resulted in the discarding of understanding and cooperation amongst nations for the common good in favour of a policy of force, not designed for purposes of self-protection, but for openly acknowledged aggression upon weaker and less fortunate nations. It was the Manchurian Crisis and the subsequent events that definitely spelt the end of the Leagaue of Nations and the concept of collective security. True, the ideals of collective security are fostered by the United Nations today, but the pattern is still similar to the League of Nations; that is to say, as long as France and Britain dominated the League, no other power dared advocate collective action against them.

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